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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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2 August 1984

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INTERNATIONAL

EL SALVADOR: THE ARMY IN THE RULING BLOC

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 pp 17-30

[Article by M. L. Chumakova]

[Text] The urgent problems of the Salvadoran revolution, the basic stages and particular features in the unification process of the leftist forces and the questions of the strategy and tactics of the FNOFM-RDF have been widely taken up in the Soviet press and, in particular, on the pages of the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA.¹ However, for a fuller understanding of the events occurring in the nation and the balance of class forces which has changed in the course of the Civil War, it is essential in more detail to examine the ideological and political strategy of the ruling classes and to bring out the basic components in the mixed coalition which comprises the ruling bloc and united by a desire at any price to suppress the rebel movement and prevent the victory of the revolutionary organizations and the appearance of a "second Nicaragua" in the region.

The Preventive Coup of 15 October 1979

The rise in the democratic and revolutionary movement which started in El Salvador in 1977 and was accelerated by the effect of the victory of the Sandinista revolution caused alarm in the nation's ruling circles. Under the conditions of the increased economic and sociopolitical crisis of the regime and the development of the unitary process in the revolutionary and democratic movement, particular importance was assumed by the position of the army which had traditionally played an extraordinarily important role in the Salvadoran political system. Its representatives became active participants in the ideological-political and armed struggle around the basic alternatives for emerging from the crisis: revolutionary, reformist and counterrevolutionary.

The processes occurring in the civilian society--the radicalization of the demands of the masses, the increased activities of the military-political revolutionary organizations and the growth of antidictatorial attitudes--naturally also influenced the army which went through a certain shock after the defeat of the Somoza National Guard. As a consequence of the growing dissatisfaction among the junior officers with the corruption reigning in the military-bureaucratic circles and with the ineffective activities of the higher military command, a movement of "young officers" began and on 15 October 1979 this overthrew the regime of Gen Romero. The crisis of confidence which characterized the political relationships of the government with various social organizations

and the desire of the Carter Administration to rely in the region on more respectable regimes in order to prevent the growth of the revolutionary wave there made it easier for the "young officers" to carry out the preventive coup. They proclaimed a policy of reform and democratization in order to prevent El Salvador from following the "Nicaraguan path."²

The reformist current in the army was headed by Cols A. Majano (who represented the radical fraction of the officers) and A. Gutierrez (who adhered to more moderate views and certain contacts with American diplomats). The Permanent Council of the Armed Forces which was organized by the "young officers" at first acted as the superior body of power. Under its leadership the first ruling junta was established and its members included representatives from the centrist and left-of-center parties which supported the program of changes proclaimed by the "young officers." However, the plans proposed, like the measures to democratize the nation, met fierce resistance from the oligarchy and the reactionary officers and also did not obtain support from the revolutionary forces.

The political activities of the upper bourgeoisie during the first weeks after the coup were paralyzed. The reactionary military upper clique assumed the role of the chief opponent of the reforms announced by the "young officers" and the first junta. Being closely tied to business circles and the security service and controlling the activities of the paramilitary organizations, this group undertook emergency measures to restore the unity of the armed forces. This concerned primarily the Permanent Council. Even 6 weeks after the coup, the predominant influence of the reformist officers had been neutralized by the group of rightist military. As a result of reorganizing the council, 80 percent of its members were supporters of the representatives of the army's reactionary wing and headed by the Minister of Defense and State Security J. G. Garcia who kept this post after 15 October. And precisely he immediately resumed the policy of repression.

The Collapse of the Reformist Plan

The punitive actions of the army, the police and the security forces continued in spite of the course proclaimed by the "young officers" of political liberalization and the terror of the ultra-rightist bands did not abate. The repressive machine of the bourgeois state continued to operate during the period of rule of the first junta: from 17 October 1979 through 3 January 1980.³ The withdrawal of the democratically-inclined leaders and the break-up of the junta meant the collapse of the first attempt to carry out the reformist plan.

In January 1980, a second junta was formed with the participation of the Christian Democrats. However, this did not exist long due to the sharp opposition of the ultra-right. The withdrawal from the junta of the Christian Democrats who supported liberal views led to a new variation of an alliance of the military with the Christian Democrats, this time with the participation of the CDP leader Napoleon Duarte. This government existed for 2 years, from March 1980 through March 1982, until the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The military-Christian Democratic partnership was entrusted with the task of carrying out the repressive reformist model for bringing the country out of the crisis in the aim of preventing the victory of the revolutionary alternative.

The CDP theoretical model was designed at carrying out reforms, halting the repression and an alliance with the "young officers"; it aimed at the support of the United States and the international Christian Democratic movement. However, in practice the CDP leaders became the henchmen of the reactionary officers and assisted in consolidating the regime which existed in the country. The attempts at carrying out economic reforms clashed with the resistance of the oligarchy and at the same time came under fierce criticism from the revolutionary-democratic forces for their limited nature. The gap between the demagogic appeals of the Christian Democrats for a society of social justice and the reality of the growing scale of terror and violence constantly increased. Actual political power remained in the hands of the military command while the Christian Democrats gave merely the appearance of a democratic facade to the authoritarian political system.

The army upper clique had close economic and social ties with the oligarchy, the new industrial bourgeoisie and the state sector of the economy and this the Christian Democrats could not boast of. The reforms carried out by them on the spot encountered the resistance of the military authorities, the police and the ORDEN militarized organizations. The murdering of agrarian reform specialists, peasant activists and participants in the human rights movement alternated with punitive actions by the army against the rural population suspected of contacts with the guerrillas.

In army circles there was a widespread cautious and mistrustful attitude toward the Christian Democrats since during the period of the 1972 and 1977 electoral campaigns they had allied themselves to the opposition forces. For this reason it was not surprising that the reforms proposed by the CDP to the reactionary officers and the representatives of the rightist parties seemed too radical and even "pro-communist." In the opinion of the leftist forces, the reforms of the Christian Democrats were merely a "political maneuver" and were not sufficient for resolving the urgent problems. In other words, the reformist plan actually was without any political and social basis for its implementation. Its support was limited to groups of government officials, the Salvadoran Cooperative Union and an insignificant number of trade unions.

The collapse of the Christian Democrat plans was also brought about by the resistance of the agrarian oligarchy and the upper bourgeoisie who employed methods of economic sabotage and resorted to attacks on the reform policy citing the negative consequences of the agrarian changes. These same forces financed the activities of the ultra-right groups which persecuted and terrorized the representatives of the democratic community and progressive figures from the state institutions. The collapse of the reform policy was accelerated by the process of the radicalization of the masses, by the unifying of the leftist revolutionary organizations and by the initiating of an armed struggle against the anti-popular regime.

Under the conditions of the growing civil war, the military-Christian Democrat government more and more widely employed methods of state terrorism. The importance of repressive elements in the policy of the authorities constantly grew. Actions of genocide more and more often were camouflaged by an unruly propaganda campaign which sought to persuade the Salvadorans that the rebels were adventurists, people without ideals endeavoring to initiate a fratricidal

war. Here the reforms carried out in the country were demagogically called a revolution and contrasted to the process of changes in Nicaragua.⁴

The mass influencing of the public in the aim of creating a negative attitude toward the rebels was supplemented by a series of harsh measures to combat strikes and antigovernment demonstrations. The Christian Democrats showed somewhat unusual activity in issuing acts and decrees of a repressive nature which provided a legal basis for new reprisals against the revolutionary and democratic movement. In 1980-1981, basic civil liberties were nullified and the provisions of the criminal and criminal procedure codes were revised in such a manner that any manifestations of the opposition came under the action of the articles dealing with "terroristic acts." Trade unions were banned for a number of worker categories, many trade union centers were broken up and collective contracts cancelled. In addition, under the conditions of the state of seige, public services and certain industrial enterprises were militarized and this led to the halting of strikes. In accord with the new extraordinary laws, control over the court bodies was transferred to the armed forces and this made arrest without charges and the use of torture a customary practice. In the aim of suppressing the actions by secondary school students, a passport system was introduced for children and juveniles from 10 to 18 years of age.⁵

Thus, the legislative activities of the Christian Democrats helped to harden the regime, to strengthen the policy of state terrorism for reprisals against the opposition forces and to further militarize the nation's political system.

Revenge of the Rightists in the Army

Under the conditions of the civil war, in the officer ranks there was a gradual regrouping of forces in favor of the extreme right wing. In this process an important role was played by the informal ties between the members of the officer corps which numbered over 700 men and had obtained their education in the Higher Military School. The specific features of the social ties in the army circles which absorbed basically members of the middle class who wished to quickly grow with and improve their social status were determined by belonging to a certain graduating class or "tanda." Each graduating class has its own president and loyalty to him was judged significantly higher than loyalty to the army per se as an institution, without mentioning the patriotism of a citizen of one's country. The ties of friendship between the individual graduating classes created that fabric of social relationships in the army which ensured succession for the military dictatorship regime. It also gained additional strength from the complicity of the officers involved in smuggling operations, drug deals and the ubiquitous corruption.⁶

Along with these "horizontal" ties, there are also relations based upon the personal authority of a senior ranking officer and providing him with popularity among the junior personnel. For example, this was the nature of the popularity in the army of the leader of the "young officers" Col Majano prior to the coup. However, his activities in the junta and his appeals to change the military command, combat corruption and support reforms not only turned the higher leadership tied to the Romero dictatorship against him but also repelled the previously politically neutral military who feared disclosure related to their involvement in the repressive actions and membership in terroristic organizations. For

this reason Majano's attempts to put an end to the activities of the ultra-right group failed. Disregarding the ban, ORDEN continued to function and this brought together around 100,000 reservists in rural localities; there also were such terroristic groups as FALANGE, the Union of the White Army and the Hernandez Martinez Brigade. The retired major of the security services Roberto d'Aubuisson who had been arrested upon Majano's orders was quickly put at liberty under the pressure of the pro-fascist officers. The liberation of this conspirator who was well known for his ties to rightist extremist groups and had taken part in preparations for the murder of Archbishop Arnulfo Romero was indicative of the change in the balance of forces in the army in favor of its extreme right wing.

Actually in May 1980, while remaining a junta member, Majano was removed from the command of the armed forces and this now was concentrated in the hands of Garcia, Vides Casanova and Carransa. The political weight and influence of these leaders from the pro-fascist wing of the army were determined not only by their position in the higher military hierarchy but also by the presence of close ties with the major state enterprises. Thus, Garcia for a number of years had controlled the National Telecommunications Agency (ANTEL) as its president. These connections were highly regarded in army circles since actually ANTEL was the center of military intelligence and the officers employed there were known for their contacts with the American corporation ITT.⁷

The greater influence of the pro-fascist current among the military and the increased conservative tendencies among the representatives of the upper bourgeoisie occurred in parallel with the process of the unifying of the leftist and democratic forces. This was evidence of a further polarization of class contradictions. The formation of FNOFM in October 1980, the founding of a single guerrilla army, the development of the people's war and the factor of international solidarity with the struggle of the Salvadoran revolutionaries--all of this strengthened the fears of the local bourgeoisie and encouraged a further development of reactionary trends among the officer corps which had been indoctrinated as a whole in a spirit of rightist nationalism and anticommunism.

In a desire to restore the unity of the armed forces, the army's upper clique undertook steps aimed against the "young officers" and initiated a campaign to discredit Majano. D'Aubuisson became the initiator of this and he initially accused Majano of belonging to the Mexican Communist Party. After the murder of five leaders of the RDF in November 1980, he tried to put the blame for this crime of the ultra-right onto Majano.⁸ Soon after this, in December 1980, the leader of the "young officers" was arrested and removed from the membership of the junta.

Thus, by January 1981, the balance of forces in the army had changed sharply in favor of the right. However, as the attempt at a revolt in the garrison in Santa Ana showed, among the armed forces there continued to exist a small patriotic wing which acted against their repressive function. At the same time, a predominant majority of the officer corps in the course of military operations against the FNOFM soldiers who still did not have sufficient experience, gained confidence in their professionalism. Deliveries of American military equipment helped the government troops repel the January guerrilla offensive and led to a

short period of euphoria in army circles. With the coming to power of Reagan and the significant increase in economic and military aid to El Salvador, the influence of the army and entrepreneur organizations on all aspects of social life grew stronger.

Under the conditions of the extraordinary laws in effect and the development of punitive operations by the troops and police, the Press Committee of the Armed Forces sharply increased its activities. This was the basic channel for disseminating official information and an instrument of psychological warfare aimed at "consolidating the nation and armed forces" for a struggle against the "leftist terrorists." The "information" of the committee was permeated with rabid anticommunism. The constant psychological influencing of the servicemen and the population combined with the punitive actions was aimed at depriving the FNOFM of a social base, driving the rebels from the cities or, in following the recommendations of the American military advisers who employed the terminology of Vietnam times, "taking the water away from the fish."

However, neither the psychological warfare against the revolutionary forces, the terror unleashed on the civilian population or the modern weapons supplied by Washington could help the government troops to drive the rebels into the peripheral regions of the country and deprive them of mass support. A series of brilliant operations by the FNOFM, the establishing of new guerrilla fronts and the undermining of the dictatorship's economic base by the rebels aroused new fears in the Salvadoran bourgeoisie and caused them to doubt the feasibility of the antiguerrilla army operations and to seek out methods for strengthening its influence on the government.

The Striking Arm of Counterrevolution

The oligarchic clans the interests of which had been jeopardized by agrarian reform, the entrepreneurial circles which were frightened by the scope of the rebel movement and had suffered losses from the economic sabotage tactics employed by the guerrillas and the numerous right extremist groupings endeavored to quickly passify the nation with an authoritarian stabilization at a price of "100,000 dead" recalling with nostalgia the bloody clash of 1932. The conservative oligarchy and the upper bourgeoisie were inclined to blame the "worthless politicians" from the Christian Democrats and the liberals of the U.S. Congress for everything. For quickly realizing the basic goals of the counter-revolution, that is, exterminating the leadership of the FNOFM-RDF, for destroying the guerrilla army and returning to the old order, the ruling classes of El Salvador needed a strong organization which combined the ability to mobilize its supporters from the ranks of the bourgeoisie with high mobility in conducting terroristic acts aimed at intimidating the public. The effectiveness of the military-political revolutionary organizations was also taken into account by the ultra-right groupings which were searching for a way to counter the FNOFM, endeavoring to remove its potential allies from the middle classes.

The upper bourgeoisie showed ever-greater political activity as the army and police demonstrated their inability to guarantee "order and stability." In the course of the civil war, with the decline in economic production, the interests of large capital were being put in jeopardy. The extreme conditions of the state of siege, the panic which seized the Salvadoran entrepreneurs and the

evermore militant tone of the statements by Reagan who promised the greatest possible support for the Salvadoran government--all of this encouraged a rapid search for an effective way to win complete political power and carry out the counterrevolutionary plan and establish an attack force which would be the bulwark of the counterrevolutionary forces.

For protecting its class interests, the Salvadoran bourgeoisie usually resorted to the corporative-type business organizations. Even in June 1980, soon after the formation of the United Revolutionary leadership, eight business organizations established the Production Alliance.⁹ This organization repeatedly proposed collaboration with the military-Christian Democrat junta and rejected the possibility of a dialogue with the FNOFM-RFD. In recognizing the lack of its political influence and without possessing proper control over the state apparatus and the army, the Salvadoran bourgeoisie began to establish its own military-political organization. For this reason it is no accident that from the autumn of 1981, on the political horizon of the nation there again appeared the figure of Maj d'Aubuisson who combined the popular image of a "hero officer" (it was not important that he was no combat officer but rather from the security service where for 9 years he had headed the investigatory department well known for the broad use of torture), the nationalist entrepreneur and long-awaited "strong personality." With good reason he was considered the student of the hero of the "soccer war" J. A. Medrano who was popular in conservative circles. The founding of the ultra-rightist terrorist organizations by d'Aubuisson, his subsequent formation of the Nationalist Republic Union (ARENA) and the eliminating of the traditional rightist parties from the political scene occurred under the conditions of the accelerated polarization of class forces and a tendency to unite different factions of the Salvadoran bourgeoisie.

An awareness of the need to establish a new party as an instrument for winning political power grew stronger as it became clear that for Washington it was much easier to continue providing all-round aid to the government which was fighting "communist guerrillas" if its coming to power was concealed by a "figleaf" of "elections." ARENA became such a party. A crucial role in the strengthening of ARENA was played by the support of the large Salvadoran bourgeoisie which had moved to Miami during the difficult times of the civil war. The psychological fatigue which was growing among various categories of the population and a longing for political and economic stability created the background against which the conservative attitudes developed.

Extreme rightist nationalism was a characteristic feature in the ideology of ARENA in expressing the aspirations of the bourgeoisie and the agent of counterrevolutionary plans. Everything that did not conform to the type of capitalist development existing in El Salvador was declared contradictory to the interests of the nation. At the same time, adherence to the principles of "national security" was declared and an individualistic spirit of private entrepreneurship was extolled. Militant anticommunism and extreme conservatism permeated all the program statements of d'Aubuisson and his supporters. Of the ten publications of ARENA in March 1982, five contained strong attacks on the reforms and four proved that the Christian Democrats were communists.¹⁰

In its propaganda activities, ARENA extensively employed political demonstrations, marches and meetings and in every possible way encouraged the spread of

rumors about its ties to the paramilitary organizations. Public appearances by the head of the party were always accompanied by the demonstrating of its military strength. D'Aubuisson appealed to his supporters as "comrades in arms." At the same time, he promised his support to the army in its struggle against "subversive elements." In endeavoring to win over the landowners whose interests had been jeopardized by agrarian reform or the middle-sized entrepreneurs, the Arenistas accused the Christian Democrats of "economic chaos," the "communitaristic" plans of whom, in their words, had led to a decline in production.

Thus, with the formation of ARENA, the ultra-right obtained an opportunity for systematically mobilizing its supporters. The growing dissatisfaction of the bourgeoisie and a portion of the middle strata with government policy was reflected on a level of ordinary awareness in a sympathy for ARENA as an opposition party. Also working for the party's popularity were the personal qualities of d'Aubuisson, his renown in the army and security forces and the aura of a hero acquired after the unsuccessful attempt on his life. The youth of the new leader also won him supporters.

ARENA was the only party which regularly conducted pre-election measures in those areas where the Christian Democrats and the traditional rightist parties did not risk appearing. The scale of the ideological effect and political influence of the ultra-right was apparent in the course of the elections of 28 March 1983, when ARENA received 29.3 percent of the votes,¹¹ thus becoming the strongest opponent of the Christian Democrats. This was a surprise for Washington the plans of which included a legitimization of the military-Christian Democrat union and not the appearance of the "pathological murderer Maj Bob" in the post of chairman of the Constituent Assembly. However, soon thereafter the Reagan Administration recognized the adjustments made by the Salvadoran neofascists in the initial scenario, including the formation of a coalition of ultra-rightist parties headed by d'Aubuisson.

The Restoration of the Military Dictatorship

Under the pressure of the American diplomatic representatives and special Reagan emissaries, in particular Gen Vernon Walters, d'Aubuisson somewhat reduced the anti-American tone of his speeches and agreed to form a coalition government of "national unity." "Help us to help you," was the dominant theme of Walter's talks with the representatives of the military command and the politicians and these ended with a temporary compromise between the military, the Christian Democrats, the traditional rightist parties and the Arenistas.¹²

On 2 May 1982, Alvaro Magana, one of the main advisors of the military dictatorship in the 1970's, became the provisional president of the nation.¹³ Actually there had been a restoration of the rightist authoritarian military regime which, in accord with the recommendations of American advisors, had been outfitted with certain attributes of "representative democracy." A new phase had begun in restoring the counterrevolutionary plan in which the decisive role was to be played by an external factor, that is, the increasing scale of U.S. economic and military aid and growing American intervention into the Salvadoran conflict.

In the bloc of counterrevolutionary forces which had come into being by the summer of 1982, the leading role was played by the military command and the radical right organizations. The right and ultra-right parties granted broad powers to the Constituent Assembly. Its activities were aimed at revising the decrees on the reforms adopted in 1980 and promulgating laws which would encourage the development of the private sector. Naturally, the anti-worker legislation, the decrees on the militarizing of public services and the bans on strikes by public officials, that is, all the counterrevolutionary measures adopted by the Christian Democrats were not repealed.

At the same time, the process of restoring the pre-reform orders was not so striking and the authorities, including the minister of defense, stated their intention to continue the changes.¹⁴ In the Aponeqsa Declaration (August 1982) signed by the President A. Magana and representatives of the Party of National Reconciliation, the CDP and ARENA, the basic elements of a program and the priorities of government policy were set out: the combating of the insurgency movement, the rebuilding of the economy undermined in the course of the civil war, and the creation of a better impression about the situation in the country overseas. The prime task of the counterrevolution--suppressing the armed struggle of FNOFM--was concealed in the program by promises of "democratization." A Permanent Commission set up under the Constituent Assembly was concerned, in following the example of the Uruguayan military, with working out a "chronogram" for future presidential elections and a series of measures to halt the "subversive activities," including an "amnesty" law for guerrillas and political prisoners as adopted in May 1983.¹⁵

The members of the counterrevolutionary bloc, while being united by a common strategic task of suppressing the rebel movement, differed over practical methods. The Christian Democrats continued to be in favor of socioeconomic reforms and some democratization as an important back-up for the repressive policy under the conditions of the civil war. The radical right, both in the army and in civilian society, wanted a hardening of the repression, a broadening of terror and joint counterinsurgency operations with the Honduran and Guatemalan armies. The complex interparty relations in the Constituent Assembly and the greater rivalry (based on personal ambition) in the upper army circles gave rise to new contradictions.

Proof of the unceasing differences and the growing struggle in the military command was the revolt of the chief of the battalion in Cabanas Department, Col Siegfried Occhoa in January 1983. Known for his ties with d'Aubuisson, Occhoa had demanded the retirement of the Minister of Defense, Garcia. Outright disobedience of orders from the army command by the rebel colonel did not entail punishment. Occhoa was given merely a "honorary" assignment to the Inter-American Defense Council in Washington. Three months later, in April 1983, Garcia retired.¹⁶ The reason for this, evidently, was the next defeat for the U.S.-trained Ramon Belloso Battalion which had suffered significant losses as a result of combat with the SNOFM in San Isidro. The post of minister of defense was assumed by Gen Vides Casanova who previously had been in command of the National Guard.¹⁷

The extreme sociopolitical conservatism, the pathological anticommunism, the ultra-right nationalism of the military command and the ARENA party, the unscrupulousness in the means and methods of reprisals against one's political opponents and the betting on a military solution for the crisis situation show that a neofascist tendency prevailed in the ruling circles of El Salvador. In endeavoring to keep their social privileges and not allow a victory of the revolution, the ruling classes, in relying on the unprecedented scale of military and economic aid from the Reagan Administration, are doing everything to strengthen the reactionary military dictatorship.

The Vietnamization of El Salvador

Under the conditions of the civil war, the leading role in realizing the goals of the counterrevolution is played by the army and the ultra-right terrorist organizations linked to the security service. In using the American military aid, the Salvadoran Command has hurriedly increased the potential of the armed forces. In 1982, in addition to the three previously existing brigades, another two were established and conscription for the army increased. Just from January 1981 through April 1982, as a result of seizure and enforced recruiting, 9,179 preinductees 15-17 years of age were recruited while the total number of the armed forces, including the police and security service, reached 34,000 men by the end of 1983.¹⁸

In 1982-1983, the new subunits of the Salvadoran Army underwent training in counterinsurgency methods in the United States and Honduras and special counterinsurgency battalions such as Atlaqatl, Ramon Belloso, Atonal and Cobra were organized. However, neither the increased size of the armed forces, the establishing of special battalions and "strategic hamlets" or the broadening of the "civilian actions" of servicemen who rebuilt bridges and roads led to a military predominance of the government forces over the FNOFM troops. The army losses increased year by year. Just from 1 July 1982 through 30 June 1983, more than 6,400 soldiers and officers were killed and wounded.¹⁹

As a rule, the large-scale operations aimed at driving the guerrillas out of the territories occupied by them ended in failure. In commenting on the offensive by the troop units in the area of Huasapa in the spring of 1983, the American magazine NEWSWEEK announced that as a result of this operation which had cost the government 5 million dollars, 100 civilians and 5 guerrillas had been killed, that is, the death of one guerrilla cost 1 million dollars.²⁰ Under the pressure of the demands of American military experts, the Salvadoran Command from May 1983 shifted from large operations to small raids by special groups of guerrilla "hunters" and in San Vicente Department endeavored to carry out an extensive pacification program which combined punitive actions with civil actions in the hope of regaining the initiative from the guerrillas and isolating them from the population. However, the change in the tactics by the regime's troops and the use of Vietnamese experience by them did not lead to results expected by the upper clique.

The brilliant operations of the FNOFM at Ilopango Airport, the blowing up of the Golden Bridge, the occupying of a number of major population points and the capturing of the deputy minister of defense and national security, Col Adolfo Castillo, show the increased combat capability of the guerrillas and the high political awareness of the men and commanders. In contrast to the growing

tendency for better coordination between the individual guerrilla fronts, in the government troops one can see a decline in discipline and more frequent instances of desertion and surrender.²¹ In knowing the humane attitude of the insurgents toward prisoners of war, the soldiers prefer to surrender and not oppose the FNOFM detachments.

In favoring a political solution to the Salvadoran crisis, the FNOFM-RDF leaders at the same time are not halting combat operations. The military successes of the guerrillas are strengthening their positions in talks with the representatives of the government peace commission. Thus, in the autumn of 1983, the insurgents conducted a number of successful operations within the campaign "independence, democracy and freedom for El Salvador" during which around 1,700 soldiers and officers of the government troops were killed and wounded and 181 were captured, including the commander of the Cobra Battalion.²²

The Salvadoran revolutionaries in waging a heroic armed struggle against the criminal regime are well aware of the evil role of the Reagan Administration in supporting it and recognize the danger of a unification of the reactionary military on a regional scale in line with the revival of the Central American Defense Council and the increased threat of direct American intervention after the U.S. aggression against Grenada. In response to this barbarian action of American imperialism, the Salvadoran insurgents in November 1983 in Cabanas Department initiated a military operation "Yankees, Out of Grenada and Central America."²³

Neither the massed American aid and threat of outright intervention nor the new maneuvers of the Salvadoran Pinochets who are attempting to pacify the nation by unrestrained terror and acts of genocide are capable of suppressing the will of the Salvadoran revolutionaries and democrats and their determination to fight with weapons in hand for the freedom and independence of their motherland.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 8, pp 5-22; No 12, pp 5-20; 1982, No 7, pp 23-36, 118-131; 1983, No 5, pp 40-51.

² ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS, San Salvador, 1982, No 403-405, p 546; T. Sue Montgomery, "Revolution in El Salvador. Origins and Evolutions," Boulder, 1982, p 14.

³ ESTA SEMANA. EL SALVADOR EN NOTICIAS, San Salvador, 1981, No 23, p 2.

⁴ ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS, 1982, No 403-404, p 472; 1981, No 387-388, p 93.

⁵ Ibid., 1980, No 384-385, p 993; 1982, No 403-404, pp 551, 553.

⁶ "U.S. Policy Toward El Salvador. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives 97th Congress, I Session, 1981, March 5-11," Washington, 1981, p 194; R. Armstrong and J. Shenk, "El Salvador: The Face of Revolution," Boston, 1982, p 160.

- ⁷ J. Pearce, "Under the Eagle. U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean," London, 1982, pp 221, 234, 243.
- ⁸ ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS, 1980, No 386, p 1212.
- ⁹ Ibid., 1982, No 403-404, p 457.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., p 460.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 1982, No 405, p 707.
- ¹² THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 April 1982; ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS, 1982, No 405, p 707.
- ¹³ According to certain data, Walters gave the generals who were completely unable to reach a common opinion some 15 minutes to name the new head of the government.
- ¹⁴ JOURNAL DE GÈNÈVE, 6 August 1982.
- ¹⁵ VENCEREMOS, 1983, No 15, p 14.
- ¹⁶ GRANMA, Havana, 19, 23 April 1983.
- ¹⁷ R. Armstrong and J. Shenk, op. cit., p 233.
- ¹⁸ ESTUDIOS CENTROAMERICANOS, 1982, No 403-404, p 434; BARRICADA, Managua, 12 April 1982; THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 13-14 August 1983.
- ¹⁹ U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Washington, 22 August 1983, p 20.
- ²⁰ NEWSWEEK, New York, 1983, No 17, p 32.
- ²¹ EL SALVADOR. SEÑAL DE LIBERTAD, 1982, No 20, p 4; VENCEREMOS, 1983, No 15, p 15.
- ²² GRANMA, 27 September 1983; 17 October 1983.
- ²³ Ibid., 1 November 1983.

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INTERNATIONAL

LAND PROBLEM CAUSES 'SOCIAL CONFLICTS' IN BRAZIL

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 pp 31-42

[Article by V. B. Reznikov: "Social Conflicts in Brazilian Countryside"]

[Text] The specific features of the agrarian question in Brazil are determined not only by the diversity of the socioeconomic and political tasks which inevitably must be come to grips with in solving it but by the uniqueness of its evolution over time and the differences between the economic regions of the nation. The agrarian problem has its roots in the distant past. To a certain degree even now the migrating of the peasantry into the new development areas is complicated by the survival of many mutually contradictory property laws a portion of which go back to even the beginning of the colonial era. The concentration of power in the hands of the large landowners, the weak political activity of the broad masses of rural workers and the enormous dimensions of the national territory are merely certain aspects of the agrarian question in Brazil which determine the sphere of state activities in this area.

The lack of progress in solving the agrarian problem was a question of particular acuteness when the military regime came to power in 1964. The struggle of the peasantry and the rural hired workers for carrying out a radical agrarian reform in the period preceding the seizure of power by the military confronted the Castello Branco government with the question of taking immediate measures to lessen the social tension in the countryside. Immediately after the coup, the leaders of the peasant movement were subjected to harsh repression, and primarily the activists in the peasant leagues, the leaders of the rural trade unions and the politicians who were in favor of agrarian reform. At the same time, under the pressure of individual bourgeois circles which were urging the employment of more flexible methods of rule and a reorientation to a policy of social maneuvering in relation to the workers, in November 1964, the "land statute" was adopted and this created opportunities for carrying out local agrarian reform by expropriating the unproductive estates in areas where social tension represented a real danger for the regime's stabilization.

However, regardless of all its limited nature, the given law remained just on paper, as its practical implementation directly touched the interests of one of the classes supporting the regime, the latifundistas. Instead of a radical agrarian reform and satisfying the demands of the broad masses of rural workers, the government set out to encourage large state, private and foreign capitalist enterprises. This policy carried out within the context of a "conservative

modernization" set a goal of reproducing capital by increasing agricultural production, expanding the fund of utilized land, colonizing the undeveloped areas and the limited granting of land to the migrant peasants. The basic emphasis was put on encouraging large capitalist farms and modernizing the production structure of the large estates. This led to the further concentrating of land ownership and income in the hands of the well-off minority.

The government's plan that the adopting of palliative measures would make it possible to lessen the social tension in the countryside and win authority among the peasant masses did not prove out. On the contrary, the struggle for land recently has grown so acute that, as has been emphasized in a statement of Brazilian sociologists who attended the third seminar on Latin American problems, the threat arose to the "stability of the entire sociopolitical system of Brazil."¹ The extreme acuteness of the question of land ownership is particularly apparent in the growing number of conflicts over this issue and in the stronger resistance of the rural workers to attempts made by the large landowners to seize the land worked by the peasants.

This problem goes far beyond the limits of the struggle between the landless peasants and the latifundistas since it most acutely reflects the basic contradictions in the development of capitalism in the Brazilian countryside. The national central press has constantly published comments on the land conflicts. Here attention is drawn to the fact that their number has steadily increased year by year. The results of research conducted by the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) show that this process has become particularly noticeable since 1970. Thus, while in 1971 there were 37 conflicts, in 1976 the figure was 126 and in 1981, their number had already risen to 257.² It is essential to bear in mind that the data given in the press deal only with the best known cases which comprise just 10 percent of the total number of such conflicts. Their distinguishing feature is the fierce nature manifested, in particular, in the large number of victims.

At present, in 13 states of the country there are up to 50 centers of social tension in the countryside. According to the data of the Pastoral Land Commission, by the end of 1981 some 916 land conflicts were registered involving 251,900 peasant families or 1,973,000 persons.³ On the territory of 21 states there are 1.2 million hectares of land for which the right to ownership has not been established and this can serve as the pretext for the occurrence of future land conflicts.

One of the basic reasons for the more active class struggle in the countryside is the increased concentration of land ownership. An analysis of data from the last agricultural census of 1980 shows that 50.4 percent of the nation's farms have an area up to 10 hectares each and they make up just 2.4 percent of the total area. At the same time, the 0.8 percent of the farms with an area over 1,000 hectares are responsible for 45.8 percent of all the lands.⁴

In parallel with the concentration of land ownership there has been a transformation of the land ownership relations. While in 1960, 28.1 percent of the peasants were not the owners of the land they worked and the farms occupied by them comprised 11 percent of the total territory of land holdings, in 1980, these indicators equaled, respectively, 35.8 and 13.7 percent.⁵ Practically this has

meant that over one-half of the small peasants worked lands not belonging to them. Moreover, a comparison of the data from the 1970 and 1980 agricultural censuses shows that over this period there was a relative decline in the number of farms of owners, renters and metayers, and the total area of private farms remained almost fixed.

At the same time, the number of farms of "posseiros" peasants, that is, farmers who had occupied the empty sections of private or state lands and worked them without the right of formal ownership (at present, there are around 1 million such farmers), over the designated period increased by approximately 13.3 percent while the area of land worked by them rose by 40 percent.⁶ Here is one of the most important reasons for the constant increase in the number of land conflicts. With 5.2 million farms in the nation, 17.4 percent of them belong to the "posseiros" who have no right to own the land worked by them. If it is considered that in a number of areas in the nation the share of farms worked by this category of peasants is up to 50 percent, then it becomes clear why the struggle for land has assumed such an exceptionally acute nature. In recent years, land conflicts have spread even to the typically minifundistas states. Thus, just from August through December 1981, in the state of Santa Catarina, there were 12 conflicts involving 2,290 peasant families, in Sao Paulo 2 conflicts (94 families) and in the state of Parana 3 conflicts (17 families).⁷

The development of capitalism in Brazilian agriculture has been characterized by a fundamental breaking up of production relations and this in different regions of the nation has occurred differently and often assumed dramatic forms. One of the consequences of this process has been the decline in the size of the rural population. This is explained by a whole series of economic and social factors: the first of their group is related to the modernizing of agricultural production and a corresponding reduction in employment and the second to the mass ruination of the small peasant farms occurring both as a result of the discriminatory state price and credit policy and to the "overpopulation" of the countryside.

The growth of the mass migration of the peasantry to the city, along with the increased number of very small farms and the combining of the labor of small producers on their plot with hired labor on other farms, the small tradesmen, trade and so forth, is one of the most important features in the proletarianization of the rural workers. However, under the conditions of Brazil, this process has had an explosive nature, since the city has an extremely small capacity to absorb the manpower of the ruined and expropriated peasants. The growing unemployment in the large cities has led to a mass reverse migration of rural natives to their homes and this has helped to exacerbate the existing land conflict and to increase the tension in the peripheral regions of the nation.

As the large estates are further transformed as new capitalist farms are organized and the existing ones expanded, the sphere of small commodity production is dropping. Either it is integrated into the agroindustrial complex or moves to less developed regions of the nation or is destroyed as a result of direct proletarianization. However, in today's Brazil the process of the proletarianization of the small producers has a whole series of particular features. In the countryside capitalism has developed in breadth and in depth but the peasantry

expelled from their lands here are not always turned into proletarians. The presence of extensive areas in the peripheral regions of the country and the relative cheapness of the land have caused a spontaneous migration of the peasantry with little land to the border areas. This started long before the proclamation of a governmental policy of colonization and hardly keeps within the limits of the state's economic policy.

The decision to colonize undeveloped areas, chiefly in the Amazon, was taken by the military government virtually immediately after it came to power. One of the basic tasks for the colonization policy was to ensure the emigration of the surplus manpower in the northeast of the nation and to mitigate the social tension in this area. The apportioning of the free lands in the Amazon was an alternative to agrarian reform. However, the reorganization of agriculture in the new regions of the nation along the lines of "conservative modernization" soon led to an extremely uneven distribution of land ownership and this, as in the other regions of the nation, was the reason for the deepening of social conflicts which in a number of instances developed into armed clashes between the migrant peasants and the large landowners.

The basic participants in the land conflicts are the latifundistas, the medium and small farmers, the "posseiros," the Indians and the representatives of the state bodies and the TNC [transnational corporation] which have concession on these territories. Most often the clashes occur between the "posseiros" and the owners of livestock farms. These owners usually possess all of the necessary means for carrying out a court investigation and can pressure the officials in order to enlist their support in clearing out the landless presence from "disputed" areas. At the same time, to avoid paying them compensation for the labor invested in the given area, the large landowners frequently resort to the violent driving out of the "posseiros."

The "posseiros" suffer just as much from the activities of the professional land speculators or "grileiros" who employ an entire arsenal of methods for the violent expropriation of the landowners. Recently the "grileiros" have employed legal pressure in their own interests. Thus, according to the existing legislation, in the event of a conflict the state bodies ban the use of the disputed area and oblige the conflicting parties to leave it until the courts can determine the true owner. By conniving and bribery of officials (there have been instances when the lawyers hired by the "grileiros" have received remuneration in the form of a third or even a half of the area of the disputed land) the land speculators usually succeed in proving their right of ownership. After this, the corresponding measures are taken against the "posseiros" as violators of the law.

One of the important reasons for the exacerbation of land conflicts in the new agricultural regions, in particular in the Amazon, is the imperfect legislation on granting land ownership rights. The absence of such laws with the actual occupation and working of a land plot is determined by the term "posse" ("possession" in Portuguese; hence "posseiro"). One of the arguments which many small farmers follow in settling on free private or state lands not belonging to them is that according to the law they have the right to gain ownership of the plots worked by them after a certain time. At the same time, if the "posseiros" does not secure the agreement of the legal owner of the land (be it a private

person or the state), then they are considered violators of the law. Precisely this circumstance is one of the contradictions in the existing agrarian legislation.

The more intense struggle for land has also been influenced by the policy of encouraging large private investments for carrying out the governmental plan to colonize the Amazon. This began to be carried out from the mid-1970's and was accompanied by the mass sale of unused state land to private hands. Here the maximum amount of territory which could be sold to one person has substantially increased: while in 1964 this was 3,000 hectares, in 1976 it was 66,000 hectares for plowed land, 72,000 hectares for forests and 500,000 hectares for carrying out private colonization projects.⁸ At the same time that the large landowners had an opportunity to establish and expand their farms without obstacle, the "posseiros" on the contrary were forced to defend their rights even to the most insignificant plots of land. According to the official data, from 1970 through 1975, constantly new lands located chiefly in the states of Parana, Maranhao, Goias, Mato Grosso and on the territories of Rondonia and Amapa were appropriated by large landowners with the aid of mercenary bands. The owners of farms with an area over 1,000 hectares appropriated more than 20 million hectares, while the owners of small plots with an area under 50 hectares over this same period lost 900,000 hectares.⁹ These figures again show that the policy of colonization held a subordinate position in relation to the agrarian policy corresponding to the interests of the large capitalist agricultural enterprises.

The sociopolitical situation in the new development territories has been characterized by the illegal seizure and sale of free lands, by armed clashes between the "posseiros" and the hired bands of the latifundistas, by the spontaneous and uncontrolled migration of peasants from the populous regions of the nation as well as by growing poverty, unemployment, crime and, finally, a constant military presence established from the times of the so-called "guerrilla de Araguaia"¹⁰ and which also can be viewed in the context of the military regime's policy aimed at subordinating the "posseiros" peasants as a social category to the authorities.

The tragedy of the "posseiros" is that capitalist expansion has basically been carried out on their lands. This involves their primary expropriation and driving off from the territories they worked. The large entrepreneurs have an ambiguous attitude toward the presence of this category of small producers on the territory of their farms. On the one hand, they are interested in having the "posseiros" sell their surplus agricultural products at low prices and thereby help to supply food products for the local urban population. On the other hand, the existence of the "posseiros" makes it impossible for them to receive rent since the fact that these peasants lack official documents showing possession of the land does not allow the latifundistas to resolve this question legally. Thus, the basic form of obtaining rent comes down to the buying and selling of the plots of land worked by the "posseiros" peasants and this, naturally, causes their growing resistance and contributes to a further exacerbation of social tension.

Prior to the completion of the highways carried out within an ambitious and uncompleted project for national integration and which was proclaimed by the government of Gen Medici, land conflicts in the Amazon did not occur so often.

However, in 1975-1976, this area was responsible for around 60 percent of all the land conflicts in the nation.¹¹ One is struck by the fact that the total number and severity of the conflicts have increased as entrepreneurial activity has intensified. Thus, while in 1971-1972, only 8 percent of all the conflicts ended in human casualties, in 1976, their number was already 82 percent.¹²

As a result of the greater social tension the "posseiros" at present have turned into an important, although not the sole, force of the peasant movement. The struggle for radical agrarian reform now rests on a broader social base in comparison with the period which preceded the 1964 military coup. In addition to renters and metayers, the "posseiros" and even the small landowners are involved in it.

In the aim of maintaining the stability of the existing regime, the government has been forced to consider certain demands of the small producer in which it sees an additional manpower source as well as a supplier of cheap food products. The authorities, in particular, have carried out a number of measures to provide financial and technical aid to the small peasant owners. Thus, from 1980 through 1982, the government turned over more than 20 million hectares of land to the landless farmers¹³ chiefly by nationalizing the large unworked areas. For example, the lands belonging to the company of the American billionaire D. Ludwig which operated in the Brazilian Amazon, were distributed between 42,000 peasants.¹⁴ A new method in the agricultural policy of the Brazilian government is also a 68 percent increase in the minimum purchasing prices for agricultural products due to the officially recognized high growth rate of inflation.

However, all these measures have had little impact on the social status of millions of rural workers, having kept unchanged the extremely uneven structure of land ownership and this is one of the main reasons for the violence which has already become an attribute of life in the Brazilian countryside. Everyone who is in favor of revising the statutes and laws which reinforce the unjust distribution of land is subject to repression. The large landowners have acted against the lawyers who have favored a revision of the land ownership laws. Thus, since the beginning of 1980 through September of 1981, 4 lawyers and 36 peasant leaders who defended the rights of the "posseiros" to own land were murdered.¹⁵ These murders and other violent actions have remained virtually unpunished.

The social tension in the countryside has made the government evermore fearful. This, in particular, can be seen from the fact that the given question is viewed by it from the standpoint of "defending the interests of national security." As the land conflicts have developed, the role of the supreme arbiter more and more frequently has been carried out by the military authorities. The right to take decisions has moved gradually to the Section for land affairs under the national security council (CSN). This agency has become intensely involved in agrarian policy since 1975, outstripping the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) established in 1970 and given the appropriate powers. In addition to the border areas and sections adjacent to the federal highways, the jurisdiction of the CSN also extends to lands which are under the control of the INCRA and the National Indian Fund (FUNAI).

The next step in increasing the involvement of the military authorities in agrarian affairs was undertaken in 1980 when within the CSN two commissions were established for investigating land conflicts in the Amazon: the Executive Group for Land Affairs of Araguaia-Tocantins (GETAT), an area where the clashes had a particularly fierce nature, and the Executive Group for Land Affairs of the Lower Amazon (GEBAM) which included the territories to be distributed after nationalizing the above-mentioned company of the billionaire D. Ludwig (the Jari Project). Both these bodies were given broad powers making it possible to expropriate large plots of land with an area up to 50 hectares and to grant the right to their possession without preliminary permission from any superior organization. Actually the prerogatives of these executive groups go beyond the limits of those provided in the Land Statute.¹⁶ The handing over of such broad powers to resolve land conflicts to a repressive apparatus means the actual recognition of the ineffectiveness of the institutional system to resolve the agrarian problem of the nation.

The membership of the executive groups, in addition to representatives of the CSN, in truth, also includes representatives of the INCRA, of the governments of the states which come under the jurisdiction of the given executive groups and a prosecutor, a total of six persons. But still the establishing of these bodies leads to the legitimatization of military intervention in the aims of preventing further radicalization of the struggle for land and places obstacles on the path to a nationwide discussion of this problem.

The same aim was pursued by the organizing in 1982 of a special ministry for land affairs and although this is not formally under the CSN, nevertheless it maintains very close ties with this department. According to a statement of the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG), "the trade union movement has every justification to consider this decision by the government as a regular measure of a bureaucratic nature among a whole series of steps recently taken."¹⁷ CONTAG also considers the activities of GETAT also ineffective,¹⁸ considering that over the last 2 years the number of land conflicts occurring in the areas of its justification has substantially increased.

In attempting to find a way out of the developing situation, the military was forced to maneuver and adopt political and legal measures. One of these was the ratification on 11 December 1981 of the so-called "Law Governing Land Ownership." In accord with this, the "posseiros" peasants received the right to own the plot worked by them at the end of 5 years and not 10 years, as had been established previously in Article 93 of the "Land Statute." However, here the area of the plot should not exceed 20 hectares. One is struck by the fact that the given law was worked out by one of the CSN departments and was submitted for congressional approval personally by President Figueirado. This again confirms how much importance the government gives to settling conflicts over land ownership.

The effect of the adopted law extends only to those areas which do not come under the jurisdiction of the national security bodies. At present, such areas are considered to be the border zone and a band up to 100 km wide adjacent to the federal highways in the so-called "legal Amazon" (considering the highways under construction and even planned). The total area of the territory not falling under the effect of the given law is approximately 40,000 hectares. This

means that here the "posseiros" are deprived of any opportunity to acquire land for personal ownership.

The shortening of the period for granting the right of land ownership to 5 years is of definite positive significance. In the opinion of a number of Brazilian researchers, the adopting of the law on land ownership can lead to a greater struggle of the peasantry in various regions of the nation, since the "posseiros" will attempt to retain their lands for 5 years while the large landowners who are interested in freeing these lands prior to the end of the 5-year period will try to drive them off violently.

Thus, the government policy conducted by authoritarian methods is aimed merely at mitigating certain contradictions in the existing political system and reducing the further growth of tension but not at eliminating the prime causes of the land conflicts.

The struggle for land is being joined by ever-broader social forces among which a special place is held by the Catholic Church as well as the rural trade unions. The question of land conflicts was raised for the first time by the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) at a session held in Goiania in June 1975. In the final document, the socioeconomic policy of the government in the Amazon region was criticized and detailed information on many land conflicts was published for the first time. The dramatic situation in the countryside was disclosed most fully in the document "The Church and the Land Problem" adopted by the CNBB at the 18th General Assembly in February 1981.

The church has organized a special body, the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) which includes both religious leaders as well as representatives of the rural workers and lawyers. The tasks of the CPT include both providing the necessary consultation for the "posseiros" and explaining the rights to them as well as giving them effective aid in conflict situations. A merit of this body is, in particular, that it publicizes many facts which the authorities would prefer to overlook.

Recently, the government representatives had often accused the CPT of inciting the peasantry to "subversive" actions "causing harm to the state." The greatest publicity was given to the arrest on 1 September 1981 of two French priests in the southern part of the state of Para. They were accused of inciting the "posseiros" to seize land and to attack a GETAT vehicle as a result of which one person was killed and several wounded. It would be wrong to ascribe to the Catholic Church the role of the organizer of the struggle of the "posseiros" for land, however the fact cannot be denied that the support of the clergy gives it greater effectiveness.

CONTAG plays a significant role in defending the "posseiros" in their conflicts with the large landowners. The efforts of this trade union conference are aimed at becoming the true expressor of the interests of the rural workers, including the "posseiros." However, it has experienced significant difficulties caused by the relatively low level of syndicalization for this category of peasants. Moreover, additional complications are created by the fact that the association of rural workers includes both small producers and hired workers the interests of whom often are contradictory. While on the level of the

CONTAG leadership these specific interests are considered rather completely, in the local trade union organizations the existing differences continue to remain substantial. The establishing of a number of regional "posseiros" associations in the aim of a collective defense of their rights before the authorities has also been a consequence of the imperfect trade union structure. The tendency to join in their own organizations shows that the "posseiros" are beginning more and more to understand the hopelessness of a solitary struggle when confronted by such a powerful enemy as is large capital relying on all the power of the state.

Regardless of the scope of the struggle of the landless peasants for land, the possibilities of their actions are rather limited both due to the geographic isolation and cultural backwardness as well as due to insufficient organization. The peasantry cannot achieve the carrying out of agrarian reform independently. For this reason, under present conditions the success of their movement depends on the alliance between the different strata of the rural workers, the urban proletariat and the liberal representatives of the middle classes.

The recently established political parties do not pay sufficient attention to the peasant movement. As a result, a gap has formed between the peasant and political movements and this is apparent in the "vacuum of political representation for the peasantry." Since 1979, this "space" has gradually been filled by the state. Attempts to dampen the intensity of the peasantry's struggle in areas where the greatest social tension can be found have often been accompanied by direct military intervention and also by a restricting of civil rights.¹⁹

In viewing agriculture as one of the preferential sectors of the economy and planning to modernize it not so much from the income of exporting food products as by utilizing internal reserves, the military government cannot long tolerate the growing social tension in the countryside. In this context it is confronted with an alternative: to continue using authoritarian methods for resolving land conflicts and which does not keep with the overall tendency toward a "democratization" of the regime or to switch over to carrying out a more or less profound agrarian reform.

While up to now the nation's leadership has succeeded in putting off a solution to the agrarian question, now this is becoming evermore difficult. The search for effective ways to reproduce capital is also encouraged by the need to repay the enormous external debt. The government sees one of the real prospects for escaping from the economic blind alley in increasing the volume of agricultural production both for domestic consumption and for export. However, without eliminating the basic obstacle on the path to achieving this goal, that is, the extremely primitive agrarian structure, the desire to establish conditions for a new economic upswing and the attempt to link the condition in agriculture with the overall "democratization and liberalization" of the regime will scarcely lead to success.

FOOTNOTES

¹ O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, 29 September 1982.

- ² A. Passos Guimarães, "A crise agrária," Rio de Janeiro, 1979, p 250; O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, 13 November 1981; 9 September 1982.
- ³ Ibid., 25 September 1981.
- ⁴ "Sinopse preliminar do Censo agropecuário. IX Recenseamento geral do Brasil," Rio de Janeiro, 1980, Vol 2, t. 1, pp 4-5.
- ⁵ "Anuário estatístico do Brasil," Rio de Janeiro, 1967, p 88.
- ⁶ "Sinopse preliminar...", pp 4-5; "Anuário estatístico do Brasil," 1981, p 294.
- ⁷ See: BRAZIL INFORMATION NEWSLETTER, Rio de Janeiro, 1982, Vol 1, No 1, p 21.
- ⁸ BOLETIN DE ESTUDIOS LATINOAMERICANOS Y DEL CARIBE, Amsterdam, 1982, No 33, p 21.
- ⁹ CADERNOS DO CEAS, Salvador, 1980, No 68, p 22.
- ¹⁰ A guerrilla center in the Southern Amazon (the Araguaia-Tocantins area) in 1972-1974. Military operations started when the process of expropriating the small peasantry in the Amazon assumed a mass nature. After the elimination of this guerrilla center the government was forced into a limited distribution of land along the basic highways which were of strategic importance for troop movements.
- ¹¹ J. de Souza Martins, "Expropriação e Violência: A questão política no campo," São Paulo, 1980, p 86.
- ¹² Ibid., p 87.
- ¹³ PRAVDA, 29 July 1982.
- ¹⁴ BIKI [Bulletin of Foreign Economic Information], 7 August 1982.
- ¹⁵ O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, 15 September 1981.
- ¹⁶ In accord with Articles 11, 12 and 97 of the designated law, free but also private irrationally used lands were subject to appropriation and allocation.
- ¹⁷ O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, 11 September 1982.
- ¹⁸ Thus, of the 500,000 small farmers living in the area under the control of GETAT, from June 1980 through July 1981, only 5,335 persons received their papers for the right to use the land. BOLETIN DE ESTUDIOS LATINOAMERICANOS Y DEL CARIBE, 1982, No 33, p 24.
- ¹⁹ J. de Souza Martins, "Os camponeses e a política no Brasil. As lutas sociais no campo e o seu lugar no processo político," Petrópolis, 1981, p 18.

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INTERNATIONAL

'OIL' STRATEGY OF MEXICO AND VENEZUELA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 pp 66-76

[Article by V. L. Israyelyan]

[Text] The energy crisis which profoundly hit the world capitalist economy has become one of the most serious structural crises which the capitalist world has encountered in the mid-1970's. The increase in oil prices, the loss by the international monopolies of their major positions in the oil producing industry of the developing oil exporting nations and the increased economic and political role of the latter on the world scene have led to a sharp exacerbation of the contradictions in world capitalism. Among the nations the influence of which on the political and economic situation in the world is becoming evermore noticeable are Mexico and Venezuela, Latin America's oil producers and exporters (see Table 1).¹ The oil industry plays an important role in the economy of both countries: in Venezuela this sector in 1980 provided 25 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), around 75 percent of the state income and 95 percent of the export earnings.² In Mexico in 1981, the national oil company PEMEX provided around 7 percent of the GDP, 28 percent of the receipts of the state budget and 68 percent of the export income.³ For this reason it is not surprising that oil is the cornerstone to the entire foreign economic strategy of the ruling circles in these countries.

The central aspects of the strategy are: long-range planning for the development of the sector, the problem of oil exports, relations with the United States as the basic importer of this most important raw material and with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as well as the questions of bilateral and multilateral collaboration.

The development prospects for the petroleum industry in Mexico and Venezuela are reflected in the national energy programs. The plans for the development of Venezuelan energy is a component part of the 6th National Development Plan. The oil strategy of the country is based upon the so-called "new concept of oil trade." According to this concept, Venezuelan oil should become a tool for establishing equal and mutually advantageous technical and financial collaboration with the consumer nations and help to expand the exports of Venezuelan goods. The plan envisages a range of measures to develop the petroleum industry, to train skilled personnel and to develop new types of technology in related sectors of industrial production. Also planned is a definite cutback in

the exports of oil and oil products by an average of 1.5 percent a year. By 1985, the share of oil in the total export volume should decline to 78 percent.⁴

Table 1

Production, Proven Reserves and Oil Exports in Mexico and Venezuela in 1977-1982, million tons[§]

Indicators	MEXICO					
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Production	53	63	75	100	120	127
Proportional amount in world production (%)*	2.2	2.7	3.1	4.5	5.8	6.7
Proven reserves	1,970	2,252	4,399	6,194	8,022	6,799
Proportional amount in world reserves (%)*	2.6	3.0	5.9	8.0	10.0	8.5
Exports**	10	19	27	50	56.5	74
Proportional amount in world exports (%)*	0.7	1.3	1.7	3.6	4.7	7.2

Indicators	VENEZUELA					
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Production	117	113	124	114	115	99
Proportional amount in world production (%)*	4.9	4.9	5.2	5.1	5.6	5.3
Proven reserves	2,598	2,570	2,551	2,563	2,898	3,069
Proportional amount in world reserves (%)*	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.6	3.9
Exports**	104	103	99	98	93	82
Proportional amount in world exports (%)*	6.4	6.4	5.9	6.4	6.9	6.8

§ "The State of the Capitalist Economy and Conditions on the Basic Commodity Markets," Appendix to the BIKI [Bulletin of Foreign Commercial Information], 1978-1983. Conversion from barrels into tons has been made figuring 1 ton = 6.9 barrels (for Venezuelan oil) and 1 ton = 7.1 barrels (for Mexican oil);

* Without the socialist countries;

** Considering exports of oil products.

The first national energy program of Mexico, adopted in 1980, envisaged, in particular, a freezing of the share of oil and gas in total exports below 50 percent. Here oil exports were given an important role in checking inflation and replenishing foreign exchange reserves.⁵ The volume of oil exports was set on a level of 1.5 million barrels per day under the condition that the share of one purchasing country should not exceed 50 percent of the export volume.⁶

Table 2

Income from Exporting Oil and Oil Products,
Their Proportional Amount in Total Income from Exports (1977-1982)*

	M E X I C O (oil)					
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Income from oil exports (billion dollars)	0.9	1.7	5.8	9.9	13.3	15.6
Share of income from oil exports in total income from exports (%)	21.7	30.8	64.7	65.0	70.0	73.5
	V E N E Z U E L A					
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Income from oil exports (billion dollars)	9.1	8.7	13.5	18.2	19.9	16.4
Share of income from oil exports in total income from exports (%)	95.3	95.0	95.0	94.7	95.0	87.7

* Calculated from: QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, México, Annual Supplements 1978-1982; QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF VENEZUELA, SURINAME, NETHERLANDS ANTILLES, Annual Supplements 1978-1982; EXAMEN DE LA SITUACION ECONOMICA DE MEXICO, México, 1983, No 686, p 51; No 689, p 177; MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, London, 1983, No 7, p 109.

Regardless of repeated statements by Mexican and Venezuelan leaders on the desire to diversify their oil market and thus weaken dependence upon the United States, the United States as before remains the major importer of both Venezuelan oil and oil products as well as Mexican crude (see Table 3). As for Venezuela, for example, the U.S. TNC [Transnational Corporation] have traditionally been the major petroleum importers both before and after the nationalization of the oil industry in this country, although its share has declined from 84 percent in 1976 to 40 percent in 1981.¹⁷ As a whole, the United States is presently responsible for the basic share of the exports of Venezuelan oil and oil products, with around 60 percent (considering the re-exporting of oil products from the islands of Aruba and Curacao).

Both for Mexico and Venezuela the American market is attractive primarily in its geographic proximity. Another important circumstance is that the United States is not only the major importer of oil from these countries but also their leading trade partner. For this reason it is not surprising that the attempts made by the Mexican government in the 1970's to diversify the geographic distribution of oil exports have gone virtually nowhere; at present Mexico, as

However, even in January 1981, in the report of the president's secretariat it was pointed out that the Mexican economy was acquiring traits characteristic of the economy in other oil-producing countries. In particular, it was pointed out that there had been a rapid rise in the share of the oil industry in the GDP, a sharp broadening of imports and instability in income from oil exports. The report drew attention also to the decline in the export volume of other goods and the growing deficit in the balance of payments for this item (6.6 billion dollars in 1980), as well as to the high inflation rates.⁷

The continuing decline in the world capitalist economy was directly reflected in the domestic economic situation in Venezuela and particularly in Mexico. Under the conditions of increased foreign indebtedness, inflation and a hardening of protectionist measures by the leading capitalist countries, many tasks set out in the national energy programs were unfulfillable. This applies first of all to the plans of restricting oil exports. At the same time over the last 2 years, the diametrically opposite problem of markets has also arisen. As is known, during this period the demand of the industrially developed countries for oil has declined significantly.⁸ The average selling price for Mexican oil has declined from 30.9 dollars per barrel in January 1982 to 28.6 dollars in October.⁹ As a result, regardless of the fact that oil exports have increased by 30.9 percent--from 56.5 million tons in 1981 to 74 million tons in 1982--income from its sales has increased by only 17.3 percent, or from 13.3 billion dollars in 1981 to 15.6 billion in 1982.¹⁰ The price for Venezuelan light crude has dropped from 34.58 dollars per barrel to 30.06 dollars, and for medium crude from 32.03 to 26.64 dollars.¹¹ Venezuela's income from the exporting of oil and oil products in 1982 declined by 13.6 percent in comparison with 1981, that is, from 19.9 billion dollars to 16.4 billion (see Table 2).¹²

The foreign indebtedness of PEMEX has risen to 20.5 billion dollars. In endeavoring to overcome the consequences of the reduced income from oil exports, Mexico has made a seventh issue of oil bonds; they are denominated in pesos, however they can be repaid by oil deliveries. The bonds have been sold from 1 March 1982.¹³ The Venezuelan oil company PETROVEN has also been in a difficult situation, having been deprived of a significant portion of its income; because of this the fulfillment of the planned capital investment programs has been jeopardized.

A serious problem for both countries is the high growth rates of domestic consumption of oil products. For example, in Venezuela this indicator in 1976-1980 was 9.6 percent,¹⁴ while the exports of oil and oil products remained approximately on the same level. This problem is even more acute in Mexico. The growth rate of consumption for energy sources, particularly oil, is significantly higher than the nation's economic development rate, although it is less than the increase in the volume of oil production.¹⁵ The existing capacity in the oil refining industry is unable to meet the demands of the domestic market for oil products and for this reason the nation is forced to import them. The significant foreign exchange outlays for these purposes forced the Mexican government in 1981 to sharply raise the domestic prices for oil products. One of the first measures of the de la Madrid government in the area of domestic economic policy was a new 100-percent rise in the prices for gasoline and other oil refinery products. This measure was envisaged by the plan for eliminating government subsidies and establishing "realistic prices."¹⁶

before, is closely tied to the U.S. market. In 1970, the United States was responsible for around 65 percent of the aggregate Mexican exports and from 1978 this crossed the 70 percent mark. The United States is also Mexico's basic partner for imports: in 1970, the importing of goods from the United States was 61.5 percent of the total volume of imports and in 1981 around 65 percent.¹⁸ Venezuela annually imports from the United States around 50 percent of the total imported product. The President of Venezuela, L. Herrera Campins, undoubtedly has considered all these circumstances in repeatedly emphasizing the "indisputable importance" of good relations with the United States. Both for Mexico and Venezuela there is the danger of the applying of trade sanctions by the United States in the event that the policy carried out by them is disadvantageous to Washington. Precedents have already occurred for Mexico in 1938 and for Venezuela in 1973. Finally, it is worth remembering that a significant portion of the external debt of these countries, particularly for Mexico, is owed to the major American banks.

Table 3

Geographic Distribution of Exports of Mexican and Venezuelan Oil
(1981)*

Consumers	MEXICO		VENEZUELA	
	Thousand bbl./day (average)	Share in total oil exports (%)	Thousand bbl./day (average)	Share in total oil exports (%)
Japan	100	5.4	--	--
United States	995	54.0	407.2	23.2
Canada	50	2.7	168.5	9.6
Nations of Western Europe	410	22.2	370.3	21.1
Latin America	159	8.7	724.8	41.3
Including:				
Central America and Caribbean Basin	79	4.4	159.7	9.1
Netherlands Antilles	--	--	421.2	24.0
Other	126	7.0	86.2	4.8
T o t a l	1,840	100.0	1,757	100.0

* Calculated from: QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF VENEZUELA, SURINAME, NETHERLANDS ANTILLES, Annual Supplement 1982; QUARTERLY ENERGY REVIEW, Latin America and the Caribbean, 1982, No 1, p 52.

The United States, in turn, is interested in importing oil from Mexico and Venezuela since these countries provide an opportunity to lessen American dependence on the supplies of the strategic raw material from the politically unstable region of the Persian Gulf. The prospects of being turned into a guaranteed oil supplier for the "northern neighbor" are fraught with dangerous consequences for Mexico. In 1980, the well known Mexican public figure and politician, the general coordinator of the Mexican Peace Movement, N. Vazquez Pallares,

in an interview with the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA commented: "If the United States stated that its 'vital interests' extend to the Near East--never mind for oil or anything else...you can imagine what might be expected here, in direct proximity to it."¹⁹

After the discovery of significant oil reserves in Mexico and the turning of the country into a major oil exporter, the United States has undertaken and continues to undertake attempts to force Mexico to significantly increase the production and export of oil to the United States. In trying to counter Washington's pressure, Mexico has raised counterdemands, in particular, to open access for Mexican finished industrial goods to the U.S. domestic markets.

One of the most important aspects in American-Mexican relations is the problem of the "braceros," that is, the Mexicans who illegally travel to the United States and are hired for agricultural work. The Mexican government is unable to provide the necessary amount of new jobs while the United States is interested in a cheap labor force and is intentionally exacerbating this already complex question for Mexico, linking the solution to it with an entire range of problems existing in the relations between the two countries, and primarily, the deliveries of Mexican oil.

The economic difficulties being experienced by Mexico undoubtedly will make adjustments in the government's oil policy. The Economic Planning Section of the Mexican Petroleum Institute has submitted a report to the nation's president and this, in particular, states: "Delays in increasing oil exports create serious obstacles on the path to achieving the goals set out by the general economic development plan." The income from the sale of manufacturing products, the report points out, is insufficient for ensuring economic growth based on oil income. Consequently, these products cannot be viewed as an alternate source of state income and for replenishing foreign exchange. Hence the conclusion is drawn on the need to increase oil exports in the near future so as to subsequently gradually broaden the exports of oil and petrochemical products.²⁰

An increase in exports will mean a certain reorientation in Mexican foreign trade policy where one of the principles is that no individual nation should take more than 50 percent of the petroleum exports. This step would lead to an increase in the already strong dependence of the nation upon the U.S. TNC and market. At present, Mexico has already increased oil deliveries to the United States which is creating strategic fuel supplies. The oil is being sold at fixed prices from 25 to 32.5 dollars per barrel (depending upon the grade). It is indicative that the United States for the first time has achieved such guarantees from a major oil exporter.

The pressure on Mexico also pursues one other goal of checking the growth of world oil prices and undermining the OPEC price policy. If a country increases oil output to 5-6 million barrels a day, then OPEC control over world prices is significantly weakened. And in this instance the chances for Mexico's entry into OPEC would be sharply reduced and this would fully conform to American interests. The plans of the American specialists in the given instance are based on the fact that the major oil producing countries are endeavoring to produce as much oil as possible while OPEC is imposing restrictions on the

amount of its output and export. Far from the last role is also played by the ever-increasing "interdependence" between the two countries in which Mexico has been assigned a junior role. The United States, in possessing a range of effective instruments for intervening into the economy of the neighboring state, can, finally, introduce a preferential tariff for Mexican goods and this, in the opinion of the Americans, will ensure the desired turn in Mexican oil policy.²¹

As for the position of Mexico itself vis-a-vis OPEC, this is characterized by definite caution. In refraining from joining OPEC, Mexico has clearly been guided by the following considerations: in the first place, membership in this organization would limit the country's independence in setting the volume of oil production and exports; secondly, in the event of joining OPEC, the United States could apply trade sanctions against Mexico.

At the same time, the policy of the Mexican government on this question is rather flexible. As was stated by the Ambassador for Special Assignments, F. Zapata, Mexico is not interested in becoming a full member of OPEC, however it does hope to reach an agreement with this organization. The nation's president, M. de la Madrid, commented: "In taking any decision relating to oil output and exports, we will consider two aspects: that the ratio of outlays and profit be advantageous for the Mexican economy and that our presence on the international oil markets does not lead to a decline in oil prices."²²

In contrast to Mexico, Venezuela is not only an OPEC member but also one of the founder countries of this organization. Venezuela's policy toward OPEC has recently undergone certain changes brought about by the unfavorable conditions on the international oil market and the OPEC decisions related to this. The former Venezuelan minister for energy and the mining industry, H. Calderon Berti, stated in January 1983 that the nation's government would come to the defense of OPEC unity however it would act against a reduced oil output quota for Venezuela²³ since the drop in exports had already led to a sharp decline in income and a growth in the state budget deficit. The minister also stated that Venezuela was ready to make a sacrifice to maintain the OPEC-set oil price level, however these sacrifices could not be unlimited. In the opinion of H. Calderon Berti, the minimum acceptable oil output level for Venezuela should be 1.9 million barrels a day.²⁴

Many political and social organizations in Venezuela such as the Democratic Action Party (in power), the People's Electoral Movement and the Venezuelan Worker Confederation, have come out against increasing oil exports as the only ones to gain would be the TNC which had increased their subversive activities vis-a-vis OPEC.

Under present-day conditions, there is the evermore urgent question of coordinating the oil policy of the Latin American oil exporting countries. At present, the first steps are being taken in this area. In October 1981, in Caracas, within the framework of the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) an agreement was signed between Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil on setting up a new international oil company PETROLATIN with equal participation of these countries in its capital.²⁵ The state oil companies of Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil by joint

efforts will carry out exploration and production of oil in Latin America and overseas. As was stated by the Venezuelan president, the free nations have resolved to set up a joint company in order to counter the American and Anglo-Dutch oil monopolies on the Latin American and other continents. The representatives of the member nations to the agreement unanimously described this step as a political one. In addition to setting up a joint company, Venezuela has offered its partners 50 billion dollars over the next few years for carrying out the OLADE programs to ensure the energy dependence of the regional states (total expenditures for these programs are 240 billion dollars).²⁶

An important aspect in the collaboration between Venezuela and Mexico in the energy area has been the signing of an agreement on the deliveries of oil to the Latin American and Caribbean countries under preferential prices; this has been known as the "San Jose Pact."²⁷ The importance of the Caribbean Basin in the oil policy of Venezuela and Mexico is determined by the desire of the latter to diversify the channels of oil exports having thereby reduced dependence upon the United States.

The concluding of the "San Jose Pact" was variously perceived both in the specialized international organizations and in the ruling circles of the involved countries. For example, the UN Committee on Energy Development and the Secretariat of the Central American Common Market criticized it since, in the opinion of these bodies, the designated agreement would allow Mexico and Venezuela to hold a monopoly position in the region and limit the opportunities of the consumer countries to conclude better deals with oil suppliers in Africa and the Near East.²⁸ For example, in Mexico the opinion on the given question split. A number of co-workers on the presidential staff supported the agreement, seeing in it one of the achievements of the nation's oil policy; at the same time other officials, in particular the head of PEMEX M. Ramon Beteta, have considered it economically ill-advised.

Nevertheless, definite steps have been taken on the path to strengthening collaboration between Venezuela and Mexico in the area of oil production and sales. In February 1982, an agreement was signed on exchanging information on the oil market in the eastern regions of the United States for coordinating marketing activities of both countries' oil companies. In the summer of 1983 in the city of Puerto la Cruz (Venezuela) a meeting was held for the ministries of the oil industry and energy of Venezuela, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Ecuador. Here they discussed the question of setting up an Organization of Latin American Petroleum Exporting Countries (OLAPEC). At present, the draft of a preliminary agreement is being worked out. The previously mentioned H. Calderon Berti, in speaking about the goals and tasks of the regional organization to be established, declared: "Having pooled our efforts, we will be able to achieve better results and better conditions on foreign markets."²⁹

However, the desire of Mexico and Venezuela to strengthen bilateral collaboration and to establish international groupings is rather of a tactical nature. Under present-day conditions the choice of the path for further development is assuming strategic significance.

Time has shown that oil to which the ruling circles of both countries have linked their hopes of accelerated economic growth in and of itself is not a

universal means for resolving problems. Moreover, under the conditions of the world capitalist economy, oil can become a factor for accelerating dependence and for deepening disproportions in a national economy.

The acute foreign exchange and monetary crisis which developed in Mexico in 1981-1982 showed the reverse side of the "oil boom." Broad circles in the public are more and more convinced that the true development of the country is possible only on the basis of its own efforts and resources. The director of the Mexican Oil Institute, Garcia Luna, formulated in the following manner the basic tasks of the nation's oil policy at the present stage: to achieve self-sufficiency in oil products; to broaden the use of heavy crude and associated gas; to increase the production of petrochemical products; to accelerate the training of own skilled personnel for the oil refining and petrochemical industries; to more actively introduce domestically made technology and equipment. Although oil has been and will be an important lever in industrialization as a source for obtaining foreign exchange, the Mexican economy, in the opinion of Garcia Luna, should not depend completely upon oil and for this reason at present an increase in oil exports is ill-advised.³⁰

In December 1982, M. de la Madrid, in speaking about the development prospects of the country, emphasized that as before oil remains the core of the economy, however, the volume of its output and sales will be determined on the basis of the principle of rationality, proceeding from national interests. At the same time, he pointed out, petroleum must not be considered a panacea against all economic problems.³¹ In a report on the results of the first year of his administration, M. de la Madrid, in particular, stated: "Our policy aimed at limiting oil exports...is an important factor in the stability of the world oil market."³² Judging from everything, the new Mexican government has set out to somewhat reduce the role of oil as the basic factor in the nation's socioeconomic development.

The major political parties of Venezuela, in considering the instructive experience of Mexico, are continuing to work out models for their oil strategy. The problem of oil is a key problem in the domestic economic and political life of the country. The new Venezuelan government will be faced with a number of questions the answers to which will be hard to give.

The progressive social circles of Mexico and Venezuela are seeking to move to an oil policy which would link the utilization of this very valuable raw material with the long-range development interests and the tasks of ensuring economic independence and social progress. Only in this manner can the oil wealth be used in the interests of increasing national prosperity.

FOOTNOTES

¹ In 1981, Mexico was in fourth place in the capitalist world for the production and proven oil reserves while Venezuela was fourth for output and ninth for proven reserves.

² BIKI [Bulletin of Foreign Commercial Information], 22 May 1982.

- ³ COMERCIO EXTERIOR, Mexico, 1981, No 9, p 1050; QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW OF MEXICO, London, Annual Supplement, 1982, p 20; EXAMEN DE LA SITUACION ECONOMICA DE MEXICO, Mexico, 1983, No 687, p 94.
- ⁴ "VI Plan de la Nación, 1981-1985," Caracas, 1981, pp 39, 59.
- ⁵ QUARTERLY ENERGY REVIEW, Annual Supplement 1981, London, 1981, pp 45-47.
- ⁶ Ibid., p 51.
- ⁷ QUARTERLY ENERGY REVIEW. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2d Quarter, 1981, pp 23, 24.
- ⁸ According to the data of the Venezuelan Central Bank for 1981, this reduction was: 7.9 percent for the Western European countries, 6.2 percent for the United States, 6 percent for Japan and 4.2 percent for the non-OPEC developing countries.
- ⁹ Calculated from: EXAMEN DE LA SITUACION..., p 94.
- ¹⁰ PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, London, 1983, No 7, p 264. In referring to the decisions of the 67th Extraordinary Conference of OPEC-Member Ministers held in March 1983, the Mexican government set new, lower base prices for crude of the "Istmo" (light) class of 29 dollars per barrel (instead of 32.5 dollars) and "Maya" (heavy) of 23 dollars (instead of 25 dollars). As was stated by the president's representative for press relations, due to the decline in oil prices the nation will not earn 1.3 billion dollars--BIKI, 19 March 1983. Due to a certain improvement in the conditions on the world market and the difficult domestic economic situation, Mexico later again increased the price for crude of the "Maya" class to 24 dollars a barrel.
- ¹¹ QUARTERLY ENERGY REVIEW. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1st Quarter, 1982, p 6; 2d Quarter, pp 6, 50. From 1 August 1983, Venezuela also increased the prices for the heavy grades of crude (with a density from 10° to 20.6° API) by 0.77-2.01 dollars per barrel--BIKI, 9 August 1983.
- ¹² PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, 1983, No 7, p 282.
- ¹³ QUARTERLY ENERGY REVIEW. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2d Quarter, 1982, pp 35-36.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., Annual Supplement, 1981, p 75.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 2d Quarter, 1982, p 44.
- ¹⁶ In April 1983, gasoline prices in Mexico were increased by another 40 percent. FINANCIAL TIMES, London, 19 August 1983.
- ¹⁷ BIKI, 22 May 1982.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 3 April 1982.

- ¹⁹ LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1980, No 11, p 101.
- ²⁰ QUARTERLY ENERGY REVIEW. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2d Quarter, 1982, p 30.
- ²¹ THE NEW YORK TIMES, 23 August 1982.
- ²² See: TIME, New York, 1982, No 51, p 17.
- ²³ For 1982, OPEC set for Venezuela an oil production level of 1.4 million barrels a day. The designated quota was observed for 3 months, however due to a decline in the export earnings, Venezuela was forced to sharply increase the average daily production level to 1.8 million barrels a day. BIKI, 3 August 1982; OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, Tulsa, 1983, No 11, p 26.
- Upon a decision of the nation's president, H. Calderon Berti, headed the PETROVEN Company. INFORME LATINOAMERICANO, London, 1983, No 35, p 414.
- ²⁴ At the 67th Extraordinary Conference of the OPEC Member Ministers, the oil production level for Venezuela was set at 1.675 million barrels a day. BIKI, 19 March 1983.
- ²⁵ COMERCIO EXTERIOR, 1982, No 2, p 185.
- ²⁶ BIKI, 22 May 1982.
- ²⁷ The agreement signed by Venezuela, Mexico and nine other Latin American and Caribbean states in 1980 not only envisaged petroleum deliveries to the Latin American and Caribbean countries in an amount of 160,000 barrels a day at world market prices, but also established prerequisites for the development of own energy sources. According to one of the points of the agreement, the recipient nations were to be given a 5-percent loan with deferred payment for 5 years and amounting to 30 percent of the value of the purchased oil. In the event that the loan was to be used for the purposes of developing the national energy base, the period for repaying the loan would be increased up to 20 years at a rate of 2 percent per annum.
- In March 1983, after the OPEC decision to reduce oil prices to 29 dollars a barrel, the State Venezuelan Capital Investment Fund adopted an unilateral decision to halt the execution of obligations under the international cooperation programs (including the "San Jose Pact") until the earnings from oil sales in 1983 would be determined. Later, in July 1983, changes were incorporated in the agreement; in particular, loans would be granted up to 20 percent of the value of the oil deliveries with a rate of 8 percent per annum. In using the loans for economic development purposes, particularly in the energy area, and for strengthening regional integration, the repayment time would be extended to 20 years at 6 percent per annum.
- ²⁸ QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 4th Quarter, 1981, p 11.
- ²⁹ BIKI, 9 August 1983.

³⁰ Ibid., 5 April 1983.

³¹ LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1983, No 6, p 32.

³² UNO MAS UNO, Mexico, 2 September 1983.

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INTERNATIONAL

U.S. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GRENADA INVASION REFUTED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 pp 135-144

[Article by M. I. Lazarev: "Grenada: Piracy Instead of Law (An International Legal Approach)"]

[Text] When on 25 October 1983 the U.S. Armed Forces invaded Grenada, occupied it, overthrew its government and then set up a puppet government and established its own law and order, everyone should have realized what had happened. For the obvious does not require truth: the U.S. was an aggressor and its government an international delinquent.

But this was not the case! The powerful North American mass propaganda media turned the situation inside out: Grenada was to blame. It was the base for Cuban and Soviet aggression which threatened the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere.

And seemingly the unbelievable happened: a majority of the American people and some in other countries at one stage believed that the United States was defending both its own and international security. Hence, even axioms at times need proof.

In order that the international community functions normally, it is perfectly essential to observe such rules of conduct for states as nonaggression, non-interference, sovereignty and equal rights. The failure to observe these seemingly elementary but at the same time basic standards involves difficult and far-reaching consequences.

More and more U.S. policy is running contrary to the principles of international law and is ignoring them. Over the entire postwar period, official Washington has endeavored by powerful means to maintain the leading role of the United States in the world. For the sake of this, the White House has initiated local conflicts endeavoring by force to maintain the status-quo to its liking. As camouflage for this policy, the myth of the "Soviet military threat" has been employed as well as the complicity of the USSR in so-called "international terrorism" and the "exporting of revolution." Using these the United States has concealed the destabilizing of international order and has carried out complete preparations for war.

Even in antiquity, conquerors endeavored to justify their actions by references to morality and law. The present U.S. Administration has not deviated from this rule and in using the powerful mass disinformation media, has given various "arguments" in "justification" and "validating" its actions against Grenada.

The "Justification" of U.S. Aggression Against Grenada and Its Legal Invalidity

The arsenal of "arguments" for the intervention includes the following: the Cuban military presence on Grenada; the presence of stockpiles of Cuban arms on the island; the creation or attempt to create a Cuban or Soviet military base; the threat to the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere; the threat to the life of American citizens on Grenada; the violation of human rights and freedoms on the island; the necessity of restoring democracy; the murder of the country's head of government; the request for intervention by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; the inviting of U.S. troops to Grenada by the English Governor General Paul Scoon.

All these "arguments" of the American side in legal terms are absolutely baseless.

The "justification" of U.S. intervention into Grenada under the pretext of the presence of Cuban military personnel in this country is groundless. It is the sovereign right of each state to invite foreign armed forces into its territory for temporary and defense purposes. And there can be no doubt that the aims of Grenada were purely defensive. The U.S. attack on Grenada was the best proof of this.

The most insignificant number of Cuban military in Grenada shows that their presence was merely to ensure the security of such an important project as the building of the airport. At the same time, it is generally known that the United States had covered the entire world with its military bases, having established a global system of military presence on foreign territories. In particular, in Latin America, American troops or bases were located on the territory of a whole series of states, and in one instance contrary to the categorical demand of this country's government to leave its territory (the Guantanamo Base on Cuba). Moreover, in contrast to the Cuban military specialists on Grenada, the presence of U.S. troops constantly involved aggression carried out directly by the United States or by "foreign hands." There are many examples of this.

The "argument" about the presence of Cuban weapons on Grenada also has no legal strength, for any sovereign state can buy and sell weapons, stockpile them and so forth. If this argument had any legal force whatsoever, then any state could invade the territory of any other country which was "stockpiling" weapons.

But modern international law in being based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of states does not permit such arbitrary actions which are absurd from the viewpoint of law and order and can lead to chaos in the world.

The myth of the establishing or attempt to establish a Cuban or Soviet military base on Grenada does not stand up at all. The creation of a major international

airport for such a country as Grenada where tourism brings in 30 percent of its income was absolutely essential. Grenada did not possess an airport capable of receiving modern passenger aircraft. The small provincial airport could handle only small aircraft and this made Grenada directly dependent on Barbados the government of which in addition did not conceal its hostile attitude toward Grenada.

The building of an international airport was not a secret to anyone. The designing, the search for funds for construction and construction itself had been underway for around 20 years and all of this was no surprise for the United States. By the moment of the armed attack on Grenada, firms from England, Finland and certain other capitalist countries were involved in building the civil airport.

The statement of the supposed threat from Grenada to the security of the United States or any Eastern Caribbean states is blasphemous. Neither at the moment of the invasion of the U.S. Armed Forces with the symbolic participation of certain Pentagon allies in small, independent Grenada, neither previously, nor in the foreseeable future was there any threat to the United States or any other government. It is absurd to assert otherwise, if one merely considers that the Grenada population is 110,000 persons while that of the United States is 232.6 million, in Barbados there are 246,000 persons and so forth. To compare the military potentials in the given instance is a completely senseless undertaking.

In the example of Grenada, mankind again, how many times how, has encountered a favorite strategem of American imperialism: under an imaginary pretext of defending its "own security" to violate the security of others. The Reagan Administration clearly relies on the antipode principles of international law according to which "might makes right" and "victors are not judged." This power has constantly and systematically preferred to substitute relations of strength for relations of law. The United States in its foreign policy practices recognizes only force. After this does it not make sense that its Latin American neighbors try to strengthen their defense capability so that their independent course can survive?

As for the "argument" of the American president on the necessity to "defend" the life of American citizens living on Grenada, it is generally recognized that nothing was threatening them. They themselves did not request such protection. Moreover, international law does not contain allowances and such motives for armed intervention. In the given instance such, so-called "protection" disrupted the normal life of both the island and the American citizens themselves and caused destruction, bloodshed and casualties. Being elevated to a principle, such "defense" could give all countries a reason to refuse U.S. citizens entry and particularly residence.

Unfortunately, the falacious justification of Reagan is nothing new in U.S. policy vis-a-vis its southern neighbors. Under the pretext of defending its citizens and property, Washington has had the habit of breaking into other's homes. History has not forgotten that, in referring precisely to this "right," American neocolonialists repeatedly sent their troops, for example, into Columbia and Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and other sovereign Latin American countries when they felt it necessary. Here the interventionists

and occupiers "as one" overthrew the governments not to their liking and "formed" (with "elections" or without them) their own pro-American puppet governments. And the present actions of the United States in Grenada are merely a continuation of this neocolonialist practice.

In addition, international law establishes that if actually there is a threat to the life, health and property of the citizens of some state living on the territory of another country, initially the so-called "local" means of their protection should be exhausted, namely by appealing to the local administrative bodies, the authorities, courts and so forth. If this still does not lead to the desired results, the question of the protection of citizens can be raised to the level of diplomatic talks. Such are the rules of modern international intercourse of states. But these rules, as can be seen, are not for the White House. The "laws" of pillage are more to the liking of its bosses.

Another pretext for the armed attack on Grenada and intervention into this nation was the thesis advanced by the American government of the supposedly occurring violations of human rights and liberties on Grenada.

As is known, in a number of Latin American countries, including in the United States itself!, thousands of political prisoners are languishing in prison. Washington maintains cordial relations and even provides aid to terroristic dictatorial regimes. Actually precisely help from the United States has helped them murder, torture and terrorize the population up to the point of a policy of genocide. This policy, of course, has caused profound indignation among the progressive world community. However, no one has taken it into his head to urge armed intervention into any of these countries, either Chile, Haiti or Paraguay or the United States.

It is well known that the protection of human rights from real or apparent violations according to modern international law is carried out on the basis and within the context of the institutions of domestic law and order. In no instance is this a justification for the attack of one state on another. All countries are obliged to observe human rights. Even if a state violates them, it bears for this moral, political, legal and other responsibility to the international community, to the UN and other international organizations. But neither the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 or the Pacts on Human Rights of 19 December 1966 contains even a mention of armed attack for the sake of defending supposed or actually violated human rights.

One other U.S. "argument" was the necessity of restoring democracy in Grenada. It is not necessary to have any special knowledge in the area of political science to realize that the question of democracy, the interpretation of this term and concept, the degree of its development, its elimination or, conversely, restoration is exclusively within the competence of each state and its people.

In the world there are different sociopolitical and legal systems, different types and forms of states and different regimes. The word "democracy" is constantly on the lips of politicians with the most diverse views and it has been inscribed not only in constitutions but also in the decrees to nullify constitutions. Modern political history in many Latin American allies of the United

States provides numerous examples of this. But what about other regions and continents? What would happen if each state began "according to its own image and likeness" to establish law and order on the territory of other countries? This would lead to constant armed conflicts and wars. International law and order would be eliminated by this.

The principles of modern international law and the UN Charter do not allow any state to intervene into the domestic political life of another state, its electoral or generally the political system, to install or eliminate any social orders. This provision stems directly from such principles of international law as sovereignty, noninterference, nonaggression and the equality of states. This is the alpha and omega of international law. The definition of these principles as well as the defining of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974 directly prohibit such actions and exclude this "argument" of the United States. And if still the American president and the State Department ignore the standards of international law, this is not because they lack the legal education but because they lack arguments for concealing the illegality perpetrated by them and for justifying the hegemonism and all permissiveness which have been elevated by Washington to the rank of state policy.

Also mentioned among the "arguments" of the American side is the death of the Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. But really is this tragic event any argument? The principle of the sovereign equality of a state as well as the principle of nonintervention do not permit any intervention, particularly armed, into the internal affairs of other states even in the instance of disturbances within them.

In order for every reasonable person to realize that this is the case, one has merely to point out that when the American President J. Kennedy was murdered in the United States, no other country in the world made any attempt by armed or unarmed means to intervene into the U.S. domestic life. Another example, no one in Washington proposed an intervention in Chile when Salvador Allende was murdered there, or in Pakistan when the President Bhutto was killed there. Conversely, Washington immediately established allied relations with the murderers of each. Moreover, Washington itself organized the murder of President Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (when it ceased needing him) and a number of attempts on the life of the Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro.

Equally groundless is the "argument" of the interventionists that they were "invited" onto the island by the English Governor General Paul Scoon.

In the first place, the English government from the very outset distanced itself from the American attack on the former English colony and subsequently member of the British Commonwealth, Grenada. Secondly, in order that the invitation of foreign armed forces--particularly in the aim of conducting military operations--into a sovereign state have legal force, it should have been done by the Grenadan government and not by the governor general. The very legal principles of the British Commonwealth do not grant such rights to the governors general. A correspondent from the EFE Agency aptly pointed out in this regard that the "governor general is a symbolic figure in the former English colonies in the Caribbean Basin and who merely represents Queen Elizabeth II."

Furthermore, the American interventionists, for justifying their actions, have referred to the Treaty on Establishing an Organization of East Caribbean States of 18 June 1981 and the request of such members of it as Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent as well as Barbados and Jamaica who participated in the aggression against Grenada.

However, in the present international community it is well known that no group of states can by a treaty abolish the imperative (basic, strictly obligatory) principles of international law reinforced in the UN Charter and detailed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970.

According to the provisions of the UN Charter, the use of armed force by one state (or a group of states) against another state (or group of states) is possible only with the approval of the Security Council. In particular, Articles 52-53 of the UN Charter clearly state that no regional organization can employ force without the approval of the Security Council for this.

Here we are not even concerned with such a "minor" detail that the so-called "request" for intervention from certain East Caribbean states was received by the United States already after the United States had attacked Grenada. Here also we are not concerned with the fact that, according to press information, the text of the request was drawn up at the State Department and the participation of the East Caribbean states had merely a symbolic nature, serving as a cover for the North American invasion and, finally, Grenada itself was not invited to participate in the discussion of the question.

At the same time, it is essential to point out that the treaty to which the United States has referred in general cannot be considered valid as it contradicts the UN Charter and the UN General Assembly Resolution of 14 December 1960 on decolonization. The treaty contains articles which legally reinforce the unequal position of certain East Caribbean colonies in this organization and officially deprives them of the right to vote on major questions of international relations in the subregion as is unambiguously stated in Article 2, Points 2, 3, 4 and Article 6, Point 3.

According to the logic of the aggressor, any inhabitant of an apartment house can break into any apartment, justifying this by a request, supposed or real, from a group of some other neighbors. But then for what reason is there an international community, for what reason did the peoples, including the American, establish the UN Charter, international law and order and such bodies as the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly? Finally, for what reason does the favorite offspring of Washington itself, the Organization of American States, exist if the United States did not even inform it of the bandit attack?

Only hopeless, inveterate hypocrisy can justify these actions by referring to "law." Sometimes in the Western press the voice is heard that the United States made an "unprovoked attack," that is, "unprovoked aggression" against Grenada. Such a turn of phrase is legally incorrect. The issue is that if any aggression was "provoked" by economic, political, cultural or other nonmilitary aggressions, then the armed attack in response to these nonmilitary actions

would still be true aggression. Aggression cannot generally be provoked, for in the event of replying to a military attack these response military actions cannot be termed aggression.

Principles and Standards of International Law Violated by the United States in Grenada

Having attacked Grenada and initiated repression and terror against its people and having put the dissidents into concentration camps, the United States trampled upon the code of international law, be it the UN Charter or the Charter of the Organization of American States [OAS].

First of all, the United States violated the principle of nonaggression. Some 108 states at a session of the UN General Assembly condemned the armed invasion by the United States of the small unprotected island. This is understandable for we are undoubtedly dealing with a most grievous international time of aggression. While on 14 December 1974 the UN General Assembly approved a definition stating in Article 1 that "aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of another state or by any other manner incompatible with the UN Charter." Furthermore, Article 2 states that "the use of armed force by a state first in violation of the Charter is evidence of an act of aggression."

Article 3 clarifies that "any of the following actions, regardless of a declaration of war, considering and in accord with the provisions of Article 2 will be qualified as an act of aggression: a) the invasion or attack by a state's armed forces on the territory of another state, or any military occupation however temporary a nature it may have and which is the result of such an invasion or attack, or any annexation employing force against the territory of another state or a part of it...." Finally, Article 5 indicates that "no considerations of any nature, be this of a political, economic, military or other sort, can serve as justification for aggression." Similar provisions are also contained in the OAS Charter.

The standards quoted in extenso clearly show the full ignoring of international law by Washington. Here is both an armed attack, an attack by the first, an invasion of the territory of another state, military occupation and attempts without any importance and justification to assert the "temporary" nature of these actions, the defensive and political considerations and the interests of the so-called "security" of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. Here also is direct indication of a crime by this power against mankind and its responsibility to the international community.

One other accusatory act against the aggressor, the interventionists and the occupier is the Declaration on the Principles of International Law adopted by the UN General Assembly on 24 October 1970. In particular, it defines the principle of the renunciation of force (Article 2, Point 4 of the UN Charter): "A principle according to which states refrain in their international relations from the threat of force or its use both against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state as well as by any other manner not compatible with the goals of the United Nations." Furthermore: "Any state in its international relations refrains unconditionally from the threat of force or its use...."

The principle of the sovereign equality of states, in being set out by the UN Charter and taken up in detail in the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Principles of International Law (1970) establishes, in particular, in Point "a" that "states are juridically equal," and in Point "f" that "each state has a right to freely choose and develop its own political, social, economic and cultural systems." No one is permitted to suppress this freedom. The same is provided by the OAS Charter.

In international relations there are, of course, situations when the government of one country turns for certain aid to another, for example, it requests defense, the repelling of aggression and so forth. However, the entire world knows that the Grenada government did not request any aid from the United States, particularly military intervention which Reagan called the "salvation" of Grenada. Grenada and its government--neither Maurice Bishop nor the one which replaced it, or the people, requested "salvation" from Reagan. It is clear that for the United States this is of no importance. It is interested neither in the will of the people nor the will of the government of the nation which has fallen into the focus of American imperial interests.

The present American administration feels that international relations must be created not in accord with the standards of international legal conduct but rather according to the laws of the "Wild West" that is, "I Take What I Want!"

The independence of any Latin American people, the manifestation of greater independence from the United States and any true social and even national self-determination frighten ruling Washington, for these limit its domination and power over the Latin American countries.

The new "government" on Grenada was set up by the occupiers after military aggression, after eliminating the national state, its army, its government, after suppressing by flagrant armed force the will of the people for sovereignty and independence and so forth.

Here one act of international piracy was heaped on another. And altogether in the language of the State Department officials this is called the "restoring of democracy!"

This is not the first time that the great power United States by such a maneuver has implanted its own standards of self-determination and democracy on the territory of a small state as well as what is acceptable and not acceptable in international relations. But this is not all. Having invaded Grenada, the U.S. Armed Forces violated the laws of conducting military operations and the rules of an occupation regime (even if this action was a war and not piracy!).

The 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions envisage that during the occupation of a foreign country, the existing civil procedures in the country should be left in effect and there should not be a fundamental breaking up of the existing institutions. The conventions on the defense of the civilian population during wartime and on the defense of prisoners of war, sick and wounded, establish that combat operations during a war can be conducted solely against the enemy armed forces and military installations and not against the peaceful population. According to the Fourth Hague Convention, an occupation

army should undertake all measures depending upon it in order, as far as possible, to ensure social order and normal life, in respecting the laws of the country.

The occupiers are forbidden to force the civilian population of the occupied territory to give information on the nation's army, on the means of its defense and to also take the enemy loyalty oath. Honor and family rights, the life of individuals and likewise religious convictions and the observance of rites should be respected. Plunder is prohibited. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibited severe handling, torture, the taking of hostages, the infringing of human dignity, in particular, insulting and belittling treatment. Forbidden for any reasons whatsoever is the expulsion and also deporting of persons to the territory of the occupier or another state.

Article 18 of the Geneva Convention on the Defense of the Civilian Population in Wartime of 12 August 1949 establishes: "Civilian hospitals organized for providing aid to wounded, sick, disabled and maternity cases under no circumstances can be the object of an attack, but will always be treated with respect and protection by the sides in conflict." Article 31 does not permit "any measures of coercion of a physical or moral sort" against the peaceful population. Article 70 points out: "The occupying power cannot arrest, prosecute or condemn protected persons for actions or opinions committed or voiced prior to the occupation" and so forth, and so forth. Also protected by the convention are partisans as well as all persons who fight against the occupiers.

All these provisions of the international conferences were flagrantly trampled upon by the Pentagon. This is not surprising. Aggressive aims also give rise to both criminal means and illegal methods of realizing them. According to information in the press, the American interventionists, contrary to the international conventions, bombed a hospital in Grenada and killed scores of persons there. They fired on schools and organized the hunting down of people.

It is not known under what law the members of the government and other politicians in Grenada were arrested by the American occupiers. The local authorities were disbanded and the social victories of the people eliminated.

Of no legal force are the actions of the English Governor General P. Scoon, who was brought in by the occupiers to make their aggressive occupation activities respectable. For performing such sovereign actions of power, the former English governor general in Grenada under the conditions of the occupation and all the related consequences cannot be considered the legal representative neither within the nation nor on the international scene.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the U.S. administration, having attacked Grenada, "ignored" not only the entire corpus juris internationalis but also its own constitution. The U.S. Constitution of 1787 (Article 1, Section 8) directly states that the proclamation of war is exclusively within the competence of the U.S. Congress.

This provision is a democratic victory of the American people. Not the president but rather the highest elected body of national power determines whether a war will be started or peace maintained for American and other peoples. One of the results of the "dirty war" in Vietnam was the additional legislative

measures which deprived the president of the right to dispatch any armed forces whatsoever without the approval of Congress.

But in his demagoguery on the "restoring of democracy" in Grenada, the American president and those who stand behind him naturally were not concerned for democracy in their own home. At the same time, it is worth recalling the English saying: "Charity begins at home."

Of course, this is far from the only instance of such actions by a U.S. president without congressional sanction, in violation of the American Constitution. Suffice it to point out that in 1981, a group of American senators headed by G. W. Crockett initiated a case in federal court in Washington against President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Defense Weinberger over the question of sending American servicemen to El Salvador and providing extensive aid to the Salvadoran junta without congressional approval. Of course, it is difficult to count on the objectivity of the North American Themis in such a case, but the very fact is noteworthy.

In the 20th Century our planet is not a jungle. The peoples do not want and do not intend to tolerate the imperial ways of the newly appeared pretenders to world hegemony. The powerful protests against U.S. intervention in Grenada are the best proof of this. The Americans should be removed from Grenada and its people should again become free. On their side is all progressive mankind and on their side is international law, the greatest achievement of modern civilization.

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CENTRAL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS EXAMINED

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[Article by M. F. Gornov and Yu. N. Korolev: "The Revolutionary Process in the Countries of Central America: Historical Succession and Characteristics"]

[Text] On the Nature of the Revolution

The crisis of the 1970's and 1980's, regardless of how it is ultimately resolved within the framework of the world system of capitalism, has already created additional objective conditions and economic foundations for socialist and democratic revolutions in the zones of increased social tension, among which Central America occupies one of the foremost places. The exhaustion of imperialism's socio-economic means for bringing about a solution to the problems of this zone (as well as those of the Middle East and a number of countries in Africa and Asia) has impelled it to switch over to forceful methods of maintaining within its own orbit those countries which are in "crisis situations." Military means of solving the problems of world politics have been called upon to lessen the socio-economic and ideological-political (propagandistic) means.

Under the Reagan administration the military arsenal, as never before, has begun to expand in a headlong fashion, encompassing, as a result, all the instrumentalities of state power. Under Reagan, moreover, the ranks of official means for waging U.S. foreign policy have been joined by those which previously had been permitted only in the case of a state of war existing between states: diversions, blockades, bombing of certain facilities, whole cities, along with the partial and complete occupation of sovereign countries.

A great deal of attention has been paid herein to the so-called secret operations, which have been called upon to serve not only business or strategic purposes but also the success of upcoming, large-scale military operations. Such were the murders of O. Torrijos in Panama and Roldos in Ecuador in attempts to achieve changes in the political courses of these countries into directions favorable for the United States. As is known, the incursion of American troops into Grenada in October 1983 was preceded by a political crisis in the country, brought about by the death of Prime Minister Morris Bishop along with a number of other political and social leaders. In the press the opinion has already been stated that the "liquidation" of Morris Bishop was the result of an operation undertaken by agents of the U.S. intelligence service, agents who took advantage of the situation which had taken shape; moreover, the direct perpetrator of this action was one of the prime minister's bodyguards, a person who had been recruited by the CIA.

Reagan regards the "pacification" of Central America as one of the strategic goals of his foreign policy; the achievement of this is supposed to show the peoples of the United States and all countries American might and the capability of bring about solutions by means of force. The determination of the United States to proceed down every path in the name of suppressing the liberation movement in Central America--such is the source of danger for the cause of peace in this region. At the same time, this is one of the basic elements out of which the "external factor" of the revolution is taking shape.

U.S. policy is leading to a "regionalization" of the revolution. Indeed, the American administration does not regard, let's say, Nicaragua as an independent sovereign state with which, by virtue of this, appropriate inter-governmental relations should be conducted. For the United States Nicaragua is, instead, a kind of partisan "liberated region," a wider zone for the suppression of which the "legitimate" governments, their armies, police, etc. are being mobilized. The most "legitimate," from the viewpoint of the United States at the present time, is the government of Honduras, whose territory American troops have, in fact, occupied, whereas its armed forces are being utilized as instruments of punishment against the Salvadoran insurgents and the Nicaraguan peasants. The entire region is being represented by the U.S. strategists as divided not by political-geographic borders but by barricades and trenches, where--on one side--are the "Reds," supported by Cuba and the USSR, while--on the other side--are the friends of the United States.

Washington has united and headed up the entire Central American counter-revolution, and this cannot fail to leave its mark on the nature of the revolutionary strategy and tactics.

Despite the regionalization of the revolutionary movement under the influence of the external factor, the countries of this region, as well as their popular movements, have their own characteristic traits, left by history and the traits of their own national development. The principal factor of victory is unity of actions against the enemy, but the effectiveness of this unity is closely bound up with the mobilization of the masses, and this problem cannot be solved without taking into account the national characteristics of each country.

But if we approach matters from the viewpoint of "regionalizing" the conflict, then this situation is characterized by the fact that no serious, principled concessions whatsoever are possible in El Salvador or in Guatemala (given the trend of U.S. policy). Any retreat would have a mobilizing influence on the counter-revolution, which would hurl itself with even greater zeal into tearing the revolutionaries to pieces. But the main thing is that it is impossible because neither in El Salvador nor in Guatemala nor in Nicaragua is there a "common ground" for seeking out some kind of joint platform--civil wars do not end in a compromise (a vivid example of that is the history of Nicaragua itself and the vile murder of Sandino after the achievement of such a "compromise").

An extremely important factor for the victory of the revolution in this region is the existence of a free Nicaragua, which, of course, poses no threat whatsoever to the United States. But it does pose a threat to the backwardness, poverty, and mass illiteracy of the population; it is carrying out changes which facilitate the flourishing of the people's initiative, the formation of a new

state system, a new society. In no period of its history has Nicaragua known such a profound, such a genuine democracy as that which the Sandinista Revolution has brought with it. The force of the example of People's Nicaragua, opposed to the bloody dictatorships in Guatemala, El Salvador, and the de facto occupation regime in Honduras--that is the real danger for the Reaganite policy in Central and South America.

There are two more factors lying on the scales of history, factors which favor the victory of the Central American Revolution. The first is the fact that this revolution did not emerge from nothingness. It is the successor of an almost century-old struggle by the Latin American peoples against imperialism; it is the heir of the entire priceless experience of this struggle.

The second factor consists in the fact that this revolution is the child of the extremely profound crisis experienced by capitalism during the 1970's and 1980's; it gave birth to it, and there is a paradox in the fact that without revolutions of the Central American type present-day capitalism could not, even temporarily, overcome this crisis, while preserving the essential core of the system.

Historical Prerequisites: The Latin American Revolutionary Experience

During the 80 years of our century in 32 of the presently independent countries of Latin America 35 important public events have taken place which were equal or approximately equal to such an historically key phenomenon as a revolution, i.e., every 2 years a powerful social outburst occurred.

It is interesting that 7 of them took place during the first 40 years of the century (1900--1939), 7 during the next 20 years (1940--1959), and 21--during the last 23 years (1960--1983). Such have been the dynamics of the revolutionary and national-liberation struggle in Latin America, and this testifies irrefutably to the offensive nature of the anti-imperialist struggle on this continent.

All these revolutionary phenomena in Latin America took place in the most modern times, i.e., after the victory of the Great October Revolution (with the exception of two: the independence of Panama in 1903 and the Mexican Revolution in the years 1910--1917).

A revolution is a concentrated expression of an age and of the internal problems of a certain country. The inner contents of the historical importance of revolutions can comprise unequal proportions of parts pertaining to the general (international) and the particular (national). Each of them likewise bears a greater or lesser load of regional importance, and at times the international and the national are composed of diverse elements. Among revolutions there are those which have, so to speak, absorbed into themselves the experience of many other revolutions; they are a concentrated expression of all the revolutionary experience of a given age or a given region (perhaps, of the type of the countries with regard to their socio-economic and political characteristics). Such revolutions of epochal and international resonance in Latin America, undoubtedly, have been the Mexican (1910), Cuban (1959), Chilean (1970--1973), and Nicaraguan (1979). These were revolutions which raised enormous masses of the people to struggle for social changes; revolutions during the course of which new

phenomena were reflected in the world, and there was a change in the balance of power in the international arena; revolutions which summed up the results for the historical period of development of world society, which marked a new stage in the general crisis of capitalism, which accomplished in practice whole phases of theoretical disputes about the nature, contents, and moving forces of revolution, such as, for example, the Cuban Revolution, which proved the principled possibility of a socialist revolution in the Latin American countries, or the Chilean Revolution, which provided enormous demonstrative material concerning the peaceful path of revolution. All these are valuable factors of world importance. At the same time, these revolutions brought with them the priceless experience of the specifically particular for the Latin American region and the national factor for the struggle of their own peoples; they substantially enriched the category of the particular, having expanded the scope and possibilities of working out the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement (the international-theoretical aspect of the "particular" in the revolutionary experience).

The victory of the Cuban proletariat and the beginning of socialist construction in Cuba confirmed the opinion that in the modern-day epoch countries which are at an analogous level of development have sufficient objective and material prerequisites for making the transition of socialism (what we have in mind is a socio-economic structure, the presence of a strong and organized working class, an influential Communist Party, politically active and organized urban middle and petit-bourgeois classes). A turning-point had arrived in the destinies of the entire continent, and this was understood not only by the revolutionaries but also by the bourgeois politicians, above all, by the leaders of the United States. During the 1960's the United States inflicted preventive or actively counter-attacking strikes against the revolutionary movement (and even against the mass national-reformist movement) of Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Peru, Guatemala, and other countries.

But even the total offensive by the counter-revolution did not inflict a decisive defeat on the revolutionary-democratic movement. Furthermore, this movement manifested two new "reserve" trends which had not been taken into account by the reactionaries. One was connected with the armed forces, on which the United States had placed its main bet in the struggle against the revolution and which, as a result of this, were deeply drawn into all the troubles of social, economic, and political life. Naturally within their ranks diverse attitudes took form toward social phenomena; this led to a politization of the army and, hence, to the appearance of left-wing, patriotic, anti-imperialist, and nationalistic tendencies and trends, which, on the whole, expressed the revolutionary-democratic aspirations of society. Unexpectedly for Washington progressive military governments have come to power for more or less lengthy periods of time and simultaneously in Peru, Bolivia, Panama, Ecuador, and Honduras. They have carried out a number of profound socio-economic changes: an agrarian reform is being conducted, the state and public sectors of the economy are being strengthened, persecutions of trade unions and other mass organizations have been halted, the activities of right-wing forces have been limited, relations with all the world's countries have been developed, including those with the socialist countries, and with an orientation basically toward the non-alignment movement.

These processes achieved their most significant scope in Peru during the period of the rule of J. Velasco Alvarado (1968--1975) and in Panama under the administration of O. Torrijos (1968--1980). These were certainly revolutionary-democratic regimes, which were distinguished, however, by the fact that the revolutionary democracy was in power without an alliance with the working class. The military leaders were not able to overcome the elitist nature of the process, the directive-type style with regard to the popular movement; they were not able to "entrust" the common people with the cause of the revolution (since they were afraid of its spontaneous, "unorganized" activity). The failure to establish an alliance with the working class and the peasantry led to a situation whereby the revolutionary democratic regime of military men could not raise the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship to a qualitative level, nor could it ensure the transition to the socialist stage.

The isolated and limited nature of the military-type revolutionary democrats separated them more and more from the proletariat as time went on. The striving to solve everything from above led to the accumulation of "petty problems," which, in the case of a mass popular movement are solved rapidly and effectively by the people themselves in the localities; attempts to create state mechanisms for solving such problems led to bureaucratization, all the more so in that they retained the old state apparatus; among the people there was a growing lack of confidence in the government's ability to lead the revolution forward. The essence of the regime as something "transitional," crisis, and temporary was sensed instinctively by both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But this feeling was in contrast to the subjective confidence of the ruling groups that it was precisely they and precisely by virtue of their "middle-man" position within the social structure who were capable not only temporarily but always to overcome the antagonism of the basic classes, that their regimes could also solve the social conflicts in a new way, by finding a "third" model for the social structure. However, instead of a society above classes and a harmony, there ensued merely a socio-political isolation and a crisis of power.

This crisis should have been resolved in a clash between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the government could have retained power (or lost it) in this battle, after deciding which side it was on. But subjectively the regime, for example, of Velasco Alvarado in Peru could not go over to the side of the bourgeoisie, whereas it did not know how to go over to the side of the proletariat. As a result, after proving incapable of expressing the interests and purposes of the working class and its democratic allies, and having lost the support of the people, the Velasco regime fell. And, as a result of this, a military-and-civilian, bourgeois dictatorship was set up; it became an ally of the principal factions of the bourgeoisie against the working class, against the organized workers' movement. It became a directly transitional form to a regime representing the bourgeois democracy--a form of political dominance by the bourgeoisie, which was confident that at the given historical segment of time nothing serious was threatening its political power. This was already a regime which more and more reflected the interests of the upper strata of the bourgeoisie, the big domestic and foreign capitalists. Since it was at a fork in the road of history and not being capable of either opening up a path to socialism or to create the sought-after "third model," the revolutionary democracy in Peru cleared away a path for the monopolistic stage of capitalism--

a unique form of state monopoly capitalism, distinguished from the classical European type by a considerably greater degree of "open-ness" for foreign capital.

The second trend of the revolutionary struggle during the 1970's which was not taken into account by the reactionaries was the reliance on the masses, on organization, broad alliances, and basically "peaceful," i.e., non-military forms of action. Bourgeois political science had for such a long time exaggerated the thesis that the success of the "Marxist" political struggle was possible solely when the decisive role would be played by military methods as the principal ones that it convinced itself of this as well as the bourgeois state leaders of Latin America. Therefore, the Chilean Revolution, in a certain sense, caught them unawares. Of course, the probability of S. Allende's victory disturbed the ruling circles of the United States, who undertook desperate efforts to block it. But all their "Latin American" experience armed them with such a set of 'prohibitive' means as could not prevent the access to power in 1970 of the Popular Unity. This sowed panic and confusion in the United States, which could only hatch such a harsh plan as the Pinochet Putsch.

The Chilean Revolution was overwhelmed by a willful effort from outside but also with the aid of a military revolt which was organized by international reactionaries; on the level of mass activity, organization, and leadership it has continued, so to speak, to develop normally. Nevertheless, imperialism strangled the revolution in Chile not with the aid of direct aggression but with the hands of Chilean reactionaries, and this fact undoubtedly indicates internal factors as the fundamental reason for the defeat of the revolution. Indeed, in contrast to the Peruvian experience, where the revolutionary democrats remained isolated from the armed forces and were unable to rally the revolutionary masses, above all, the organized proletariat, around themselves, in Chile the mass popular movement, headed up by the working class, was unable to achieve definitions in polarizing men in the military services, was unable to maintain in its own camp a sector and protect their democratic ideas loyal to the revolution from the reactionaries within the armed forces, and was unable to make the transition in time from basically peaceful methods of struggle to basically military-political ones, having yielded the initiative to the counter-revolution at the beginning of the civil war. To the extent that the Peruvian revolutionaries over-estimated, even absolutized, the effectiveness of military actions and "organizing the revolution" from above, to this same extent in the Chilean Revolution there was an under-estimation of the need to politicize the armed forces and to support the democrats and revolutionaries in them.

The Chilean Revolution was met by the Latin American reactionaries and imperialism with the same horror as had been the case with the Cuban Revolution; and with the same headlong haste as in the 1960's conclusions were drawn, calculations made, and preventive and counter-revolutionary actions were undertaken. In all countries where broad-based, popular coalitions of the Popular Unity were already in existence (the Broad Front in Uruguay, the National Meeting in Argentina, and others), efforts were undertaken, including military coups, to undermine them and physically annihilate the leaders and activists. At the same time, purges were conducted in the armed forces and in the repressive organs as a whole.

Characteristics of the Revolutionary Process

Nevertheless, the thunder was already crashing at the end of the 1970's. Central America became a concentration of events. "Beginning in 1979, when revolutions were victorious in Grenada and Nicaragua, independence was attained by the people of Belize, the revolutionary deeds of the Puerto Rican and Haitian patriots became more active, and an upswing began in the people's revolutionary struggle in El Salvador and Guatemala, the center of gravity of the Latin American Revolution has shifted to the region of Central America and the Caribbean," it was stated at the International Theoretical Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Left-Wing Revolutionary Parties of Latin America, which was held on 26--28 April 1982 in Havana.¹

The scope and depth of the conflict in Central America, as noted by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Honduras, R. Padilla Rush, attained a level comparable with the principal regions of the highest tension in South-East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.² At present Central America is one of the main foci of international tension, fraught with the danger of unleashing a large-scale war. The essence of the crisis lies in the clash between the movement for social progress and democracy and the resistance to any progress on the part of the native reactionaries and imperialism, i.e., in the clash between revolution and counter-revolution. As V. I. Lenin wrote, revolution engenders counter-revolution every day, every hour. Such is the dynamics of events in Central America as well. The conflict is not limited only to the given region; all the basic forces of the present day have been drawn into it.

However, wherein lies the characteristic trait of the clash, the opposition between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution in the Central American region? In the bourgeois press, including scholarly publications, there are frequent assertions that, supposedly, the United States has no serious economic interests in Central America, and, therefore, the tension here is determined, in the first place, not by economic but by political and military-strategic problems.³ Of course, the latter must not be belittled. Up to the present time 14,000 merchant vessels a year pass through the Panama Canal, hauling 135 million tons of cargo. The American naval fleet can pass through this canal at any time unhindered within a matter of hours from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific or in the other direction. We can understand, therefore, the persistent attempt by the United States to maintain its control over the military bases which it possesses here, and which allow it to keep the entire region under its guns.⁴ But this is merely one of the reasons why Reagan in his speech of 10 May 1983 to the American Congress proclaimed Central America and the Caribbean Sea as the "fourth border" of the United States.

The anxiety of the United States over the events transpiring in Central America is based on concerns over the revenues which the American monopolies are extracting directly or indirectly from their capital investments and their control over the economy of this region. To this very day half of the volume of all U.S. foreign trade pass through it in transit, along with 25 percent of all the fuel which it imports.

The limited nature of the domestic market of each of the region's countries, their weak capital-intensiveness, and the weak diversification of their

economies have held back the influx of foreign capital in any great volume, but they have led to a rapid monopolization of the principal sectors by relative modest-sized masses of American capital investments. During the 1970's a rather rapid industrialization of these countries took place. Suffice it to say that the intra-regional commodity turnover alone increased during the years 1970--1978 from 297.5 million dollars to 925 million dollars (in current prices), i.e., it more than tripled (more precisely by 309 percent, or an average of 38 percent annually). It must be taken into account, however, that a large part of the goods produced are controlled by trans-national capital, above all, by American capital.⁵

The ever-increasing integration of the Central American countries into the world capitalist economy cannot, nevertheless, solve the national problems of the economy. The main thing which remains is the insolubility of the tasks of creating a minimally proportional domestic economic system, capable of satisfying the need for development, production, and reproduction, i.e., that which is properly understood in the broad sense by a domestic market. Regional economic integration could partially compensate for this deficiency of development; even it, however, would not provide all the components of a "national market." For various reasons the broad strata of working people are interested in a unitarist national movement on condition that it have a revolutionary and democratic thrust, for attempts at economic integration in accordance with the plans of the imperialist monopolies have revealed their inability to solve the socio-economic problems of the peoples of this region and, moreover, have shown that the path proposed by the TNC's [trans-national corporations] leads to an exacerbation of the existing problems and a growth of social tension.

The activities of the TNC's in Central America have convincingly demonstrated their ability to find adequate solutions for maximizing their profits, but they are utterly alien to the tasks of national and regional development proper. The TNC's in Central America cannot propose a balanced plan for solving crises in their national hypostases (even if the trans-national capitalist interests are taken into account). Their alternative for solving certain global problems within the crisis of the world capitalist system is, evidently, linked with an inevitable reduction of this very system, with an inevitable shrinking of its political-geographical borders by means of the partial or complete loss of certain national communities, units, and economies (markets). In other words, the anti-crisis plan of the TNC's can facilitate the preservation of the main systems of world capitalism, but it makes the foundations of the bourgeois society even more rickety in countries where the socio-economic contradictions are particularly acute, thus weakening the existing "weak links" of the imperialist system and engendering new ones.

The very system of imperialist dominance in Central America has created practically insurpassable impediments for implementing this or that national-capitalist model by way of precipitous (evolutionary or radical-reformist) changes in the basic socio-economic structures. This does not mean that the world system of capitalism will not gradually (and by way of modernization according to the prescriptions of the TNC's) create the necessary (and socially minimal) structure for reproducing the basic elements of the production process (including a labor force and, consequently, a sufficiently full market for consumer goods).

But the problem is that international monopoly capital is simply in no position to carry out a modernization, while retaining high profits and a certain level of diversification of the national economy which would ensure the provision of goods to the domestic market (taking into account the acute exacerbation of the competition between monopolies, the tightness of budgets, the restructuring of markets on a world scale, the increased risk of capital investments, the huge indebtedness of a number of large developing countries the amortization of which is physically impossible, and the bankruptcy of these debtors would threaten to bankrupt the entire present-day financial-credit system, etc.). The "social price" of this modernization would be such that, as events in Central and South America, as well as in the Caribbean have shown, the peoples could not bear all the burdens of the socio-economic and political pressure which would continuously squeeze them over a period of 10--15--20 years.

The failure of the attempts at a national-capitalist development, which were undertaken by the bourgeoisie during the 1960's and 1970's, has led to a profound crisis of capitalism in Central America. The reasons for this lie in the fact that the world capitalist system stimulated the integration not of the national communities but merely those sectors of the economy in which the foreign companies operated in a monopolistic manner. The attempts to integrate these sectors into a national economy, as undertaken by the native reformist bourgeoisie, were perceived as hostile actions not only against these companies but also against the governments of the countries where they originated.

The reformist efforts of the bourgeois governments of the 1970's on the whole, of course, testified to the failure of the attempt to create the national-capitalist models to which these governments aspired. But we must not fail to take into consideration the fact that their activity has led to an expansion (quantitative and qualitative) of those sectors of the economy which could be and were co-opted by the TNC's to the process of new integration into the capitalist system. Here, as is often the case, the subjective goal of the political leaders (the national bourgeoisie)--to raise the level of national production--led, in practice, to the inclusion of new sectors of the national economy in the process of internationalization (trans-nationalization), which is objectively inherent to the present-day stage.

Interesting ideas along these lines were expressed at the International Theoretical Conference held in Havana in 1982. "Since the 1970's," the representative of the Communist Party of Cuba said in his speech, "the Latin-American and Caribbean economies have been the subjects of the process of the emergence of a new international division of labor within the world capitalist system.... As a result, the destiny of this region's economic evolution depends, as never before, on the over-all dynamics of capitalism on a world-wide scale.... The process of trans-nationalizing the economies of the Latin-American countries has hardly by-passed a single country, finding one of its manifestations in the final integration of the continent's bourgeoisie into the imperialist big finance and monopoly capital.... This new international division of labor presupposes for the developed countries a specialization in producing the basic items of a complex technology and in the development of science and technology for retaining control over the most advanced technology...."⁶

In accordance with this division of labor, the Central American states within the number of all the developing countries have had to accept the labor-intensive and technologically "dirty" spheres, branches, and sectors of production. In general, what was predominantly raw-material specialization in the past had to be replaced by basically industrial-type specialization (processing mineral raw materials, processing agricultural products, metalworking, chemical, and machine-building industries).

Such a specialization requires a completely new structure of capital. The rate of the changes which are occurring dictates time periods and scope of accumulation which are characteristic of the monopolistic stage of capitalism. It leads to a rapid concentration and a taking out of capital investments from the traditional native sectors of the economy, to their "de-capitalization" and decline, which entails irreversible changes in the structure of the domestic goods exchange and the market.

On the whole, it is clear that the insurgent struggle, civil war, and revolution in Central America constitute the social price for development and modernization according to the prescriptions of the TNC's. The more inflexibly the re-structuring has proceeded on the socio-economic relations in accordance with the Friedman model, which has led to a speed-up of specialization, a concentration and monopolization of the technologically advanced and competitive sectors and sub-divisions of the economy on the world market at the expense of a decline in native industry, and has also facilitated the distribution of the national resources in favor of the monopolies, an increase in the army of the unemployed, and a lowering of the general living standard of the working people, the more social conflict it has produced. The harsher has been the social and political yoke, the more explosive potential has piled up.

The acuteness of the socio-economic contradictions has engendered a profound crisis within the ruling class--the bourgeoisie. The orientation of its upper strata toward trans-nationalization, accelerated accumulation and concentration of capital cannot help but be reflected directly and indirectly in the position of the middle-level and petit bourgeoisie, which is being deprived of sources of financing and credit and is encountering sharply increased competition. It has (with its relatively modest means of production) only one possible orientation--toward the domestic market; but the policy of the monopolies has led to a gradual elimination even of the sources of raw materials for native industry. In addition to this, even though the enterprises created by the TNC's or with their participation pay their personnel only 1/5 or 1/7 the wages for the very same work done in the developed capitalist countries, nevertheless, this is incomparably more than what is paid by the native entrepreneurs. Consequently, they attract the most skilled specialists and workers, taking them away from the native bourgeoisie, who are, therefore, compelled to come to terms, to a greater extent, with the workers' movement and the possibilities to utilize their labor. As a result, the plan of the native circles of the bourgeoisie, which includes national-reformist measures, has clashed quite roughly with the trans-national plan of the monopolies. The profound political crisis of the "upper strata" has not allowed monopoly capital to "peacefully" and "democratically" implement its own model; hence--the establishment of dictatorial and military regimes, capable of suppressing the struggle of the working people as well as that portion of the bourgeoisie which advocates the

viewpoint of national-capitalist development. On the other hand, the platform of the latter is not only Utopian but also historically reactionary, for it clashes directly with an objective law of capitalism--the internationalisation of capital.

Against the background of extremely strong social tension and the exacerbation of the class struggle, an intensifying strike movement, and a general dissatisfaction, a political situation has been created which is interwoven with complex contradictions and fraught with revolutionary explosiveness or the establishment of a fascist dictatorship.

Furthermore, in the Central American states (in any case, in a number of them, such as El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras) the nationalistically minded native bourgeoisie have already come to power and, in class encounters with the proletariat, have already "fixed" their own counter-revolutionary nature. Therefore, the creation of a broad national front in such countries with the participation of the bourgeoisie has been made extraordinarily difficult. This does not mean that these or other strata of the bourgeoisie will not take part in the democratic movement; they will inevitably participate in it without begging permission either from imperialism or even from the political leaders themselves.

It is another matter that the left-wing political parties cannot and must not permit them to have hegemony within the revolutionary-democratic movement, since these are forces which have already tasted power and have already carried out the minimum reforms of which they are capable. And the existing historical experience testifies to the fact that, in the first place, the bourgeoisie and its leaders, despite all the sincerity of their personal motivations to democratize and integrate society, they are capable merely of preparing new sub-divisions of the economy for trans-national integration; and, in the second place, under the slogans of national unity they carry out an even more narrowly class-type and anti-worker policy than the TNC's (and objectively they cannot do otherwise because they have less funds for social policy). The nationalistic bourgeoisie constitute a reserve of the TNC's, when the possibilities of their monopolistic integrationist policy become exhausted. The contradictions between them, although acute (particularly during periods of crisis such as the second half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's) are temporary in nature.

As follows from what has been said above, the possibilities for carrying out the TNC line are limited with respect to time for each country and for the region as a whole by the framework of the socio-economic sectors which are more or less prepared for monopolistic integration. The completion of the next phase of the TNC offensive has engendered crisis phenomena in the economy as well as in politics. Herein a "critical situation" could be created, fraught with the chance of a democratic revolution.

Beginning with the April 1974 revolution in Portugal, bourgeois sociologists have been assiduously working out a model for the transition from a dictatorship to a "free society," i.e., to such a social change as would allow the avoidance of a national-democratic revolution and a loss of control over what is happening by the international and native bourgeoisie. The new

prescriptions have already been employed in Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Peru, Panama, and other countries. The task of revolutionary theory is to find a way to mobilize the resources of the revolutions in such situations so as to effectively oppose the reformist-counter-revolutionary plan with a revolutionary-democratic one.

Thus, if we speak about the socio-economic plan proper of the Central American bourgeoisie, it constitutes a reformist, counter-revolutionary variant of the inclusion of new sectors, branches, and sub-divisions of the economy into the process of trans-nationalization. From a historico-gnoseological point of view it is Utopian and reactionary. Nevertheless, the specific struggle of the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois masses against the tyrannical-dictatorial and fascistic forms of rule, bound to certain TNC stages, compels us to regard them as an object (and subject) of the social policy of the revolutionary-democratic forces. And, inasmuch as their active participation in public life is inevitable, we should find forms and methods of mutual cooperation, on the one hand, and utilize their conflicts with the monopolistic groups, on the other hand.

Of course, the contradictions within the bourgeoisie comprise an indicator of the crisis of the ruling class, the "crisis of the upper strata"; the Central American bourgeoisie as a class has no revolutionary potential. But the specific socio-political struggle--and here again the experience of Nicaragua and El Salvador is convincing--is so complex that it is constantly introducing its own adjustments into the theory. Also from the viewpoint of theory, we must not deny the possibility of the gradual and unique integration of small- and medium-scale private capital into the socialist economy under the conditions of the complete collectivization (nationalization under a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship or under the dictatorship of the proletariat) of monopoly capital, which controls 40--60 percent of the national production, and the functioning of a public (socialist, state) sector as a systems-forming one. This is permissible in theory, but only the practical experience of the revolutionary peoples will be able to prove how much and under what specific conditions this is realizable. And the final elimination of the private ownership of the means of production can be carried out through cooperation and association with the public sector (with the dominant position occupied by the latter), etc. The principal conditions herein are the following two: a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship and the absence of intervention by the international reactionaries (and of the forms of particularly active subversive activity, provoking a civil war), i.e., in the absence of an external, counter-revolutionary, open terror against the revolutionary people (such a terror, would, naturally, provoke revolutionary resistance to the open and potential allies of the counter-revolution within the country).

Therefore, the question of the participation by the native (middle-level) bourgeoisie in the democratic movement must be considered in a complex context (i.e., whether or not it will participate is a matter of indifference, but its contribution to the process of national development could be varied). The nature of the bourgeoisie's participation in the social process depends on many factors and, to no small degree, on the tactics of the left-wing parties, on the degree of unity achieved by them, on the effectiveness of the policy being conducted by them, on the slogans chosen--in the final analysis, on the

strength of the left-wing organizations and movements, on the strength of the revolutionary movement. An important indicator is the influence of the bourgeoisie among the masses: if it retains a significant electorate and control over the mass organizations, then it will attempt to impose its own national-reformist or social-reformist plan.

The present-day conditions of the revolutionary struggle in Central America require a particularly careful analysis of the moving forces and nature of the revolution and the revolutionary process. In our opinion, this process has the following traits: it is directed at eliminating the economic and political domination of foreign capital; at eliminating the economic power and political rule of the native oligarchy, bound up with American imperialism and functioning, as a rule, through the medium of harsh dictatorships; it includes the broad popular masses in social and political life; participating actively in it are the working class, the peasantry, office employees, the intelligentsia, petty and middle-class urban property-owners, as well as broad strata of society, motivated to bring about socio-economic and political changes.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Conferencia teorica internacional. Caracteristicas generales y particulares de los procesos revolucionarios en America Latina y el Caribe," Havana, 26--28 April 1982, p 137.
2. R. Padilla Rush, "El proceso revolucionario hondureno en el momento actual," S. 1, 1983, p 15.
3. POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, Paris, 1983, No 20, p 26.
4. DEFENSE NATIONALE, Paris, January, 1982, pp 91--107.
5. Moreover, it was characteristic of the 1970's that the TNC's rushed into the processing industry. Thus, in the processing industry of Nicaragua American capital owned 85.9 percent of all enterprises, in El Salvador--29.5 percent, in Guatemala--62.4 percent, in Costa Rica--84.5 percent, and in Honduras--83 percent.

The production of chemical, chemical-pharmaceutical items, metalworking, etc. is being actively transferred to the Central American countries. Already in 1976--1978 for Central America as a whole 614 enterprises were operating under the aegis of TNC's; of these 171 were in the chemical-pharmaceutical industry, and 122 in the processing industry; 504 of these 614 enterprises belonged to American companies.--D. Castillo Rivas, "Acumulacion de capital y empresas transnacionales en Centroamerica," Mexico City, 1980, pp 64--95, pp 166--185.
6. "Conferencia teorica internacional...", p 351.

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INTERNATIONAL

NARCOTICS PRODUCTION, TRADE SURVEYED COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 pp 55-61

[Article by S. V. Tagor: "Narcotics: A Clandestine Business"]

[Text] After the end of World War II the illegal trade in narcotics took on a new nature and gradually became an international problem. In recent decades the consumption of all types of narcotics in the developed capitalist countries has sharply increased,¹ and this has entailed a broadening of the scope of contraband trade in them and the influence of this criminal business on the economy and politics of certain countries--the narcotics "producers."

During the 1950's narcotics smuggling from Latin America to the United States was carried out, for the most part, by the Cuban Mafia, which had a powerful, multi-branched organization. After the victory of the Cuban Revolution its base was transferred to Florida and "merged" into the all-powerful North American Mafia.² In recent years its international "families" in league with the governments of certain Latin American countries have expanded the geographical production of the raw materials for obtaining narcotics, and this has brought about an unprecedented cocaine boom. The preference given by the smugglers to the cocaine trade,³ is to be explained, above all, by the fact that income from its sale exceed by far the income from the illegal trade in other types of narcotics. The illegal processing of cocaine has become a profitable "sector" in a whole series of Latin American countries.⁴ On an annual basis, 30,000 kg of contraband cocaine is delivered from Colombia to the United States alone; it has been evaluated at 22 billion dollars.⁵

Most of the cocaine being produced in Latin America is consumed in the United States. In recent times the demand for this narcotic has increased in Western Europe, and its influx into the European "black market" has increased. The threads of this criminal business extend from a number of Latin American capitals to Miami, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, as well as to the port cities of Western Europe. The underground network encompasses producers, wholesale buyers, smugglers, and agents engaged in selling the narcotics. At the disposal of the Mafia, which controls the production of narcotics and their smuggling, are ships and airplanes. The income derived from this criminal trade is used to recruit pilots, sailors, and signal men. These same funds are also used to maintain a whole army of hired killers, who guard the interests of the Mafia and protect this "black" business.

But just what is the degree of involvement of the individual countries of the continent in the production and smuggling of narcotics?

Bolivia

This country ranks high in Latin America and in the world with regard to the illegal production and smuggling of cocaine. On an annual basis Bolivia produces 220 tons of coca paste--a semi-finished product from which cocaine is processed. According to the available data, every year some 100 tons of pure cocaine proceeds from Bolivia to the United States; this amounts to half of the "deliveries" to the United States of this narcotic from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and other Latin American countries taken together. According to data of the UN International Commission on Narcotics, the income of the Mafia from the trade in "Bolivian" cocaine amounted to 1.2 billion dollars in 1980⁶ and reached 2 billion dollars in 1981.⁷ For the sake of comparison it should be said that the entire export of this country in 1980 was equal to 941.9 million dollars.

The coca bush is cultivated, for the most part, in the agricultural regions of the departments of Cochabamba and La Paz. Some 26,500 hectares of agricultural lands are utilized for this purpose. In the department of Cochabamba about 40,000 families live exclusively on the income received from the sale of coca leaves.

The uninterrupted management of such an underground "industry" is impossible without close ties with the country's ruling circles. That is why the Mafia supported the reactionary military upper echelon which interfered with the access to power of the left-wing bloc headed by Siles Zuazo in 1980. The connection between the "cocaine magnates" and the reactionary forces was manifested particularly clearly during the time in power of the military government of Garcia Mesa (1980--1981). Under the protection of the minister of internal affairs, Colonel Luis Arze Gomez,⁸ the Bolivian "cocaine magnates" received great freedom of action within the country. They even unleashed a struggle beyond its borders, since the international Mafia had relegated to them only the role of supplier of raw material, which was processed in the neighboring Latin American countries. During the period when the military were in power, the Bolivian cocaine Mafia grew stronger and "muscle in" on the positions of its competitors.

The task of putting an end to the cocaine Mafia has been one of the most difficult problems confronting the government of Siles Zuazo. In an interview with Gavin Scott, the chief of TIME magazine's South American bureau, he emphasized the following: "We must wage a struggle not for the life but to the death with the narcotics smugglers."⁹ The government has already announced the beginning of a broad-based campaign to combat the smuggling of narcotics. It has also requested aid from the governments of the United States and other Western countries. In line with the program for combatting narcotics, the United States is granting Bolivia 3 million dollars a year.¹⁰ In the opinion of the Bolivian government, however, these funds are clearly insufficient, since the cocaine Mafia has much greater financial resources at its disposal. The new government clearly understands that it will be able to carry out effective measures to interdict the production and smuggling of narcotics only by relying on the

support of the peasants and broad strata of this country's population.

Peru

Peru is one of the largest producers of cocaine in the world. Stretching over a length of 250 miles in the valley of the Huallaga River in the foothills of the Andes are legal plantations of the coca bushes, whose leaves have the highest content of alkaloid cocaine for use in medicine. At the present time the area of plantations permitted by the government has reached 17,860 hectares. The annual harvest of leaves from them amounts to 9,750 tons. But illegal plantations of this bush occupy an area of 50,000 hectares and yield an annual harvest of 28,000 tons.¹¹ Income from smuggling cocaine has reached 800 million dollars a year.¹²

The "capital" of the illegal cocaine trade in Peru has become the city of Pingo Maria, or, as it is called, the "White City," located in the valley of the Huallaga River.

The former military government of Peru adopted Decrees No. 22926 and No. 22927, providing punishment for cocaine smuggling. These decrees are the strictest in Latin America with regard to narcotics smugglers. The civilian government of Fernando Belaunde Terry proclaimed the stepping up of measures to interdict the growing of coca and the smuggling of narcotics. Illegal plantations have been destroyed, and a special senate commission was created. On 28 May 1982 it published a report in which particular attention was paid to instances of corruption in the juridical organs in trying cases dealing with narcotics smugglers.

Colombia

The official statistics assert that first place in this country's exports is occupied by coffee. In reality, however, this is not quite the case. Several years ago the illegal "export" of narcotics had already crowded the export of coffee out of first place. According to various estimates, it brings to this country from 4 billion to 8 billion dollars a year.¹³ Most of this illegal income is provided by marijuana. According to the calculations of the Colombian government, as many as 80,000 families in the country are engaged in growing marijuana and in its illegal trade. According to data published in 1979 by the assistant attorney general, Roberto Garcia Ordonez, on the Guajira Peninsula alone the area devoted to marijuana plantations amounts to 100,000 hectares.¹⁴

Marijuana is grown both by small-scale producers and by large-scale farmers. The small-scale producers use modest-sized plots--totaling only a few hectares (3 hectares on the average), applying simple technology which does not require any great capital outlay. The large-scale producers cultivate marijuana on plantations whose area exceeds 15 hectares. Here use is made of advanced technology, and labor mechanization is being introduced. The wages of a hired laborer, employed on marijuana plantations, are considerably higher than the average wages of ordinary agricultural workers and amount to 300 pesos a day (whereas the average wages for this country do not exceed 127 pesos a day).¹⁵

It is interesting to compare the incomes of a small-scale marijuana producer and a small-scale coffee producer. If the former receives 101,000 pesos of net profit from 1 hectare, the latter receives 42,500 pesos. Such a difference in incomes is also the reason that an ever-increasing number of small-scale farmers cultivating the traditional agricultural crops are switching over to growing marijuana.

Some 95 percent of the marijuana produced in Columbia is "exported." Some 85 percent of it (25,000 tons) is delivered to U.S. markets, while 15 percent goes to Canada and the countries of Western Europe. The "Colombian quota" of marijuana illegally imported into the United States amounts to 60 percent: 30 percent is brought in from Mexico, while 10 percent is shipped in from Jamaica or is produced in the United States itself (in particular, in the Hawaiian Islands and in the northern coastal area of the state of California).¹⁶

Marijuana is brought out of Colombia in two ways: 70 percent--by air, and 30 percent--by water. According to the available data, the country has approximately a thousand secret "airports," 200 of which are situated on the Guajira Peninsula.¹⁷ About 500 airplanes take part in marijuana smuggling.¹⁸

The coast of Colombia has many convenient bays from which it is easy to ship marijuana abroad. Some 100 ships are engaged in this, constantly cruising between Colombia and the United States.¹⁹ They have been furnished with complex electronic equipment. Despite the fact that the Coast Guard boats seize an ever-increasing amount of marijuana, the commander of the Coast Guard units in the United States, Admiral John Hayes, acknowledges that "we manage to seize only 10 percent of the narcotics being brought into the country."²⁰

The chief role played by Colombia in smuggling cocaine is the role of intermediary. Since it possesses a multi-branched, underground network for smuggling marijuana and an extremely advantageous geographical position with egress to the Pacific Ocean as well as to the Caribbean Sea, Colombia is a center for the transfer of cocaine being produced in Peru and Bolivia.

The commander of the troops in the northern provinces, General Jose Maria Villareal Abarca, states the following: "The marijuana plantations are so extensive that it is impossible to destroy them. Therefore, we are attempting to block the warehouses, transshipment points, wharves, and landing strips."²¹ According to data from the Ministry of National Defense, during the period from October 1978 through July 1979 the armed forces seized 75 airplanes (70 of which were North American), 74 ships, and 268 motor vehicles engaged in smuggling narcotics. Colombia's armed forces shot down 5 airplanes belonging to the North American Mafia for refusing to obey orders to land. During the period indicated 1,227 Colombians and 188 foreigners were arrested on charges of narcotics smuggling; 2,600 tons of marijuana were confiscated, and plantings of this crop were destroyed with a total area of 10,200 hectares.²² From August 1978 through February 1979 narcotics were taken from smugglers totaling an amount worth 49 billion pesos, of which 34 billion was accounted for by cocaine, and marijuana--15 billion.²³ In September 1979 the police seized 800 kg of cocaine, valued at 256 billion pesos, or 6.5 billion dollars.²⁴

The problem of narcotics production and smuggling remains one of Colombia's most acute social problems.

Brazil

Up to recent times Brazil has played the role of a minor transshipment point in cocaine smuggling. Now, however, such a "status" for this country has changed in the plans of international "underground business." The smugglers are using every means possible to "stimulate" the growing of coca bushes. The place where they have stepped up their activity is the border region of the Brazilian Amazon Basin. The smugglers have been attracted by the sparseness of its population, the majority of which consists of Indians. The local political authorities complain that the shortage of personnel and equipment makes it impossible for them to put a halt to the ever-increasing smuggling of narcotics. Thus, the chief of the federal police in the Manaus region, Alves de Brito, has declared the "at our disposal are 186 policemen for controlling everything going on in an area equal to the size of Great Britain, France, Spain, and West Germany, taken together."²⁵

As the underground network of illegal trade in narcotics expands, the smugglers are creating newer and newer support points in Brazil. One of them is the city of Manaus, selected by the smugglers because of its convenient location on the bank of the Amazon River and its good airline connections with Miami, Los Angeles, New York, and Paris.

Mexico

Since it has a common border with the United States, which is the largest consumer of narcotics in the world, and favorable climatic conditions for growing the plants from which marijuana and heroin are extracted, Mexico has long been their biggest supplier to the "black market" of the United States. According to government data, in 1975 narcotics worth a total of 1 billion dollars were transferred from Mexico to the United States.²⁶

In order to reduce the scale of heroin penetration onto its own territory, the United States presented Mexico with airplanes and helicopters for discovering illegal plantations. This made it possible for the Mexican government to unleash a broad-based "chemical war" against illegal plantations on the slopes of the Sierra Madre.

The government of Mexico is constantly making efforts with regard to combatting the illegal production and smuggling of narcotics. It strives to combine active deeds by detachments engaged in combatting smuggling with according to the peasants opportunities to grow useful agricultural crops and to sell them at a profit. The fight against narcotics smuggling is being waged by 10,000 soldiers of the regular army; they have at their disposal airplanes, helicopters, and coast guard vessels. In operations against the smugglers just in the Mexico City region from December 1976 to February 1977 the authorities arrested 1,000 persons; they confiscated 234 rifles, 438 pistols, as well as 55 kg of heroin, 170 kg of cocaine, and 126 tons of marijuana.²⁷

Every day about 70 airplanes and helicopters make flights over regions where marijuana is grown in order to discover new plantations. If there are such plantations, special airplanes are called out, which spray them from the air with paraquat--a powerfully acting herbicide.

However, despite the widely announced campaign, the utilization of up-to-date equipment, and U.S. aid, illegal plantings of the opium poppy and marijuana are still being carried on. The peasants grow marijuana and opium poppies on very small plots, which makes it very difficult to discover them. The basic cause impelling the peasants to grow opium poppies and marijuana is material gain. The average peasant household in the Sierra Madre region receives about 400 dollars a year from the sale of bean and corn crops. However, if they plant opium poppies on a plot of only 2.5 acres, they can receive an income ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 dollars.²⁸

Caribbean Basin

The connecting link in the network of smuggling narcotics from Latin America to the United States comprises Panama and Puerto Rico. Every day the airports of these countries are utilized by the smugglers to transfer cocaine and heroin into the consumer-countries. Jamaica, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands have become major transshipment points and bases for the narcotics smugglers. As much as 15 percent of all the contraband cocaine from Latin America to the United States and about 65 percent of the marijuana is transshipped through the Bahamas.²⁹ After Colombia Jamaica is the second largest supplier of marijuana to the North American market. This country's income from marijuana smuggling amounts to 1.1 billion dollars a year.³⁰ If narcotics are shipped from the Bahamas principally by sea, from Jamaica they are sent to the United States by air transport.

Narcotics are delivered to the coasts of the Caribbean Basin states in large batches on large ships. On the islands the contraband cargo is repacked into small packages and shipped to the United States either on fast yachts or on modest-sized, sports-type airplanes. It must be noted that the smuggling routes through the island states function quite effectively. This is to be explained by the fact that many agents not connected between themselves participate in the transference of the narcotics. The U.S. Coast Guard vessels and Customs arrest only a few of them.

Within the Latin American countries there is an increasing understanding of the fact that all attempts to interdict the underground production of narcotics and their smuggling are doomed to failure while the demand for narcotics in the United States is still rising. Hence, a firm opinion has already taken shape in these countries that it is high time for the United States to proceed to solve the problem of narcotics for themselves at home. And the authors of numerous studies conducted in the United States have also come to this very same conclusion. Thus, for example, the report by Senator William Spong, presented for consideration to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, indicates that the problem of combatting narcotics smuggling has been exacerbated basically not by the increase in the volume of their production in the Latin American countries but by the increasing demand for heroin, cocaine, and marijuana on the part of hundreds of thousands of Americans. Studies conducted in the

United States have shown that as long as the demand for narcotics continues to grow here, the smugglers will take any risks in order to ensure their delivery. Senator Spong writes as follows in his report: "The conclusion to which we must inevitably come is at once simple and profound: the problem of our ruinous habit of using narcotics is America's problem."³¹

Senator Spong's report touches upon the essence of the given problem. The American government and society will not be able to put an end to the dreadful evil of drug addiction unless they examine the problem of narcotics as an internal problem for the country. Only a complex of measures with regard to combatting the demand for narcotics can solve the problem of their production and smuggling. The lack of a consistent government program for combatting drug addiction in the United States has provoked dissatisfaction among the Latin American countries.

In most of the world's states, including the Latin American ones, it is understood that joint efforts are needed in order to combat narcotics smuggling. It is precisely this which explains the establishment, under the UN, of a Commission on Narcotics, which includes representatives from the governments of the "producers" as well as from those countries which are "consumers" of narcotics. This commission is subordinate to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). A great deal of aid is rendered to it by the specialized agencies of the UN. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) engages in research studies in the field of treating drug addiction, UNESCO carries out programs with regard to informing the population of the harmful effects of narcotics on human health, FAO has worked out economically advantageous projects for growing agricultural crops, and PROON has studied the consequences of the "underground economy" for those countries which are narcotics "producers." In order to coordinate and intensify work along these lines, a Special Fund for the Control of Narcotics Abuses was set up in 1971 within the framework of the UN. At the Fund's disposal are financial means amounting to 15 million dollars a year, coming in in the form of dues. It must be emphasized, however, that the international organizations have not yet utilized all the available possibilities for rendering aid to those countries where the problems of the "underground business" and smuggling of narcotics go beyond the bounds of the "ordinary."

In Latin America cooperation is also being carried out with regard to the struggle against narcotics smuggling in the regional level. In 1973 the Latin American states signed a treaty in Buenos Aires on combatting narcotics smuggling. It went into effect in March 1977, after it was ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador. In June 1978 the first regional conference was held in Buenos Aires; there the participating countries once again affirmed their determination to combat narcotics smuggling.

Nevertheless, the facts have shown that the illegal production and smuggling of narcotics is constantly expanding in Latin America, and the traditional methods of combatting it are clearly insufficient. In order to solve this problem in a radical way, it is not enough to attempt to root out the smugglers and underground producers of narcotics; we must, first of all, solve the social problems which lead people to drug addiction, and we must change the

situation within which the rural population engages in growing those crops from which narcotics are made.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the United States alone during 1979 some 42 million persons used a total of 65,000 kg of marijuana per day. This is four times the marijuana consumption in 1974. The profits of the Mafia, which engages in the sale of this narcotic, amount to 25 billion dollars a year.--EL TIEMPO, Bogota, 28 January 1979. From 1978 through 1980 the number of drug addicts in the United States in the age group from 12 to 17 years increased by 25 percent. One out of every four persons from 18 to 25 years old smokes marijuana every day.--E. Samper Pizano et al., "La legalizacion de la marijuana," Bogota, 1980, p 10.
2. See Hank Messick, "Of Grass and Snow: The Secret Criminal Elite," New Jersey, 1979.
3. Cocaine is produced from the leaves of the coca--a bush growing on the slopes of the Andes in such countries as Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. This bush has been known to the Indians for thousands of years: the leaves of the coca used to be chewed in order to deaden the feeling of hunger, stand the cold better, and lessen fatigue. The Indians used to call the coca bush the "White Goddess." According to Indian legend, the founder of the Inca dynasty, Manco Capac, received the coca bush as a gift from his father--the Sun--and brought it to Earth.
4. In Latin America the opium poppy and coca bush are grown legally, and opium and cocaine, respectively, are obtained from them, to be used in the production of medicines. For example, 90 percent of the legally produced opium goes into the manufacture of morphine.
5. EL TIEMPO, 1 October 1979.
6. The American magazine NEWSWEEK has calculated that the Mafia's income from contraband "Bolivian" cocaine in 1980 reached 1.6 billion dollars--NEWSWEEK, Washington, No. 6, 1981, p 11.
7. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Paris, No. 330, 1981, p 18.
8. Luis Arze Gomez is now living in emigration in Argentina. The Siles Zuazo government is seeking his extradition to face charges on numerous crimes, including narcotics smuggling.
9. TIME, New York, No. 43, 1982, p 22.
10. NEWSWEEK, No. 6, 1981, p 12.
11. CARETAS, Lima, No. 701, 1982, p 20.
12. NEWSWEEK, No. 6, 1981, p 12.

13. EL TIEMPO, 24 June 1979.
14. Ibid.
15. VANGUARDIA AGRARIA, Bogota, 1 April 1979.
16. Ibid.; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Washington, No. 19, 1980, p 59.
17. EL ESPECTADOR, Bogota, 24 June 1979.
18. VANGUARDIA AGRARIA, 1 April 1979.
19. Ibid.
20. EL TIEMPO, 28 January 1979.
21. EL TIEMPO, 29 January 1979.
22. EL TIEMPO, 1 October 1979.
23. EL TIEMPO, 4 February 1979.
24. EL TIEMPO, 12 September 1979.
25. NEWSWEEK, No. 6, 1981, pp 15--16.
26. EXCELSIOR, Mexico City, 27 March, 1977.
27. Ibid.
28. P. Lupsha and K. Schlegel, "The Political Economy of Drug Trafficking. The Herrera Organization (Mexico and U.S.)," New Mexico, 1980, p 10.
29. NEWSWEEK, No. 6, 1981, p 16.
30. Ibid.
31. "Drugs, Politics and Diplomacy: The International Connection," Beverly Hills--London, 1974, p 60.

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MONOGRAPH SERIES ON POLITICO-SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN MAJOR STATES

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 pp 127-130

[Review-article by S. V. Patrushev on the following books: "Peru: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoye i politicheskoye razvitiye (1968--1980 gg.)" [Peru: Socio-Economic and Political Development (1968--1980)], editor-in-chief, Yu. A. Zutritskiy, Moscow, "Nauka", 1982, 296 pages; "Meksika: Tendentsii ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'no-politicheskogo razvitiya" [Mexico: Tendencies of Economic and Socio-Political Development], editor-in-chief, V. V. Vol'skiy, Moscow, "Nauka", 1983, 389 pages; "Braziliya: Tendentsii ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'no-politicheskogo razvitiya" [Brazil: Tendencies of Economic and Socio-Political Development], editor-in-chief, V. V. Vol'skiy, Moscow, "Nauka", 1983, 367 pages]

[Text] The collective monographs under review here belong to the series of comprehensive works on various countries, as prepared by the Latin America Institute.* These studies are devoted to the most important countries, those which, to a great extent, determine the features of the continent, those which account for a good two-thirds of the population and three-fourths of the economic potential of the region. But even that is not the essence of the matter. We are confronted here with societies which have manifested during the last few decades what one foreign researcher has designated as the "surprises" of Latin American development. Included among such manifestations, which were unexpected for many people, although, of course, with various criteria, are the phenomenon of the Peruvian Revolution, which marked out new opportunities, paths, and forms of the liberation movement, and the experiment at speeded-up capitalist modernization--the upward flight and collapse of the "Brazilian economic miracle," and what has now become the completely obvious crisis of the longest-lived "model of development" in the region--the Mexican, touching upon its key element--a political system which has unprecedented stability for Latin America.

To understand these phenomena means to study attentively, carefully, and in a multi-faceted way many factors--domestic and foreign--of national development,

* The first book in this series--"Argentina: tendentsii ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'no-politicheskogo razvitiya" [Argentina: Tendencies of Economic and Socio-Political Development] was published in 1980 (For reviews of it see: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 6, 1981; NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, 1982, No 4).

to delve deeply into the essence and traits of the processes characteristic of various stages of history and the social life of the countries under consideration. It is precisely on such a foundation, multi-leveled and, therefore, extremely complex to implement, but also most fruitful, that the works under review have been constructed.

Within the known likeness of the general structure, which rises from the base to the social super-structure, from the economy to domestic and foreign policy, each monograph has a logic of exposition inherent only to it. Naturally, it is devoted primarily to the realities of the country, to its "uniquely expressed features." But an essential role has also been played by the "super-tasks" assigned to the authors' groups themselves.

The purpose of the work devoted to Peru is to study the almost 12-year period of rule by the military, which, as is rightly emphasized in the book, "left a deep mark in Peruvian history and exerted an enormous influence on its subsequent course" (p 11). What is fundamental in this book is an analysis of the lessons to be drawn from the revolutionary process, its phases, contents, and moving forces, a study of the problem of revolutionary changes, the formation of new production-organizational structures, along with the political and ideological institutions of the revolutionary period. At the center of second work under consideration is the problem of the "juncture" between the basic blocs of the model of stable development, "the inextricable inter-connection among the socio-economic as well as the domestic and foreign aspect of the government's policy, the entire complex set of methods of social and political maneuvering and practice of moderate bourgeois reformism" (p 4). The main thing for the authors of the third book is to trace the development of the country through the prism of the opposition between various tendencies and alternatives, based on "profound processes of an objective nature" (p 328).

It is difficult to estimate which of the approaches is more preferable; most likely--a synthesis of them, although it is fully understandable that it would not be easy to carry this out. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to note that the works on Peru and Mexico, in our opinion, would only gain if the contents analysis of the events of 1968--1980 or the mechanism of the functioning of the Mexican "model" had been incorporated within the general "authorial" concept of the socio-historical development of the corresponding countries. The attempt--and an extremely interesting one!--aimed at creating such a concept is, undoubtedly, an important achievement of the study devoted to Brazil. It is particularly necessary to single out the splendidly executed essay on the genesis of capitalism, which became a point of departure for the ensuing analysis. And, although the examination of the present-day "Brazilian model" could, obviously, have been more systematic (the affirmation of this is the experience of the work by the Mexicanists), the initially broad-based approach of the Brazilian experts has allowed us to reach an evaluation of the prospects for economic and, to a certain extent social, development of the "Latin American giant."

Before we attempt to express certain ideas directly or indirectly stemming from the studies under examination, let's outline, as precisely as necessary, the circle of those fundamental questions which, with varying degrees of completeness have been reflected in the given works. In the economic sphere

this includes the role, forms, and methods of activity of foreign capital (for the most part, of trans-national corporations), of the state sector and local private enterprise; the problems of industrial development and the stimulation of scientific and technical progress; the evolution and the characteristics of agrarian relations; the questions of economic policy. In the socio-political sphere this includes the dynamics of the class and the social structure; the characteristics of the arrangement of social-class forces and the characteristic traits of the ruling bloc; the development of the labor and other mass movements; the political system and its institutions; the positions of the armed forces in the society and the struggle between tendencies within them; the role played by the Catholic Church. The ideological sphere encompasses the opposition between concepts of national development. Foreign-policy questions include the place of the corresponding country within the world community; the doctrines and practice of relations with the world's chief states, including the Soviet Union.

All these diverse topics are encompassed, so to speak, by one over-all hoop. This is the problem of development, the problem of seeking out ways, methods, and means of co-opting the societies under consideration to genuinely up-to-date forms of social progress. The characteristics and the complexity of the situation consist in the fact that, at the turn of the 20th century, in the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism, the countries of Latin America, as the study on Brazil justifiably emphasizes, cannot and "will not --without a combination of extraordinary, exceptional, and, hence, temporary circumstances--mechanically repeat the evolution of the imperialist powers or the stages of capitalist formation, close to their own sunset or historically already past it" (p 326).

In this connection, the natural "axis" of our "hoop," around which all three studies rotate, could be called the question of the correlation of the role of the economic and non-economic, in particular, the political factors of development. Under the historically unique conditions of the Latin American societies this question has its own specific, which can be, to a large extent, disclosed in analyzing the problem of the state as an active, sometimes decisive regulator and leading participant in production relations and, consequently, social relations as well as bearer of power, the nucleus of the political system.

It was precisely the state which was regarded by the revolutionary-democratic leaders of the military government of Peru in the ascending period of the revolution (1968--1975) a moving force and the basis of national development (pp 21, 32). As demonstrated in the books under review, it was precisely this which was and has essentially remained the leading agent of change in the economic structure and, at the same time, a powerful factor of class-formation and transformation at all levels of the social structure of the Mexican (pp 9, 122--123) and the Brazilian (pp 66, 124, 184) societies.

Moreover, the state strives not only in the economic sphere to "fill in"--by means of its own entrepreneurial-regulating activity--the gaps in the reproduction ties, which are a direct consequence of a development deformed by the conditions of imperialist dependency. Let us note, by the way, that the fact of the existence of such gaps, as pointed out by the authors of the book on

Mexico (pp 135, 147), is yet another confirmation of the unique "spread" in time and in economic space, of the processes of forming local monopolies and a monopolistic re-structuring of the entire economic, i.e., the transition to the monopolistic stage of capitalist evolution, which requires criteria of analysis other than those applied to the societies of developed capitalism.

The attempt to "integrate" society, to impart a wholeness to the social organism "from above" is also to be observed in other areas of public life. An example of this is furnished by the persistent efforts of the state and the social communities connected with it to achieve a horizontal and vertical consolidation of the ruling classes, although these efforts have been undermined by such a policy of modernization of the production apparatus as inevitably intensifies inter- and intra-class differentiation, as is noted in the book on Brazil (p 44).

Perhaps the process of "organizing society by the state" has been manifested most vividly in the substantially different variants in two countries--Mexico and Peru. The state which was created by the political formation here--the Mexican PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party], which is difficult to regard as a purely party institution, or the (different in nature and less developed in form) SINAMOS [National System for the Support of Social Mobilization] in Peru--were accorded the functions of drive-belts, called upon to facilitate the transformation, "harnessing," and reproduction of the structures of political and civil society, and also--by means of an all-encompassing state regulation--their common orientation in accordance with the aspirations of the ruling groups. Moreover, if in the case of Mexico we are talking about the aspiration to "create" a bourgeois type of society, in the case of Peru--it concerns an attempt to "organize" a society of a different, non-, and even anti-bourgeois type.

An original and extremely important factor of the state's "integrationist" efforts is its ideological activity. The authors of the books under review have provided a detailed characterization of the ideological sources, foundations, and groundwork of the goals and tasks of state intervention in social life; they examine the mechanism and the characteristics of introducing the appropriate ideological constructs into the mass consciousness. This is, above all, a statist kind of nationalism, one which, however, has substantially differing variants and forms in each country, and which has played an historically varied role in social life.

Analysis of the foreign-policy sphere organically continues the study of the intra-country aspects of the given problem. It must be noted that the authors of all these works have succeeded in noticeably deepening the working out of these questions; this is particularly obvious in comparison with the first book of the given series (devoted to Argentina), the foreign-policy part of which suffered from excessive descriptiveness.

The works under review convincingly demonstrate the occurrence in recent years of a growth in the foreign-policy activity of the countries being examined, a diversification of their ties, including, above all, a rapprochement with the developing states and an expansion of contacts with the world of socialism. The main of this process--among other causes--lie in the exacerbation and even

crisis of relations with the United States, and also--not in last place--in strengthening the positions of the socialist forces connected with the state sector of the economy.

The principal value of the books under review consists in that, by pulling together into a unified complex the consideration of many aspects of social life, by "summing up" its development, they have, by necessity, summarized the "preliminary results" of the preceding, as a general rule, lengthy "partial" investigations by scientific groups and separate researchers. They have elucidated the boundaries which have been reached in this research field, the depth to which it has been "plowed," and the "blemishes" which have remained, and, thereby, they have outlined the directions and milestones of future scholarly research. Such works as these allow the reader (let's hope, not just the Soviet reader but also the foreign reader--after these publications have been translated into other languages) to obtain an integrated concept of the problems, tendencies, and prospects for development of the countries whose rule in the modern-day world is growing.

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INTERNATIONAL

INSTITUTE SPONSORS CONFERENCE ON CUBA'S ROLE IN WORLD

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 pp 135-136

[Article by A. O. Pavlov (Kiev) and Oliver Sapiro (Cuba): "Socialist Cuba in the Present-Day World"]

[Text] On 16 December 1983 a scientific conference was held in Kiev. Entitled "Socialist Cuba in the Present-Day World," it was organized by the UkSSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, the Kiev State University imeni T. G. Shevchenko (KGU), and the USSR Academy of Sciences Latin America Institute (ILA).

The introductory remarks to the conference participants were delivered by the rector of the KGU, Corresponding Member of the UkSSR M. U. BELYY. After noting the world-historical importance of the Cuban people's achievements in building socialism, he laid particular stress on the role played by international solidarity with the Island of Freedom, and he demonstrated the importance of Soviet-Cuban cooperation for strengthening the outpost of socialism in the Western Hemisphere. M. U. Belyy dwelt in detail on the participation of the university's group in Soviet-Cuban scientific and cultural cooperation.

The director of the USSR Academy of Sciences ILA, Doctor of Economic Sciences Professor V. V. VOL'SKIY noted the increasing role played by research on the problems of latin America being conducted in the Union republics. The KGU's Latin American specialists have actively participated in working out the problems of the revolutionary and liberation process in the countries of this region. The Scientific Center on the Problems of Latin America has already functioned successfully for 10 years now at the KGU. Within its framework 22 candidates' dissertations have been prepared and defended, 4 monographs have been published, as well as other scientific works on the problems of Latin America.

Among the tasks confronting Soviet Latin American studies, V. V. Vol'skiy singled out the need for a multi-faceted analysis of the important of the experience of the Cuban Revolution in building the foundations of socialism and its international importance.

Candidate of Economic Sciences A. D. BEKAREVICH thoroughly analyzed the achievements of Socialist Cuba and demonstrated the dynamics of the country's economic development, emphasizing particularly that the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product and the national income in Cuba is considerably higher

than in any other Latin American country. After talking about the successes of the Cuban people in the social sphere, particularly in education and health care, as well as about the fundamental trends of the country's economic growth in the future, A. D. Bekarevich noted that Cuba was successfully implementing the program for building a socialist society, as outlined by the decisions of the historic First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba and made more specific by the Second Congress of the Cuban Communists.

The basic stages and principles of the republic's foreign-policy activity were thoroughly analyzed in his report by Docent V. V. PASHCHUK. He noted that right after the Revolution the task of defending the gains made by the people and of creating favorable external conditions for their development was moved to the foreground. An enormous role in strengthening the revolutionary gains was played by the fraternal aid of the USSR and other socialist states. Relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community have continued to remain the most important factor for strengthening Cuba's international positions. The speaker noted the increase in the role played by Cuba on the Latin American continent.

During the course of the work of the sections more than 30 reports and communications were heard; they were delivered by lecturers, graduate students, and undergraduate students from the USSR, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, Cuba, Peru, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mali, Chad, Togo, and other countries.

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INTERNATIONAL

EVOLUTION OF RIGHT-WING REGIME IN BRAZIL OUTLINED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 pp 137-144

[Article by A. A. Sosnovskiy: "Brazil: The 'Doctrine of National Security' and the Evolution of the Regime"]

[Excerpts] On the threshold of the election of a new head of state--a successor to the present-day president, J. B. Figueiredo--upcoming in November 1984 public opinion and the press of the largest Latin American country are paying persistent attention to the question of the place and the role of military institutions and doctrines in the political system of contemporary Brazilian society.

The increased interest shown toward this problem is also linked to the development of events in Argentina, where the transition of power to a civilian government has been accompanied by a decisive demarcation from the political course and ideology of the military regime of 1976--1983 (a period when the "doctrine of national security" (DNE) served in Argentina as a grounds for the "dirty war" waged by reactionary militaristic circles against the democratic forces).

Today, in analyzing the similarities and differences between the Brazilian and Argentine variants of the doctrine, researchers and the press are more and more often asking the following question: will the future leaders of Brazil retain the heritage of the political course followed by their predecessors--the military-type governments of the years 1964--1984, or will they start out on a completely different path? This question is undoubtedly likewise of interest to the Brazilian military. Therefore, certain candidates for the position of the country's president in striving to secure the support of the army, have not skimped on their promises not to allow the "Argentinization" of Brazil.

The attention being paid by Brazilian public opinion, as well as that of many researchers, to the problem has also been brought about by the attempts activated recently by the Reagan administration to revive among the Latin American military an adherence to the ideological standards of the "cold war."

Indicative in this regard was the recently completed visit to Brazil by the U.S. secretary of state, G. Shultz, during the course of which he managed to "push through" a number of agreements on cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere.

Thus, the growth of interest in analyzing the ideology and political practice of the pro-imperialist, militarist, and technocratic circles which are actively attempting to carry out their own "model" of accelerated capitalist development in the states of this region is scarcely accidental. In the final analysis, it has been brought about by an exacerbation of the struggle around the alternatives and tendencies of national development among the Latin American states.

Different variants of the "doctrine of national security," beginning in the mid-1960's, make up the foundation of the anti-democratic course followed by most of the right-wing authoritarian military regimes of Latin America. But the Brazilian variant of the doctrine of military security is an example of the chronologically first and most complete attempt at a practical application of this doctrine. Furthermore, it was precisely the Brazilian variant which exerted the most substantial influence on the emergence of the right-wing authoritarian ideology in other countries of the continent.

During the 1950's the Military College (VVS) had already worked out a scrupulously drawn up system of ideological priorities, among which could be included a combination of an ambitious, right-wing nationalistic geopolitical concept and a pro-American foreign-policy orientation, along with elements of economic modernization and social conservatism. Such a "multi-purpose" nature allowed the doctrine of the Military College to become the ideological base for fusing the interests of the various factions of the ruling classes with the upper level of the armed forces. Thus, already in those years the Military College leadership was paying attention not only to the tasks of working out the fundamentals of a "more rational" state, but also to training personnel for a new "elite" which would be heterogeneous in its composition.

As the ties became stronger between the upper level of the officers, big capital, and the civilian technocratic circles (since the early 1960's an important role was played in this by the IPES [Institute of Higher Economic Studies], connected with the Military College)⁸, as well as the increase in the number of this school's graduates occupying key posts in the army and in the state apparatus⁹, the theoretical developments of the Military College began to lose the "academic quality" which had previously been inherent to them. Now the basic attention of its research staff was concentrated on the most acute and urgent problems of national activity. "The ideas and proposals expressed in the auditoriums of the Military College no less than 5 years prior to the 1964 coup encompassed a wide range of problems--from recarving the borders (eliminating the traditional political forces and forming federations within "natural" economic boundaries) to establishing a two-party system."¹⁰

The solidarity, ideological unity, and corporate-type spirit of the Military College graduates predetermined, to a large extent, the fact that it was precisely they who turned out to be the most prepared to head up the rather motley bloc of forces which in 1964 overthrew the government of J. Goulart. Their hegemony was also maintained in the initial phase of the military regime's rule. The statistical data allow us to quite accurately define their role in carrying out the coup and working out the foundations of the "Brazilian model." Some 60 percent of the graduates of the Military College and only 15 percent of the graduates of other educational institutions among the

Brazilian generals took an active part in the coup.¹¹ Already by 1962 some 90 percent of the officers promoted to the rank of general were graduates of this school. As the American researcher R. Schneider wrote, "a general who had not gone through the Military College became as rare as a one-legged soccer player."¹²

Immediately following the 1964 coup the decisive role played by the Military College in defining the new political course was determined both by its strategic position in the armed forces, which guaranteed for it the establishment of political and ideological contacts between the military and the civilian elite, as well as by the development of the doctrine of national security itself, which envisioned the isolation of the workers from participating in political life and Brazil's firm positions in the defense of the "Western world" under the political hegemony of the United States.¹³

The first military government, headed up by Castello Branco, consisted to the extent of 90 percent of military and civilian technocrats who were closely connected with the Military College and the IPES.¹⁴ The ruling faction possessed quite a high degree of internal monolithicity. Initially its members counted on staying in power for a relatively brief period of time, that which was necessary for suppressing the revolutionary movement and the resistance of the workers and speeding up the rate of economic growth. In accordance with this task, the political program of the "Castellists" provided for the retention of many elements of the previous political system (in particular, the multi-party system), but under the effective control of the military.

Implementation of this plan at this stage was impossible by virtue of a number of factors: the government's anti-inflationary measures did not lead to immediate results, the resistance of the bourgeois opposition proved to be stronger than anticipated, and the regime itself was not yet sufficiently firmed up. Under these conditions there was a sharp upswing among the military in the influence of the members of the so-called "hard line"--a faction comprised basically of extremely right-wing officers of the middle generation (the "colonels"), who advocated a strengthening of the anti-communist and authoritarian tendencies, limitations on the participation of civilians in governing the state, and the development of the regime's right-wing nationalist thrust. Increased pressure on the government coming from the "hard-liners" led to a whole series of "coups within the coup," as a result of which the regime's course was transformed more and more to the right: in October 1965 Institutional Act No. 5 was adopted, which eliminated the multi-party system, limitations were placed on the powers of the legislative organs, several governors were removed from power, militarization of the state apparatus was stepped up, repressions were unleashed not only on the members of the left-wing forces but also affected the leaders of the moderate bourgeois opposition. After the adoption in 1967 of a new constitution, cast in the spirit of the doctrine of national security and aimed at institutionalizing the regime, an entire series of so-called institutional and supplementary acts were adopted; these led to a strengthening of the repressions and to still greater limitations placed on democracy.

The passing of power to Castello Branco's successor, A. Costa e Silva (1967--1969) marked the final loss of political hegemony by the Military College graduates. After the adoption of Institutional Act No. 5, which allotted

dictatorial powers to the president, and the removal of Costa e Silva from power completed the period of the regime's emergence. The economic upsurge which began in 1968 created the foundation for its consolidation and relative stabilization.

The strengthening of the influence of the bearers of right-wing, nationalist, conservative tendencies in the Brazilian military upper levels, naturally, had an effect on the further development of the regime's ideology. This, however, did not lead to a rejection of the doctrine of national security, inasmuch as the "hard-liners" were unable to propose an integrated alternative either to the political plan of the Military College or to its ideological concepts. They did not have at their disposal sufficiently skilled administrative personnel, nor did they enjoy the confidence of the big capitalists under the conditions whereby the direct threat of a revolutionary crisis, which had existed in the early 1960's, had already been eliminated. As a result, a unique compromise was reached between the two principal military-political and ideological trends within the framework of the Brazilian military's upper echelon. The "convergence" of the doctrine of national security and the right-wing, nationalist views was directed at reducing the elements of elitism; it was supposed to ensure access to power not only to the higher officer class but also to the lower levels of the command staff. At the same time, beginning in the mid-1960's, the teaching of "national security" was introduced as a required subject at such military educational institutions as the Command and General Staff School (FSE ME) and the Agullas Negras Academy. These measures, together with easing the access to officers' schools for members of the relative lesser-propertied classes and increasing the salaries of the junior officers, have become a part of the comprehensive program of the ruling upper class with regard to strengthening its support in the army.

At the Military College itself the intensification of the right-wing, nationalist tendency began to be felt as early as mid-1967, when the school was headed up by General A. Fragoso. It was precisely then that an attempt was undertaken to work out such a variant of the doctrine as could combine the interests of the rival military factions, the civilian technocratic elite, and monopoly capital, and, thereby, the functional quality of the Brazilian "model" under the conditions of the incipient "economic boom." The "Brazilian miracle" facilitated the consolidation of the ruling factions. And it was precisely as a result of the intensification of centripetal tendencies within the "model" that a temporary stabilization of the regime was achieved. The ideological aspect of this process consisted of the fact that, by the end of the 1960's there had occurred a final synthesis of the great-power nationalist concepts and the thesis of the need for a speeded-up capitalist development as the most important condition for political stability, capable of damping down the "red heat" of the revolutionary movement. The economic priorities herein were shifted in the direction of the state sector--the material base of the military-bureaucratic upper echelon. This synthesis also imparted the finishing touches to the Brazilian variant of the doctrine of national security as the ideology of the "mature" Brazilian "model" during the period of its consolidation (1968--1974).

The "improved" variant of the doctrine of national security which took shape on the basis of the factors enumerated above within the walls of the Military College--the "doctrine of national security and development"--found its embodiment

most fully in the course of the third military government (under President E. Garrastazu Médici). Relying on what had been newly achieved, creating the illusion of the monolithic unity between the regime and the internal unity of the army, attempting to institutionalize itself by means of economic achievements, having broad recourse herein to corporativism and social demagoguery, this government had much more scope for political maneuvering than did its predecessors. As F. M. Cardoso wrote about this period, "the regime and its ideology, by remaining authoritarian and considering a centralized state and bureaucracy as the basic instruments for strengthening the positions of national development, reminded one of the political organization and ideas of the period of the 'New State'."¹⁵ Retaining its anti-communist thrust, the regime's ideologists, to an increasingly greater degree, turned to the ideas of development, in which they saw a pledge of stability. Under the conditions of the "economic boom," which was widely trumpeted by the nationalist propaganda, there was an intensification of faith in the unshakability of the existing state of affairs among broad strata of the population, stupefied by the vision of a future "national greatness." This was also facilitated by the fact that at that stage of the country's development the direct threat to the capitalist system from the Brazilian revolutionary and labor movements was temporarily neutralized.

However, even the very favorable economic conditions of the period known as the "Brazilian miracle," under the conditions of the acts of the extraordinary legislature, the most vivid specimens of which were Institutional Act No. 5 and the National Security Law, which removed de facto all limitations on persecuting the regime's opponents, could ensure only a temporary stabilization of the situation, scarcely eliminating the acute contradictions embedded in the foundations of the "Brazilian model." The stormy albeit brief period of economic growth brought about serious social shifts, among which could be included the mass migration of the rural population to the cities and an increase of the marginal strata, the growth of the proletariat, the blatant contrasts between wealth and poverty at the different "poles" of social life, etc. All this facilitated the growth of new crisis factors, one of which by the beginning of the 1970's was the exacerbation of the contradictions within the ruling bloc, which included within itself representatives of monopoly capital, the military upper echelon and technocracy. The expansion of the state into the sphere of economic relations began to encounter increasing opposition on the part of influential strata of private capital, whose interests turned out to be infringed upon.¹⁶

Changes in the attitudes of a considerable portion of the ruling classes, fraught with a condemnation of the unstable social base of the governing regime, manifested themselves in the mid-1970's. Recognition of this danger became one of the factors which compelled the ruling upper echelon, without changing the essence of its own ideology, to have recourse to a certain re-arrangement of their priorities and to begin gradually to maneuver in the direction of "liberalization."

During the period when the Geisel government was in power (1974--1979) there occurred a unique kind of return to the political program and ideological traditions of "Castellism." There was an increased importance for such traditional institutions of "representative democracy" as political parties and a parliament; things had served in previous years merely as a screen for the

military dictatorship. At the end of the 1970's Institutional Act No. 5, which was hated by all the democratic forces of Brazil, was abolished. This measure testified to the growing recognition of the genuine threat of a social outburst. In the estimate of the Brazilian press, Geisel, by abolishing Institutional Act No. 5, "defused the time bomb which this represented for the regime." Moreover, the most prominent leaders of the "hard-liners"--the military minister S. Frot and the commander of the Second Army, E. d'Avila Melo--were removed from power. At the same time the course of the Geisel government toward liberalization was not consistent. It functioned with a look backward at the most conservative part of the military upper echelon. Under pressure from the ultra-right-wingers, in particular, the reactionary "April package" of legislative measures was adopted; it included two amendments to the constitution and eight decrees of an anti-democratic nature, conceived as an additional "leash" for the opposition.

More noticeable were the new trends which began to be manifested in the Geisel government's foreign policy--in the further strengthening of Brazil's autonomous course with regard to the United States, the attempts to play the role of leader of the "third world," a pragmatic trade policy, which was expressed, in particular, in expanding the ties with the socialist countries.

The time in power of the government of President J. B. Figueiredo, who entered upon his duties in March 1979, became a period of considerable acceleration of the "liberalization" process. Amnesty for the regime's opponents, restoration of the multi-party system, the holding in November 1982 of general elections, which became an important step on the path of returning to the norms of bourgeois democracy--all these testify to the serious attempts being made to restructure the internal political life of Brazil. In striving to maintain control over the development of the political processes connected with "liberalization," the ruling circles have had more and more active recourse to the ideological positions of populism. In pointing out this specific trait of "liberalization," the Brazilian press stated that the "regime, no matter how paradoxical this may seem, has been compelled to return to populism in order to survive."

The turn toward "liberalization" was brought about, on the one hand, by the fulfillment of the task of the accelerated transition of Brazilian capitalism to its state-monopolistic stage. On the other hand--the economic decline during the mid-1970's revealed the blatant contradictions and antagonisms of Brazilian society, contradictions which deepened considerably during the years of military rule. Liberalization signifies a turning away from the extraordinary political structures of the preceding "transitional" period, not only regulated "from above," but also partially compelled, carried out under the pressure of broad-based democratic forces.

It is obvious that, under the new conditions, it will be all the more difficult for the advocates of the doctrine of national security to maintain their ideological hegemony within the framework of the ruling bloc. In recent years the democratic aspirations of Brazilian society have seriously affected even the military, including that "Holy of Holies" of the doctrine of national security--the Military College. It is not by chance that, since 1979, the swearing of allegiance by the Military College leadership in support of the process of internal political democratization has become a unique kind of tradition.¹⁷

However, even in the program documents of the new, governmental Social-Democratic Party, which was created after the 1980 party reform, and in the utterances of prominent political leaders quite a few of the traditional positions of the doctrine of national security have been retained as before. Nor must we fail to take into account the fact that, in the last few years, the rigid stereotypes inherited from the period of the "cold war" have been used more and more frequently by that portion of the Brazilian military which, in entering upon the role of a right-wing opposition to the course of the present-day government, would like to return the country to the times of dictatorship. The doctrine of national security itself, as has been shown by its 30-year evolution in Brazil, can change its form with sufficient flexibility, depending upon the political and social conditions.

FOOTNOTES

8. For a more detailed treatment see R. A. Dreifuss, "1964: A conquista do Estado. Acao-politica, poder e golpe de classe," Petropolis, 1981.
9. By 1966 its graduates included 599 military men, 224 entrepreneurs, 200 officials in the most important ministries, 97 officials in government agencies, 39 members of parliament, 23 judges, and 107 persons in the liberal professions.
10. As quoted from "Authoritarian Brazil. Origins, Policies and Future," edited by A. Stepan, New Haven--London, 1973, p 55.
11. A Stepan, "The Military in Politics. Changing Patterns in Brazil," Princeton, 1971, p 184.
12. R. M. Schneider, "The Political System of Brazil. Emergence of a 'Modernizing' Authoritarian Regime, 1964--1970," New York--London, 1971, p 244.
13. E. R. de Oliveira, "As forcas armadas: politica e ideologia no Brasil (1964--1969)," Petropolis, 1976.
14. A. Stepan, Op. cit., p 240.
15. F. H. Cardoso, "O modelo politico brasileiro e outros ensaios," Sao Paulo, 1977, p 53.
16. For a more detailed treatment see M. A. Cheshkov, "Kritika predsstavleniy o pravyashchikh gruppakh razvivayushchikhsya stran" [A Critique of the Ideas concerning the Ruling Groups of the Developing Countries], Moscow, 1979, p 178.
17. See, for example: VEJA, Sao Paulo, 5 September 1979, pp 26--27; O GLOBO, Rio de Janeiro, 20 March 1981.

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INTERNATIONAL

TNC'S, U.S. TRADE POLICY, IMF BLOCK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 13 Apr 84)
pp 11-25

[Article by L. L. Klochkovskiy and I. K. Sheremet'yev: "Imperialism and the Economic Crisis"]

[Text] Latin America is now living through a period of severe economic crisis. It is of a general nature, affecting almost all countries and the majority of key economic sectors. The crisis has taken many forms. Above all, it has led to the abrupt deceleration of economic development and, in particular, to the considerable reduction of product output in several of the most important economic sectors.

In 1980-1983 the regional GDP not only failed to increase, but actually decreased (according to the preliminary estimates of the ECLA, the decrease just in 1983 was 3.3 percent, or 5.6 percent per capita). The crisis has had the most severe effect on the processing industry--the main generator of economic progress in the Latin American countries. Production volume in this industry decreased by 15 percent in 1980-1983. The crisis has also led to the perceptible reduction of investments, credit and financial operational volumes, domestic trade and capital construction. Foreign trade has also suffered: Total commodity exchange decreased by 15 percent in 1982. The problem of indebtedness has grown more serious. Many Latin American states (including the leaders--Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) have had to request Western creditors to revise foreign debt repayment terms. Balance of payment deficits and the related inflation have reached unprecedented levels (the consumer price index rose 56 percent in 1980, 58 percent in 1981 and almost 80 percent in 1982). The level of unemployment has risen dramatically: In 1982 around 30 percent of the able-bodied population had only part-time work or no work at all.¹

The present state of the economy has been called critical by regional experts. "Latin America," ECLA Executive Secretary E. Iglesias recently said, "has encountered an economic crisis which surpasses all postwar crises in terms of its severity and is comparable to the dismal period of the 'great depression' of the 1930's."²

The abrupt deterioration of economic conditions could have far-reaching social and political implications as well as serious economic consequences. Programs

and plans for economic development have already been impeded in many Latin American countries, and there has been a perceptible increase in social tension. Government circles and economists in the Latin American countries are nervously seeking a way out of the current situation.

In our opinion, an analysis of the distinctive features and causes of this crisis would be of great significance in determining the prospects for overcoming it.

The Roots of the Crisis

The dependent nature of the capitalist development of present-day Latin America has engendered a variety of contradictions leading to acute signs of crisis in the economy. Pronounced disparities in the distribution of national income, the related restrictions on the size of the domestic market and on accumulations, the selfish class policy of dominant groups, the dependence of the economy on the main centers of capitalism, and imperialist exploitation are inherent features of dependent development. They are impeding economic and social progress in the Latin American countries and are causing the regular disruption of the process of capitalist expanded reproduction. There is no question that these factors also played a role in the intensification of the current economic crisis.

In addition to this, the severity of the economic difficulties Latin America encountered at the beginning of the 1980's was due to a number of new developments dating back only a decade and a half or two decades. One of the main tendencies during this period was the intensive internationalization of the economic affairs of these countries--the result of their active inclusion in qualitatively new economic relations with world capitalist centers and their deeper involvement in the system of international capitalist division of labor. The deciding factor responsible for stimulating these processes was international financial capital, as personified by transnational corporations and banks.

The last 15 years were marked by the economic infiltration of Latin America on an unprecedented scale by the TNC's. When they were crowded out of their traditional spheres of activity (as a result of nationalization), primarily out of the petroleum and mining industries and plantation farming, the TNC's more than covered their losses by strengthening their position in other spheres of the economy on this continent, especially the more dynamic branches of the processing industry. According to estimates, direct foreign investments in this sphere totaled 30-32 billion dollars by the beginning of the 1980's, exceeding the 1960 level by more than 10 times. Foreign companies now control up to 40 percent of the industrial production in Latin America. Their position is particularly strong in the chemical, electrical equipment and automotive industries and in general machine building. Foreign capital accounts for 80-100 percent of the output of these industries.

The crux of the problem, however, is not simply the stronger position of TNC's in the Latin American processing industry. International monopoly capital is determined to control the key processes occurring in this sphere of the economy,

particularly the industrialization of the import-substitution processes that became the main link of the continent's economic development after World War II. This was supposed to reduce the Latin American countries' dependence on the foreign market by expanding the local production of manufactured consumer goods, reducing imports and improving balances of trade and payments. In spite of this, however, foreign companies did not reduce exports of manufactured goods to the region and even made every effort to increase them. For example, according to a special study, the Mexican processing industry's imports of North American products increased by almost 50 percent between 1966 and 1972, while Brazil's imports increased 3.5-fold.

As a result, many Latin American industrial enterprises and whole industries are connected to foreign capital and depend directly on imported raw materials, fuel, semimanufactured goods, machines and equipment. To a considerable extent, this nullified the "protective effect" of import-substitution industrialization. Despite the slight decrease in imports of consumer goods, the regional demand for imports in general has increased. Furthermore, the TNC's tendency to use foreign technology in enterprises built in the region presupposed the intensification of regional technological dependence and increased expenditures on foreign technical assistance, patents and various services. According to estimates, the combined annual expenditures of the Latin American countries for these purposes are 2.5-3 billion dollars. In this way, international monopolies were able to neutralize much of the actual impact of the industrialization of import-substitution processes and to use it to create a new and effective system for the economic domination of Latin America by capitalist centers.

In the beginning of the 1970's many Latin American countries began to conduct an economic policy aimed at developing several branches of the processing industry for the expansion of exports. International monopolies interfered in this process so that they could use it in the interests of their own neo-colonial strategy. North American TNC's established a network of enterprises in a number of states of the region (primarily in Mexico, but also in Brazil, Colombia and some Central American and Caribbean countries) to specialize in the manufacture of specific consumer goods or components, the assembly of pieces and sets of equipment and the shipment of these products either to parent firms in the United States or their affiliates in other countries. According to estimates, at the end of the 1970's semimanufactured goods and finished items accounted for almost 60 percent of all products shipped to the United States by the Latin American branches of TNC's. By the beginning of the 1980's the United States was buying more than 10 billion dollars' worth of finished items and semimanufactured goods from Latin America, and these products accounted for up to 45 percent of total imports from this region. This gave rise to a new system of close ties between the export sector of the Latin American processing industry and the North American market.

The rapid (and essentially spasmodic) expansion of credit relations between Latin American countries and developed capitalist states was an important factor in the increasing integration of Latin America into present-day capitalism's system of international economic relations. In the 1970's the states of this region received around 300 billion dollars in foreign loans and credit;

their total foreign debt reached 350 billion dollars at the beginning of 1984. Expenditures on its repayment and the payment of interest now exceed 30 billion dollars a year. In general, foreign credit has become one of the determining factors of regional economic development.

The more important role played by foreign sources of financing in the national economy is a natural feature of dependent capitalist development and represents a direct result of the conscious policy of dominant classes. The latter are prepared to pay any price to avoid radical socioeconomic reforms and to replace them with various palliatives, particularly the wider use of foreign resources. This important aspect of the genesis of financial dependence has been pointed out by many Latin American researchers. For example, famous Mexican economist M. Wionczek has said: "Many developing countries have recently resorted to foreign financing not only to cover the current deficit in their balance of payments and budget but also to postpone important reforms that might augment domestic accumulations and reduce dependence on foreign sources of financing."⁴

This process has been actively stimulated by imperialist powers and monopoly capital, which regard large-scale credit and financing operations in Latin America as an effective means of supporting the "Brazilian," "Mexican," "Chilean" and other Latin American models of dependent capitalism, securing high profits on invested capital. In the 1970's and early 1980's Latin America accounted for more than 40 percent of all the financial resources allocated by Western powers in the form of credit and loans to developing countries.

In recent years credit and financial leverage has played a much more important role in imperialism's economic strategy. The imperialist countries have forced the overwhelming majority of Latin American states to accept a group of strict financial obligations, as a result of which various aspects of their social life are more vulnerable to external influences. Above all, credit leverage is used by international financial capital for the much more intensive economic exploitation of the countries of this continent. According to estimates, Latin American states paid developed capitalist countries more than 90 billion dollars in interest on credit, and the pressure of financial exploitation is still mounting. These processes have contributed to the perceptible augmentation of the role of foreign economic transactions in regional economic affairs, and this is specifically attested to by the correlation of imports and exports of goods and services to the GDP. Between 1970 and 1980 this indicator rose from 26 percent to 50 percent.⁵ Therefore, Latin America has entered a new phase of economic relations with developed capitalist states, which have numerous means of exerting pressure on countries of this continent and of intensifying their exploitation of these countries. The system of regional economic dependence on imperialism has undergone substantial modernization: Its traditional forms have been supplemented with new ones, offering broader opportunities to influence the Latin American economy in various ways.

Some features of the Current Crisis

The sphere of foreign economic ties has become something like the epicenter of the crisis in Latin America. The reason is that the increasing severity of

the crisis in the capitalist centers caused the imperialist powers and the U.S. to employ traditional and new forms of Latin American dependence in order to transfer the burden of economic problems to this region (and, of course, to other developing countries). First of all, international monopolies made a massive effort to lower the prices of raw materials and foodstuffs from Latin America. As a result, the price of sugar fell to less than a third of its previous level between 1960 and 1982, and this was accompanied by a decrease of 32 percent in the price of corn, 30 percent in the price of fish meal, 17 percent in the price of coffee, 19 percent in the price of wheat, 17 percent in the price of lead and 23 percent in the price of tin.⁶ The prices of the majority of goods purchased by Latin American countries, on the other hand, remained high. As a result of the growing gap between export and import prices, the conditions of foreign trade steadily grew worse for the Latin American states and they suffered severe foreign currency losses. In reference to this situation, ECLA experts noted: "The export-import price index for the Latin American countries not exporting oil fell to its lowest level in 30 years in 1982, and the average for 1980-1982 was much lower than the level in 1931-1933, the most critical period of the 'great depression.'"⁷

Latin America was seriously injured by the rise of protectionist barriers in the United States and other developed capitalist states. One attempt to include expanded sales of Latin American goods. In 1982 the physical volume of exports remained at its previous level in the region as a whole, but it decreased in some countries: by 8 percent in Brazil, 24 percent in Mexico, 10 percent in Uruguay, 11 percent in Panama, etc. Protectionist measures were particularly injurious to exports of finished items and semimanufactured goods which were always subject to fluctuation in connection with the quantitative restrictions instituted in developed capitalist markets. The large industrial enterprises established in recent years by Latin American countries (especially Brazil) in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, petrochemicals and the pulp and paper industry with a view to the foreign market encountered acute economic problems. This led to production cuts, the underloading of production capacities and the immobilization of substantial capital investments. Under these conditions, the American companies operating in northern Mexico, Haiti, Haiti and other regions began to curtail the production of goods intended for sale in the United States.

The measures taken by the Reagan Administration and U.S. banking monopolies in the sphere of credit and financing had extremely negative implications for the Latin American countries. The institution of artificially inflated loan interest rates and the related rise in the dollar exchange rate compounded these countries' already acute currency and financing difficulties. The hike of interest rates resulted in losses calculated in billions of dollars. In 1982 interest payments alone absorbed 50 percent of the export receipts of Argentina, Brazil and Chile and 44 percent of Mexico's receipts.⁸ The manipulation of currency and finances also had an extremely adverse effect on the mass-scale "flight" of the capital of the Latin American bourgeoisie, for whom the transfer of funds to the largest U.S. and West European banks had been profitable. For example, a total of 13 billion dollars from Venezuela alone was transferred abroad in 1982, including more than 5 billion only to U.S. banks; the respective figures for Mexico in 1980-1982 were 22 billion and 25 billion.

Subversive activity by imperialist states had a direct effect on the foreign economic relations of the countries of this region. There was a decrease of 11 percent in their combined export income in 1982. The deficit in their balance of payments reached the record level of 14 billion dollars, and even countries earning huge sums from the export of oil, such as Venezuela and Mexico, experienced severe financial difficulties. Under these conditions, many Latin American states had to resort to dramatic import reductions. For example, in 1982 total imports were reduced by 50 percent in Argentina, 39 percent in Chile, 38 percent in Mexico and 31 percent in Bolivia. In turn, this naturally affected many industries depending on deliveries of equipment, spare parts, crude resources and other materials from abroad. Strict import restrictions led to production cuts, the reduction of the operational load of production capacities, the growth of unemployment and many other negative developments.

All of this explains much of the reason for the synchronized development of the crisis in capitalist centers and the Latin American region. In its search for ways of overcoming its own difficulties, international monopoly capital was able to quickly aim the spearhead of the crisis toward Latin America. The fact that signs of crisis are more pronounced in the economy of this continent than the developed capitalist economies is due to its relatively weak economic base, its limited resources for economic and social maneuvering, and the deep-seated conflicts characteristic of dependent capitalist development.

One of the main results of the crisis was the dramatic increase in social tension in many Latin American countries. The dominant oligarchic elite has been trying to overcome mounting economic difficulties by disregarding the interests of workers and practicing the more intensive exploitation of labor. The dramatic decline in the standard of living of the poorest population strata is one of the characteristics of the present situation in the region. In Mexico, for example, inflation caused prices to rise 100 percent in 1982 and 80 percent in 1983, but workers' wages rose only 50 percent.¹⁰ In Brazil food prices rose 250 percent in 1982-1983, but wages rose only 90 percent. A study conducted in Brazil by the World Health Organization indicated that 38 percent of the population is suffering from malnutrition.¹¹ The American NEWSWEEK magazine described the position of the Latin American laboring public: "The social consequences of the crisis are distinguished by their severity. Malnutrition is much more widespread in Mexico and Peru now that their governments have cut subsidies for the main food products. Physicians have reported a rise in the number of infectious diseases (particularly tuberculosis and typhus) as a result of the housing shortage in overcrowded cities. Medical care has deteriorated: Hospitals do not have enough money to buy medicine."¹²

More and more Latin American businessmen, even representatives of big local capital, are experiencing mounting economic difficulties, particularly financial ones. In an analysis of the situation in Brazil, Mexico's COMERCIO EXTERIOR commented: "Hundreds of businessmen throughout the country cannot pay their debts,... Many of them, such as the gigantic Matarazzo industrial group, once one of the most powerful in Latin America, have suffered colossal material losses and are on the verge of financial ruin."¹³

The laboring masses have been waging an increasingly resolute struggle for their vital interests. The strike movement is growing in many countries. All Argentina strikes by thousands of workers and employees have affected sectors of the economy, and Brazil was shaken throughout 1983 by huge public demonstrations protesting the government's policy of restricting workers' rights. Mounting social tension in some countries has essentially evolved into a severe domestic political crisis. This is true of Chile, where the most diverse population strata are now demonstrating against the fascist dictatorship, which has produced hunger and poverty and has brutally stifled the elementary democratic rights and liberties. These strata are united by a common goal--the overthrow of the bloody Pinochet regime.

The economic crisis is promoting the even more pronounced aggravation of conflicts between the countries of this region and imperialism. The imperialist powers are not only blocking Latin American efforts to overcome the crisis, but are even exacerbating it. In 1982, for example, countries in the region were able to improve the state of their balance of trade perceptibly by sharply reducing imports; they not only eliminated their trade deficit, but even accumulated a total positive balance of 8.8 billion dollars. But these efforts were nullified by larger payments on foreign debts and the excessive interest rates charged by transnational banks on loans. These payments rose 28 percent in 1982 and totaled 34.4 billion dollars, resulting in a larger deficit in the balance of payments and more severe currency and financial difficulties. It is obvious that the economic crisis has only exacerbated existing conflicts in Latin America and has made the economic and sociopolitical situation in this region even more unstable.

Now that imperialism is exerting stronger pressure through all channels (monetary, trade, investment, technological, etc.), the system of Latin American economic relations with developed capitalist states is turning into a sphere of increasingly acute clashes and conflicts.

The Economic Crisis and Imperialism's Neocolonial Policy

The second half of the 1960's and the 1970's were marked by the perceptible intensification of the Latin American people's struggle to consolidate their political autonomy and economic independence. The nationalization of foreign property was conducted in the region on a fairly impressive scale. Latin American countries took steps to develop economic and political integration and to strengthen ties with developing states in other regions.

Latin America began to play a much more important role in the developing countries' movement for the reorganization of international economic relations. The tendency toward autonomous action and toward the elimination of dependence on imperialism (especially U.S. imperialism) became much more distinct in the foreign policy of many Latin American states, led to the diversification of foreign relations and promoted broader political and economic cooperation with socialist states.

With a view to all this, imperialist countries and TNC's are striving to make use of economic difficulties in Latin America in their own strategic interest.

At present, imperialism's neocolonial policy consists in taking advantage of the situation to reverse the course of history, to regain and strengthen its economic control over the region and to completely eliminate all factors contributing to the reinforcement of Latin American political and economic autonomy.

The huge debt this region owes to the developed West and the recent exacerbation of difficulties in its repayment constitute the imperialist powers' principal means of leverage. It is significant that the problem of foreign indebtedness is the result of a conscious financial policy conducted by imperialism in the 1970's and designed to have far-reaching effects. With a view to the acute shortage of financial resources (particularly in the form of freely convertible currency) in Latin America, the developed capitalist countries advanced a theory at the beginning of the last decade to imply that the Latin American demand for foreign financing should be satisfied primarily by means of private credit. To this end, all efforts by Latin American borrowers to gain access to government financing on relatively preferential terms were impeded. Foreign private banks became Latin America's main creditors and imposed extremely harsh financing terms on the countries of this region. The direct result of their activity was a significant rise in interest rates, the reduction of crediting periods and, eventually, the spasmodic growth of payments. Total payments increased more than tenfold just in the 1970's and exceeded 26 billion dollars in 1980.¹⁴ The economic crisis of the early 1980's complicated the problem of indebtedness to the maximum: Repayment obligations rose at a rapid rate while the solvency of countries in the region was undermined. In 1982, 14 Latin American states had to request deferments from their Western creditors.

The West's approach to the intensification of regional financial difficulties was influenced by two key factors: firstly, the desire to present each debtor with a united front of imperialist creditors and, secondly, the plan to impose the harshest refinancing terms on Latin American states to prevent the alleviation of monetary difficulties and to turn them into a permanent means of "attaching" the countries of this region even more closely to capitalist centers.

The coordinator of the actions of imperialist powers and transnational banks in Latin America is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which performs a broad range of mediating functions in the developed West's financial relations with Latin America. The IMF not only negotiates the refinancing of foreign loans but also oversees their repayment. Administrators of the IMF conceal the actual aims of the fund and are lavish with statements about their willingness to assist in the economic recovery of Latin American countries, the restoration of their solvency and the promotion of their accelerated economic and social progress. An analysis of the agreements that have been signed indicates something else, however. The IMF is primarily a promoter of the imperialist strategic line in this region. Its principal aims are, firstly, the coercion of the Latin American countries to repay loans at any price and to pay usurious interest rates; secondly, the imposition of "economic stabilization" programs on the states of this region in the long-range interests of international monopoly capital; thirdly, the prevention of radical solutions

to the foreign indebtedness problem by means of excessively harsh refinancing terms (particularly the institution of even higher interest rates).

It must be said that the IMF's donor functions and its mediation of negotiations with international banking monopolies on the refinancing of loans have given this organization much more influence in the economic affairs of the region. The fund has broader opportunities to influence the economic policy of Latin American countries. The "stabilization programs" imposed on them by the IMF are of a traditional nature: They are designed to curtail activity in the state sector, provide foreign and national private capital with maximum freedom and effect sharp cuts in allocations for social needs. Under the pressure of the fund, some Latin American countries (Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and others) cancelled government food subsidies in 1983. This led to substantial price increases. State sector financing was cut and there were mass layoffs of the workers and employees of state enterprises. In Peru, for example, the government announced its plan to sell state enterprises and allowed private capital to trade in cotton and coffee, which had previously been sold through the state trade network. Measures to restrict the state sector were also taken in Mexico.

One important feature of the IMF's present tactics is its willingness to resort to the complete cessation of financing as well as to threats and blackmail in an effort to secure its own demands. In May 1983 the refinancing of Brazil's foreign debt was stopped by the IMF in violation of an agreement concluded at the beginning of the year. The debtor's partial nonfulfillment of the terms of the agreement was used as a pretext. The fund's action put the country on the verge of financial catastrophe. Brazil had to stop payment (its unpaid debts were estimated at 6 billion dollars by the end of 1983). Giving in to this pressure, the government took further steps to limit the financing of the state sector and to cut social spending. The IMF felt that this was not enough, however, and refused to extend any new credit to this country until the end of the year. The position taken by the fund aroused the indignation of the Brazilian public. Prominent representatives of financial and industrial groups controlling more than 200 companies asked the government to revise its economic policy and reject IMF bids. State Bank administrator Langoni resigned to protest the fund's pressure. Members of the opposition in the parliament, headed by deputies from the Brazilian Democratic Movement, demanded the refusal of the IMF ultimatum and the declaration of a moratorium on foreign payments.

International monopoly capital is trying to take advantage of this situation to strengthen its own position in the economies of the Latin American countries and to draw them even deeper into the new system of international production, trade and financial ties. The heightened investment activity of foreign capital in some branches of the processing industry in Latin America is striking. Automobile corporations have recently made extremely large capital investments. For example, foreign companies are putting up motor-building enterprises in Mexico, designed for the export of around 2 million automobile engines a year.¹⁵ Foreign businessmen invested 1.2 billion dollars in the Brazilian economy in 1982 and 1983 to expand the export production of motor vehicles and components and parts for them. In connection with this, the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE reported: "In Brazil the leading North American

automobile companies are integrating their enterprises into a single international production system."¹⁶

The mounting economic pressure connected with imperialism's more aggressive military policy (which was graphically demonstrated by the Malvinas crisis, the criminal U.S. aggression in Grenada and Washington's policy in Central America) poses a serious threat to the political sovereignty of Latin American countries and is impeding their economic and social progress. Under these conditions, the states of the region must take immediate and resolute steps to intensify the anti-imperialist struggle in defense of their independence.

In Search of a New Development Strategy

As was mentioned above, the crisis has severely complicated economic and social conditions in the region and has made the Latin American system of dependent capitalism even more unstable. Experience has clearly demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of the form of development based on the theories of the "open market economy," on the deep involvement of national economies in the neo-colonial system of international capitalist division of labor and on the extensive use of the services of TNC's and the credit and loans of imperialist financial centers. Under these conditions, there is an urgent need for a new development strategy in Latin America. In this connection, we should recall R. Prebisch's statement that "we have reached a serious turning point in history, equivalent to the period of the 'great depression.'" We are forced by circumstances to determine our own course of development."¹⁷

The search for a new strategy is going on in an atmosphere of intensive struggle between patriotic forces and large democratic groups on one side and the oligarchic elite, supported by imperialism, on the other. Recent events (the outcome of the elections in Argentina, the significant leftward shift in the public mood in Brazil, the growth of the strong movement against the dictatorship in Chile and the intensification of the sociopolitical crisis in Central America) indicate that the broad popular masses in the countries of this region are making increasingly vehement demands for the limitation of the omnipotence of foreign capital and for an end to the antidemocratic policy of ruling circles.

The growth of anti-imperialist feelings in various strata of Latin American society is one of the factors motivating ruling circles to take a number of steps to protect the economic interests of their countries against imperialist encroachment. This process is reflected in the more perceptible involvement of the latter in the movement for nonalignment. At the Seventh Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries (New Delhi, March 1983), Latin American representatives participated actively in drafting resolutions blaming capitalist centers for the severe economic difficulties of developing states and demanding immediate measures to prevent the further intensification of the crisis. These measures include the institution of easier terms for the repayment of debts, the lowering of protectionist barriers in international trade and the offer of assistance to developing countries in the mobilization of financial resources for the development of agriculture, power engineering, etc.

The policy of these states on the regional level is also displaying more pronounced anti-imperialist features. A 1982 SELA document, "The Fundamentals of the Strategy of Latin American Economic Security and Independence," the efforts to work out a common Latin American position at the sixth UNCTAD session (Belgrade, June 1983) and the plans to establish some form of collective economic security in the region attest to the desire to take stronger united action and to practice the collective resistance of imperialism's economic pressure. Of course, existing differences in national interests and mutual conflicts are complicating this process. For example, the Latin American countries still have not agreed on a way of repaying foreign debts, not to mention the creation of a "united front of debtors" to deal with Western creditors. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the line of collective opposition to imperialism's economic pressure, based on broader regional cooperation and stronger ties with developing states in other regions, will be an important part of the new development strategy.¹⁸

At the same time, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the economic development of the region must be based on internal resources to a much greater extent than in the 1970's. This is made necessary by existing difficulties in the system of international capitalist economic relations and by the fact that the Latin American countries have already virtually exhausted their capabilities in some areas (particularly in the sphere of foreign crediting) and cannot count on a significant increase in funding through these channels. This lends special importance to internal steps to overcome the crisis and to establish the necessary conditions for economic growth.

The objective potential for this exists in Latin America. Above all, the countries of this region have augmented and updated their economic potential (including industrial potential) and they have a fairly strong state sector and a relatively diversified system of foreign economic ties. But only a goal-oriented development strategy will make the full use of this potential possible.

The governments of some countries in the region recently declared their intention to revise their domestic economic policy. Their top priorities are the redistribution of national income in favor of low-income strata, the expansion of the domestic market, the mobilization of internal sources of accumulations, the more efficient operation of state enterprises, the limitation of inflation, etc. It is clear, however, that the implementation of these declarations will be an extremely contradictory and inconsistent process. The measures that have been taken cannot provide a fundamental solution to acute socioeconomic problems (especially the scandalous social inequality). The progressive Latin American public believes that the only realistic way out of the present difficulties will consist in the institution of radical socioeconomic reforms in the interest of the broad popular masses of the continent.

FOOTNOTES

1. Some researchers in the West believe that the number of unemployed in Latin America (including people with part-time jobs) now exceeds 100 million. See, for example, "Inter-American Development Bank. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. 1983 Report," Wash., 1983, p 125.

2. REVISTA DE LA CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, 1983, No 19, p 7.
3. "The External Economic Relations of Latin America in the 1980's," E/CEPAL/G 1160, 23 April 1981, p 34.
4. "LDC External Debt and the World Economy," Mexico, 1978, p 25.
5. "Inter-American Development Bank. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. 1982 Report," 1982, p 24.
6. REVISTA DE LA CEPAL, 1983, No 19, p 21.
7. Ibid., p 27.
8. Ibid., p 39.
9. FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, Department of State, Wash., October 1982; COMERCIO EXTERIOR, Mexico, 1982, No 9, p 934; GRANMA, Havana, 6 January 1983; for more detail, see LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1983, No 11, pp 61-96.
10. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 23 September 1983.
11. Ibid., 25 July 1983; 13 October 1983.
12. NEWSWEEK, New York, 1983, No 30, p 25.
13. COMERCIO EXTERIOR, 1983, No 9, p 833.
14. "Inter-American Development Bank. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. 1983 Report," p 386.
15. COMERCIO EXTERIOR, 1982, No 12, p 1363.
16. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 25, 26 July 1983.
17. REVISTA DE LA CEPAL, 1982, No 18, p 3.
18. For more detail, see LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1984, No 4, pp 49-54.

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INTERNATIONAL

BRAZILIAN LABOR MOVEMENT CRITICIZED AS 'REFORMIST'

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 13 Apr 84)
pp 26-36

[Article by A. N. Savin: "Reformism in the Brazilian Labor Movement"]

[Text] Reformism in Brazil has deep historical roots as a political theory and practice. The main varieties are bourgeois and social-democratic. The supporters of bourgeois reformism act on the belief that capitalism is the best of all possible systems and that it could be even better if it could be improved without changing its essence. Social reformists, on the other hand, suggest that reforming the bourgeois order would gradually turn it into another order known as "democratic socialism."¹ Another difference between these two varieties of reformism is that although the object of their influence is essentially the same--the workers movement--the subjects, or agents, of these brands of reformism are different. In the case of bourgeois reformism it is usually the ruling bloc, consisting of the state and the business community, and this ideology is carried directly to the proletariat by the labor aristocracy. In the social-democratic form, on the other hand, the reformist wing is part of the workers movement. These differences between the two varieties of reformism do not concern matters of principle. They both have the same goal--to prevent the development of the revolutionary movement by replacing it with a bourgeois reformation.

Reformism has generally taken the bourgeois form in Brazil. This is not surprising because most of the country's contemporary history coincides with the period of dictatorship. Under the conditions of a lengthy period of crisis-ridden socioeconomic development, engendered by overall backwardness, a dictatorship met the needs of the dominant classes more closely than a bourgeois democracy. Representing a solid barrier blocking the development of the revolutionary movement, the dictatorship established the necessary conditions for the intensive exploitation of labor and thereby aided in the resolution of one of the main problems of capitalism--the accumulation of capital.

It is significant that reformism could not complete its evolution in a dictatorship, and it was used by the dominant classes to supplement the main methods of rule--terrorism and repression. Another characteristic feature of Brazilian reformism is that its agent, particularly during the initial stage, was not the bourgeoisie, but the military-bureaucratic elite, which defended

the bourgeoisie's class interests. This was due to the relative structural and political immaturity of local business groups.

This tendency was already apparent at the beginning of the 1930's, immediately after the bourgeois victory over the agrarian oligarchy. It was reflected in a number of measures taken by G. Vargas against the trade-union movement. In 1931 he began to create an alternative to proletarian trade unions. He cultivated corporate syndicates--government-controlled organizations to serve as "an instrument of economic development and class cooperation." The creation of the trade unions was judicially secured by the labor legislation known as the "Consolidated Labor Laws" (CLL). This legislation is still the judicial basis of Brazilian union activity.

In line with the CLL, the corporate principle was the main organizational feature of trade unions.² Businessmen were members of the union along with the workers, and they had "equal" rights. According to the engineers of the CLL, this approach was supposed to promote the "replacement of the old and negative theory of class struggle with a new, constructive and organic theory of class cooperation."³ As a result of this, trade unions ceased to be an instrument for the protection of proletarian interests and became an organization for the maintenance of "social peace" between labor and capital. This was fully in line with the premises of the reformist doctrine.

Another equally important feature of the labor legislation was the detailed regulation and bureaucratization of all aspects of union activity. Articles stipulating the conditions for calling a strike occupy the central place in the CLL. Remaining "within the law" in a strike entails a complex bureaucratic procedure which nullifies the results of this most effective form of working class struggle. The factors reducing its significance include a high quorum at the union meeting where the decision to call a strike is made, and a lengthy conciliation process prior to the strike. Furthermore, it is significant that the only agency to which the union administration can appeal is the Ministry of Labor. If the conditions stipulated in the CLL are not met and the workers begin a "wildcat" strike, the state uses the full force of its repressive system against them. Therefore, the system of relations between the state and the labor unions in Brazil under the conditions of a dictatorship is distinguished by a combination of authoritarianism and some elements of bourgeois reformism, which gives us grounds to call the reformism of that period an authoritarian-corporate variety.

The social base of authoritarian-corporate reformism is the union bureaucracy. It is made up of presidents of trade unions on various levels, the jurors of regional tribunals on labor affairs, etc. The union bureaucracy is not involved in the production process and is closely bound to the Ministry of Labor, which corrupts it materially in an attempt to attach it more closely to the government. During the 1969-1972 period, for example, a labor tribunal juror chosen from among the workers received a minimum of 35,000 cruzeiros a month (around 5,500 dollars).⁴

The efficient performance of bureaucratic functions by these people is secured by their thorough training in special courses organized by the largest

inter-American reformist organization--the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), operating under AFL-CIO auspices. The AIFLD is something like a "smithy" where reformist personnel are forged for the Latin American countries, including Brazil. Between 1964 and the middle of 1973, its Brazilian branch--the Institute of Labor Culture--trained around 29,000 union functionaries.⁵ They still occupy the majority of top-level positions in labor unions, federations and confederations.

The strategic aim of the union bureaucracy consists in forcing the proletariat to give up its struggle against capitalism by employing the CLL and paralyzing its class energy. It is understandable that it takes a hostile view of such means of proletarian struggle as strikes. Its own actions are confined to the submission of timid petitions to the president of the country and the Ministry of Labor. The only addition to this has been demagogic talk about the need for "mutual sacrifices by employers and workers for the sake of the nation," but actually for the sake of the exploiting elite.

During the first years of the military dictatorship the main emphasis was placed on the manipulation of proletarian thinking, but this was not reinforced by a policy of broad social maneuvering covering a large portion of this group. According to adviser on union affairs in Latin America S. Romualdi, the Latin American union officials of that time substituted subtle rhetoric for concrete steps to improve the financial status of union members.⁶ A shortage of funds meant that the government could only afford to bribe a small substratum of union bureaucrats, whose number was obviously insufficient for the efficient control of the labor movement. The main weakness of this policy was its elitist nature. Since the union bureaucracy could not serve as the only mediator in relations between labor and capital, the government constantly resorted to the use of the repressive network.

At the beginning of the 1970's, however, certain changes were apparent in this policy. In particular, they included a transfer to a broad-scale policy of social maneuvering. The government raised the minimum wage for many categories of labor, instituted a so-called "social integration program," etc. It is interesting that this transition was accompanied by the consolidation of the regime at the time of the Brazilian "economic miracle" and apparently in the absence of strong proletarian pressure (not one strike was recorded, for example, in Sao Paulo in 1971).⁷ The fact is that higher profits in the production sphere during the years of the economic boom established the necessary material conditions for the transition to a policy of sweeping social maneuvers. The grand monopolist bourgeoisie exerted some pressure on the government.⁸ Furthermore, the preventive nature of the reform of relations with unions attested to some flexibility on the part of the ruling elite.

The transition to the new line led to the allocation of government funds in 1970 for a "program of social integration," representing a profit-sharing system for the workers of private enterprises with the aim of cultivating a bourgeois outlook in these workers and encouraging them to build a "neo-capitalist society" of the Western type. These funds came from two sources: the smallest part was deducted from taxes on enterprise income and the greater was a percentage of enterprise net profits. The ruling elite took this step to

stimulate labor productivity and to alleviate social tension in relations between workers and employers. More than 30 percent of the workers were covered by the program.⁹

The funds allocated for workers were intended for the purchase of homes, the augmentation of pensions, the alleviation of the burden of inflation, etc. Subsequent events proved, however, that far from all of the shareholders benefited from their participation in the program. This was prevented by its clearly elitist nature, because the criterion used in the distribution of funds was the period of continuous service at the given enterprise. It is not surprising that high-paid workers benefited the most from the program. Workers with a minimum income, on the other hand, could be paid a sum equivalent only to 2 years' wages after 30 years of participation in the program.¹⁰ Competitions for the title of "Exemplary Worker" of Brazil represented another way of involving workers in bourgeois state policy and augmenting labor productivity. Around 2,000 firms, employing 3,221,000 people, participated in these contests.¹¹

Palliatives like these, however, were too limited to prevent the growth of the workers movement, and it became much more active in the second half of the 1970's. Workers demanded fundamental changes in union organization and even in the regime itself. The size of the movement threatened to destroy the old union network and motivated the dominant classes to take extreme measures. Authoritarian methods of control could no longer serve as the main means of restricting social protest. Statements about the willingness of ruling circles to effect political liberalization began to appear more frequently in official propaganda. Changes occurring during the course of economic modernization served as the basis for this. They took the form of the accelerated monopolization and concentration of production, accompanied by the formation of a local monopolist bourgeoisie, which began to insist on access to political authority.

The bourgeoisie felt that the labor problem could be solved by a broader policy of social maneuvering for the sake of class peace and the heightened exploitation of hired labor. The program for the revision of the union system was part of the general strategy of transition to the Western type of "industrial society," the need for which began to be discussed more frequently by members of the ruling elite.¹² In this context, their interest in the theories of J. Galbraith and R. Dahrendorf and in the experience of developed capitalist countries in the regulation of social relations is understandable.

The dominant classes felt that the reorganization of the union network should be accomplished by instituting the principles of North American syndicalism or trade-unionism--that is, one of the varieties of bourgeois reformism in the labor movement during the initial stages of the monopoly form of capitalism. Trade-unionism differs from the authoritarian-corporate "model" primarily in its basic platform, in accordance with which demonstrations by the proletariat for the improvement of its financial status are regarded as completely normal and acceptable events. During the course of a form of "cooperation under the conditions of confrontation," the working class strives to acquire maximum material benefits and thereby increase its share of the social product. The proletariat's sociopolitical behavior should be determined by its status as a "consumer, and not a producer, owning no means of production."¹³

Expressing the feelings of the grand bourgeoisie, C. Bordella, a prominent member of the Sao Paulo business community, said that strikes in themselves, as manifestations of the desire for a larger share of national income, are completely legal, but they must be conducted strictly within the bounds of the law.¹⁴ American sociologist A. Ross states, however, that the detailed regulation of strikes is the first step toward the creation of a "bargaining union" because "it is most successful in eliminating emotional outbursts."¹⁵ The Brazilian bourgeoisie enlisted the aid of American experts on the labor movement to solve this problem. In an article in ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, U.S. expert P. Shaw recommended the regulation of all aspects of the strike, even the number of picketers.¹⁶

The trade-unionist regulation of labor conflicts differs from the regulation in the CLL. Whereas the latter was designed to prevent all strikes, the former was merely supposed to keep them from transcending the bounds of economic demands. Trade-unionism defends purely economic positions and has always been extremely hostile toward the politicized labor movement and political strikes. The "bargaining trade union," according to the supporters of this "model," should be apolitical and ideologically neutral. Lenin had good reason to define trade-unionism as "narrow professionalism."¹⁷ The dominant classes strive to prevent the proletariat from participating in politics, as this could lead to its rejection of the capitalist order.

It is in line with this aim that trade-unionism tries to institute its own methods of solving labor conflicts. The reformists of this current contrast the strike, as an extreme method whose legality is acknowledged if it follows the proper procedure, with collective bargaining. During the years of the dictatorship, the possibility of concluding collective agreements was sharply restricted, and wage increases stipulated in these agreements were considered to be illegal. In spite of the government ban, however, under pressure from the working class some foreign and national enterprises began to practice so-called "underground raises," which were paid to workers on the local level without any interference from the Ministry of Labor. In this way, the new relations between labor and capital began to be established, based on the practice of direct negotiations between employers and workers, culminating in the signing of collective agreements. They began to be used more widely at Brazilian enterprises: 755 agreements were concluded in 1975, 999 were signed in 1976, in 1979 the figure was already 1,400, and in 1980 it was 1,500.¹⁸

The birth of "de facto" new, "contractual" relations forced the ruling elite to take more energetic steps to plan the reform of the union system. An international conference on cooperation in labor relations was held in Sao Paulo in April 1981 for this purpose. It was attended by Minister of Labor M. Macedo, the union bureaucracy, headed by Cid Ferreira de Souza, and prominent industrialists. A draft plan submitted at the conference envisaged the limitation of the government's mediating functions in relations between employers and unions, which would grant the latter greater independence and encourage direct dialogue. The significance of the collective agreement was viewed from the standpoint of theories of "class partnership" as an important instrument in securing "balance and harmony between capital and labor and attaining social peace." "Workers and employers must be companions in a common

cause," a speaker stressed at the conference.¹⁹ The so-called "Committee of 14," made up of the most influential businessmen in Sao Paulo, was formed to secure the success of bilateral dialogue.

The institution of elements of "industrial democracy" in relations between labor and capital has clear and definite aims, which are essentially the following: It is supposed to give the proletariat illusions about the possibility of solving all problems without exception within the framework of the capitalist order through negotiation; it is supposed to convince the workers that although there are a number of conflicts between the laboring public and the bourgeoisie, they are partners in the construction of an "industrial society" devoid of antagonism and based on the principles of "social harmony"; the system of collective bargaining, leading to decentralization, is supposed to separate the main segments of the proletariat; the only function of trade unions is to be the achievement of the more equitable distribution of social wealth, the "sharing of progress" through "peaceful competition," thereby directing the struggle of the working class into the blind alley of economism; the unions are to be granted some rights and opportunities for limited intervention in social affairs, giving their rank-and-file members a sense of equal participation in national life. Definite prerequisites for the implementation of bourgeois-reformist plans in the labor movement do exist in Brazil, and one of the main ones is the widespread preoccupation with economic factors. The scales of this phenomenon are attested to by the fact that the strike struggle, which grew continuously until the end of the 1970's, declined sharply after the publication of the law on wage increases. Whereas 103 strikes were recorded in 1978, the number had fallen to 19 by 1980.²⁰

Although the bourgeoisie practices social maneuvering in its relations with the entire proletariat, it has particularly high hopes for the skilled workers of large private enterprises in modern industry. The percentage of these workers is constantly rising. This segment of the laboring public, employed primarily at TNC enterprises, is paid an average of 67 percent more than workers in local industry and has a standard of living approaching the level of the middle strata. The bourgeoisie encourages skilled workers to acquire a non-proletarian outlook by cultivating cosmopolitanism, political indifference, conspicuous consumption, etc.

Under the specific conditions of Brazil, trade-unionism is not promoting a more democratic system. Conciliatory syndicalism of the liberal type, with economic struggle as its only point of reference, could hardly become the bulwark of a democratic order in the country. The only way of making democracy stable, according to progressive Brazilian sociologist L. V. Vianna, would consist in the development of a "non-liberal," non-collaborationist union movement.²¹

The social-democratic variety of reformism is not as characteristic of the country as the bourgeois variety because, whereas the elements of bourgeois reformism can exist under an authoritarian regime, the existence of democratic political freedom during a period of heightened social activity by the proletariat is an essential condition for action by social democrats. After all, this variety of reformism, representing petty bourgeois tendencies in the labor movement, arises as a result of its horizontal growth. An understanding of the

mechanics of this phenomenon can be gained from a statement by V. I. Lenin, who wrote: "The growth of the labor movement unavoidably attracts a certain number of petty bourgeois supporters, who are captivated by the bourgeois ideology, have difficulty ridding themselves of it and constantly lapse back into it."²²

The prevalence of authoritarian forms of government in Brazil precluded the earlier appearance of social-democratic parties. Social-democratic tendencies were apparent, within the bounds of nationalism, only during the years of Trabalhista governments, whose policy was distinguished by broad democratic freedoms. Social-democratic parties in the full sense of the term--the Trabalhista Democratic Party (PTD), which adheres to the classic postulation of "democratic socialism" and receives most of its support from middle strata, and the Labor Party (PT), which is supported primarily by members of the working class who belong to trade unions--could not appear until the rise of the labor movement in the late 1970's and early 1980's and the onset of relative liberalization contributed to their birth. Considering the nature of the PT's social base, an analysis of its ideological premises seems particularly pertinent.

As L. I. da Silva, founder and chairman of the PT, pointed out, "the party was born under the influence of a mass movement and during the course of strikes and popular struggle throughout Brazil."²³ The party's contact with the masses and its radical program of struggle against the regime constituted its strength in regions with the highest proletarian concentration--in the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais.

The PT program sets the goal of turning the party into "a political weapon of the working class and laboring public...so that the people can build a society of equality, where no one will exploit or be exploited."²⁴ Struggle for socialism is declared to be a strategic goal of the proletariat. Party leaders reject the plan for "democratic socialism" in the belief that it will not transcend the bounds of capitalist relations and will take only partial measures to cure the social ills engendered by the bourgeois structure. It proposes the drafting of a purely national plan for socialism, which will take the "specific characteristics of the Brazilian people" into account.

The main characteristic of the new order the PT wants for Brazil is the exercise of democratic freedoms, presupposing broad union autonomy, the right to strike, the freedom of political organization, the repeal of extreme laws and the granting of civil rights to Indians, women and others. This should be accompanied by a number of reforms, particularly the redistribution of land and the nationalization of some industries.

Participation by the proletariat in political affairs is the central demand in the democratic platform of the PT. The party feels that more energetic social activity will be required for the implementation of its plan, but it also defends the thesis that the workers do not have to arm themselves with any kind of ideology. A new theory of development and a model of socialism, according to PT leaders, can be worked out during the course of a spontaneous mass movement. "The kind of socialism we want," the PT leaders maintain, "will

not be engendered by our decrees or by anyone else's. The specific nature of this socialism will be decided by all the people.... The kind of socialism we want will be a product of daily struggle just as the PT was."²⁵

Although the political "bread" of the PT is still vague in some areas, there is no question that several of its premises point up the social-reformist essence of the party. For example, its ideologists view the "inclusion of the laboring classes in the power structure of contemporary society," and not the destruction of the capitalist order, as the means of making the transition to socialism.²⁶ The slogan of "class cooperation" within this structure would be a logical extension of this "inclusion." Although this principle is not present in the party program, it has already been mentioned by party leaders. The same tendencies can be seen in the long-range plans for the PT, which is supposed to become an organization in which "groups or revolutionary currents, the church, social democrats, liberals and leftist radicals" will coexist.²⁷

The trade unions, according to PT ideologists, represent an effective means of exerting pressure on the authoritarian government and on employers for the purpose of forcing them to institute reforms leading to the democratization of the political system and the unions. Secretary-General J. Bittar of the PT has spoken of the fundamental possibility of a "social pact" with the bourgeoisie, conditional upon the establishment of broad-scale democracy.²⁸

As this party has not been fully established as yet, it has not lost the characteristic militancy of social democrats seeking power. For this reason, the PT represents the radical opposition to the regime and to trade-unionism, advocating labor unity. This points up the possibility of the PT's evolution to the left, which would make its participation in the broad democratic movement possible.

In conclusion, we should stress the fact that reformism has penetrated the Brazilian labor movement to an impressive depth. The further intensification of monopolistic tendencies in the development of Brazilian capitalism will establish the material conditions for strong trade-unionism--the modern form of bourgeois reformism. Consideration for the distinctive features of each variety of reformism and the planning of different tactics on this basis to deal with the different reformist currents will make the struggle against them more successful.

TWONOTES

1. "Politicheskaya sistema obshchestva v Latinskoy Amerike" [The Political System of Society in Latin America], Moscow, 1982, p 110.
2. Several researchers of Brazilian legislation consider the corporate principle to be fascist and use this as an argument to prove that the Brazilian regime is of a fascist nature. The basis of these allegations is the fact that G. Vargas borrowed the corporate principle from B. Mussolini's "Labor Charter." In fact, it was first used in the labor movement by the founder of American reformism, S. Gompers, and only later made its way into the "Labor Charter" and CIL.

3. R. M. B. de Araujo, "O batismo do trabalho. A experiencia de Lindolfo Collor," Rio de Janeiro, 1981, p 89.
4. "Conjuntura nacional: III ciclo de debates do teatro Casa Grande," Petropolis, 1979, p 248.
5. LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Riverside, California, 1976, No 1, p 40.
6. S. Romualdi, "Presidents and Peons. Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America," N.Y., 1967, p 417.
7. M. Arruda, H. de Souza and C. Afonso, "Las empresas transnacionales y el Brasil," Mexico, 1978, p 52.
8. REVISTA MEXICANA DE SOCIOLOGIA, Mexico, 1976, No 4, pp 890-891.
9. V. L. B. Ferrante, "FGTS: ideologia e repressao," Sao Paulo, 1978, p 377.
10. Ibid., p 375.
11. INDUSTRIA E PRODUTIVIDADE, Rio de Janeiro, 1978, No 127, p 5.
12. M. H. Simonsen, "Brasil 2001," Rio de Janeiro, 1969, p 261.
13. L. M. Rodrigues, "Conflito industrial e sindicalismo no Brasil," Sao Paulo, 1966, pp 41-42.
14. O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 29 September 1979.
15. L. M. Rodrigues, Op. cit., p 29.
16. O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 3 February 1980.
17. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 11, p 426.
18. O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 1 January 1978; 13 March 1980; 3 March 1981; 16 October 1982.
19. INDUSTRIA E PRODUTIVIDADE, 1981, No 144, p 21.
20. AMERIQUE LATINE, Paris, 1982, No 10, p 69.
21. "Conjuntura nacional," p 258.
22. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 20, p 306.
23. MOVIMENTO, Sao Paulo, 5 October 1981.
24. EL DIA, Mexico, 8 July 1981.
25. MOVIMENTO, 25 October 1981.

26. MUNDO LATINOAMERICANO, Mexico, 22 February 1981.

27. DIALOGO SCCIAL, Panama, 1982, No 150, p 40.

28. O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 6 January 1981.

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'PROGRESSIVE' MEXICAN JOURNAL OF REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY PRAISED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 84 (signed to press 13 Apr 84)
pp 62-74

[Article by L. S. Poskonina: "The Latest Trends in the Evolution of Mexican Capitalism (According to Reports in ESTRATEGIA Magazine)"]

[Excerpts] The influence of Marxist-Leninist ideas on the ideological climate in Latin America is clearly reflected in works by progressive social scientists. It is clear from the position taken in the second half of the 1970's and the early 1980's by the continent's prominent representatives of democratic social thought. Progressive economists, sociologists and political scientists, as Latin American communists have pointed out, made a great contribution to the study of major Latin American problems.* In recent years, as a result of the broader use of Marxist methodology, they have successfully researched the problems of imperialism and dependence and questions connected with general trends and specific national tendencies in the development of capitalism in the countries of this region, the nature of social processes in Latin America and the distinctive features of these processes.

An analysis of the ideological position occupied by the group of Mexican progressive scientists who write for ESTRATEGIA magazine is of interest in this context. Articles in this magazine examine a broad range of questions about the nature and contradictions of Mexican capitalism, the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement, the role of the working class and its allies in the anti-imperialist and antimonopoly struggle, the significance of the broad anti-imperialist front and of the proletarian party and its programs, the role of the USSR and the socialist countries in the world revolutionary process, the struggle against bourgeois-nationalist and petty bourgeois theories and against anticommunism, and many other subjects.

The members of the publication's editorial board are Mexican scientists who are well known in their own country and abroad--Alonso Aguilar, Fernando Carmona, Jorge Carrion, Rufino Perdomo and Ignacio Aguirre. The magazine was first published in 1975. Proceeding from Lenin's statement that there can be no revolutionary movement without a theory of revolution, ESTRATEGIA's organizers

* O. Millas, "Debemos profundizar el analisis de las economias de America Latina," ESTUDIOS, Rome, 1981, No 79, p 61.

resolved to work out the kind of political line, strategy and tactics for the revolutionary movement that would, in their opinion, make progress toward socialism possible.

The anti-imperialist and class struggle, the Mexican scientists stress, requires a high level of political awareness and self-discipline from the laboring masses and a thorough knowledge of the realities of national life. This is why the magazine editors have concentrated primarily on the study of Mexico's socioeconomic structure and of the latest trends in the development of capitalism, which is an essential prerequisite for the engineering of a revolutionary program, strategy and tactics. Analyses of the driving forces of the revolutionary process, and particularly the role of the working class and its allies in this process, are also a top priority. The unification of all leftist Mexican forces in a struggle against exploitation and poverty and for socialist reforms has been declared the purpose of the theorizing of the magazine staff.

ESTRATEGIA also feels obligated to publicize the theories of the revolutionary movement. For example, the first issues of the journal had a regular section entitled "Deviations from Revolutionary Struggle," in which such phenomena as reformism (1975, No 1), sectarianism (1975, No 2), terrorism (1975, No 3), adventurism (1975, No 5) and economism (1975, No 6) were explained. Mexican analysts have stressed the importance of Marxist methodology in analyses of socioeconomic and political processes on the global level and on the national level. Mexico serves as a specific example in the latter case. A. Aguilar states that Marxism-Leninism is not a "magic formula" or "holy scripture," but a social theory that must be applied creatively to the analysis of real events. He attempts to disclose and reveal the particular significance of the laws of dialectical materialism in an understanding of the development of Mexican society and capitalism today.* In discussions of the present era, the international situation and the balance of power in the world arena, ESTRATEGIA's authors proceed from the belief that the main contradiction of the present day is the conflict between capitalism and socialism.

Discussions of revolutionary theory and the strategy and tactics of the workers movement, based on the creative use of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, represent an important part of the theoretical studies of Mexican analysts. They substantiate the thesis regarding the hegemony of the proletariat in the struggle for democracy and socialism, pointing out the need for a broad anti-imperialist front. They view a working class alliance with the peasantry as the main link of this front. In their declaration of the strategic slogan of struggle for socialism, ESTRATEGIA's authors place a high value on the worldwide historic significance of the achievements of real socialism.

* A. Aguilar, "El Problema de las fases en la lucha por el poder," ESTRATEGIA, Mexico, 1976, No 8, p 29; A. Aguilar, "Unidad, alianza y lucha de clases," ESTRATEGIA, 1977, No 13, p 70; A. Aguilar, "Algunas contradicciones del proceso de acumulacion de capital," ESTRATEGIA, 1975, No 4, p 44.

The great scientific and political value and the productivity of the theoretical studies discussed above are indisputable. New trends, which could be described as the evolution of the views of a large and influential group of progressive scientists in the direction of the Marxist analysis of fundamental regional issues, are apparent in Latin American democratic social thought.

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NATIONAL

ROLE OF COLLECTIVITY IN WORK OF PARTY ORGANS ASSESSED

Moscow SOVETY NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 22 Mar 84) pp 10-17

[Article by A. Sliva, candidate of legal sciences: "The Leninist Principle of Collectivity"]

[Text] One of the key ideas, and, in actuality, one of the invariably burning ones, of V. I. Lenin concerning the soviets is the principle concerning the combination in their activity of the principles of collectivity and individual responsibility. The practice of state organization provides a brilliant example of the efficient implementation of this principle. In regard to the discussion of this principle during the first years of the Soviet authority, V. I. Lenin emphasized, "The chief and immediate slogan now is the slogan precisely of practicality and precisely of efficiency" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 159). The Party's 26th Congress and the subsequent plenums of the CPSU emphasized with particular force the creative potential of society as a whole, and the tremendously increasing importance of discipline and personal responsibility. And that pertains especially to the responsibility of the economic, soviet, and party leaders.

The question of collectivity in the work of the state agencies is inseparably linked with the very essence of our state and with its class nature. V. I. Lenin emphasized that decisive instructions for the cause of the building of socialism can be provided only by collective experience, and for this purpose it is insufficient to have the experience of those upper strata that made history both in the land-holding society and in capitalist society. "We cannot do it like this," he said, "precisely because we are counting on joint experience, on the experience of millions of workers" (Ibid., Vol 36, p 380). The Communist Party invariably follows that Leninist behest, taking all steps to support and develop the collectivistic spirit that predominates in our society.

The Leninist principle of collectivity penetrates the entire activity of the soviets. Its consistent and correct application creates the prerequisites for making the correct decisions that are free of subjectivism and that take into consideration the present-day level of scientific knowledge and advanced technology. "Without discussion," stated V. I. Lenin, "the conscious workers will never resolve an important question" (Ibid., Vol 13, p 193).

V. I. Lenin developed the basic demands made on the collective work of the state agencies. We have in mind, first of all, the fact that any such organ in its qualitative makeup, must be truly a working agency, and it must unite highly competent people. V. I. Lenin uncompromisingly spoke out against the "ignorant spirit of an anti-specialist attitude" in joint institutions. He required the strictest observance of the democratic norms and traditions of joint work. Every member of a joint agency must possess the opportunity to participate in the preparation of questions, to receive the necessary materials, and to express himself during the discussion period, and, if necessary, even to state his own opinion. V. I. Lenin sharply protested against the possible replacement of a joint agency by its leader, and served as a personal example in this regard.

But V. I. Lenin clearly saw, and required the observance of, the limits of joint action. He pointed out that joint action is necessary for the discussion of the basic questions. Otherwise it becomes a formality and begins to hinder the job at hand. V. I. Lenin emphasized the special importance of the strict separation of two democratic categories: on the one hand, discussions, the holding of meetings, and, on the other hand, the establishment of the strictest responsibility for the executive functions. The many years of practice that have been gained by the soviets have tested and confirmed the Leninist idea that socialist democracy in no way contradicts individual management. Individual management guarantees the best use of human capabilities and real, rather than verbal, verification of the work and helps to make it quicker and more precise. Responsibility must be established, V. I. Lenin pointed out, for the executive functions, for each work sector, for a precisely defined job, for leadership within a definite time interval, and for the fulfillment of clearly and unambiguously delineated assignments and practical operations.

The question of the responsibility borne by the individual manager is inseparably linked with the granting of the necessary powers to each leader. Order is created primarily by the unity of his will. Discipline during labor can be guaranteed only if there is subordination, and implicit subordination at that, to the orders issued by the Soviet leaders. Therefore "the practical management of an institution, management, job, or task," V. I. Lenin wrote, "must be assigned to one comrade who is known to be firm, decisive, bold, and able to carry out the practical job, and who enjoys the greatest trust" (Ibid., Vol 39, pp 45-46).

Lenin ideas concerning the combination of collectivity and the responsibility of the individual manager received their reflection and reinforcement in many party documents and enactments of state agencies. In them one can discern the tendency toward the increase in the efficiency of joint institutions, toward the intensification of the responsibility borne by each deputy, each worker in the soviet apparatus for the execution of the plans and decisions. As far back as the decree of the Party's 9th Congress it was clearly stated, "Collective action, insofar as it occurs in the process of discussion or resolution, must unconditionally yield its place to individual management in the process of execution. The development of this tendency manifested itself clearly in the 1977 USSR Constitution, in the new management in the

process of execution." The development of this tendency constitutions of the union and autonomous republics, and in the current legislation concerning the soviets.

The Basic Law of the USSR, for the first time, proclaimed at such a high level the collective, free, efficient discussion and resolution of questions as a most important principle of the activity of agencies of state authority. The guaranteeing of collective action in the work of the Soviets is served by the constitutional norms concerning the bringing up of the most important questions in state life for discussion by the entire nation, for discussion by the citizens within the confines of the republics and the administrative-territorial units, and concerning the possibility of the enactment of laws by nationwide or popular voting (referendum). Collectivistic principles are guaranteed by the constitutional rights of the citizens to unite into social organizations, to participate through those organizations and labor collectives, as well as individually in the administration of state and public affairs. Norms that are directly aimed at guaranteeing collective action in the activities of the soviets are the norms that pertain to their being accountable to the nation, to publicity, and to the broad involvement of the citizens and the taking into consideration of public opinion in their work. It can be said that the collectivistic principle permeates the entire USSR Constitution.

A new impetus for developing the collectivistic principles in the work of the soviets and their agencies is provided by the USSR Law Governing Labor Collectives, which was enacted in June 1983. The use by the soviets of the potential capabilities embodied in that law has only just begun. As has been noted in Party documents, the carrying out of the collective rights and obligations of the workers is the mainspring of social progress under socialism. The taking of all steps to guarantee them is an important task of the agencies of state authority.

The development of the new legislation was directed at increasing the effectiveness of all the basic joint forms of work in the soviets. This pertains first of all to the sessions of the soviets, at which, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, the most important questions must be considered and resolved. Thus, republic-level enactments specify in a concrete manner the deadlines for consideration by state and public agencies and by officials of the recommendations and comments of the deputies which are brought up at the sessions of the soviets. For example, the Regulation of the ESSR Supreme Soviet defines for this purpose a one-month deadline; and the law governing the oblast soviet in Belorussian SSR, two weeks. This recognizes the importance of each worthwhile idea that the deputy makes as a member of a joint agency.

There has also been an intensification of the legislative guarantees of the collective work performed by the permanent commissions of the soviets. The consideration of the recommendations of the commissions has become a constitutional obligation of the state and public agencies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations. In the statutes concerning the commissions, they are granted the right of inquiry at the sessions of the appropriate soviet, and there is a precise definition of the quorum for meetings and for

the making of decisions. Reflection of the practice of recent years was provided by the norms governing the cooperation between the permanent commissions, on the one hand, and the agencies of people's control, labor collectives, and public organizations, on the other. The Statute Governing the Permanent Commissions of the Local Soviets of the RSFSR, which was adopted in 1983, for example, established that the commissions can also conduct their meetings during the time when the soviet is conducting sessions. The practical assimilation of this right of the commissions for most of the soviets is a long-term task. For the time being, not much experience has been accumulated.

One can discern a tendency toward the intensification of the guarantees of the activity of the executive committees of the local soviets as joint agencies of deputies. The current legislation firmly establishes the new questions that can be resolved by the executive committees only by joint action. Preparatory, deliberative, and consultative forms of joint work in the soviets and their agencies are also developing. The practice of forming temporary commissions of soviets, and permanent and temporary commissions of presidiums of supreme soviets has been legalized everywhere. In the departments and administrations of the executive committees of the kray and oblast soviets, provision is made for the opportunity to create boards, the decisions of which are implemented, as a rule, by the orders issued by their leaders. There has been an expansion of the practice of forming various public councils (city-building, technical-economic, medical, etc.) that are formed under the departments and administrations of the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets. All this attests to the striving to elevate the joint principles -- to use Lenin's words -- to a system of organization.

Another question that is inseparably linked with the legislative guaranteeing of the effectiveness of joint work is the question of the legal guarantees of the responsibility borne by the individual manager. The USSR Constitution characterizes our developed socialist society as a society with the highest level of organization, and it establishes the principle of the responsibility that is borne by each state agency and each official for the assigned job. The statutes governing the permanent commissions of the soviets, which statutes were recently enacted, have defined in more detail the obligations and rights of the deputies -- chairmen, secretaries, and members of commissions. The union-level act and republic-level acts governing the mandates of the voters, while giving in detail the general legislative norms, establish the individual obligation borne by the deputy -- his obligation to participate in organizing the public and the labor collectives to execute the mandates, and in supervising their realization, and his obligation to strive for the implementation of the mandates.

The legislation of a number of republics contains norms governing the basic functions of the chairmen and secretaries of executive committees. The individual responsibility of the Soviet managers for the consideration of the citizens' suggestions, statements, and complaints has been established. At the same time, as is attested by the practical workers themselves, the opportunities for the more precise establishment of the powers granted to and the responsibility borne by the officials in the Soviet apparatus have by no means been exhausted in the laws and governmental enactments. In this regard

it is not excessive to recall that V. I. Lenin, while attaching tremendous importance to this question, even wrote about "the law of individual responsibility" (Ibid., Vol 53, p 90). For example, a question that requires a more precise resolution is the question of the functions and responsibility of the deputy chairmen, as well as other persons who are part of the makeup of the executive committee. The discussion that is being conducted on this topic in SOVETY NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV magazine confirms this convincingly.

To prove the need for specifically this kind of resolution of the question, one can give the following argument. The laws governing the Councils of Ministers contain a special article about the functions of the chairmen of the governments and their deputies. And yet similar norms for the leaders of the executive committees do not exist in most of the laws governing the local Soviets. They also fail to contain any instructions about establishing the personal responsibility of the members of the executive committee. Yet everyone knows V. I. Lenin's point of view on this score: "It is necessary to appoint to each sector one executive committee member who is personally responsible for the execution. . ." (Ibid., Vol 50, p 350).

It is completely obvious that legislative measures alone are insufficient for assuring the complete carrying out in practice of the Leninist ideas concerning the collectivity of management. A large amount of organizing work is also necessary. And it is not by chance that at the 26th CPSU Congress mention was made of the need to convert every session, every meeting of a permanent commission into a true council of people, into a collective search for the most correct decisions. Movement in precisely this direction is becoming more noticeable. Many Soviets are successfully carrying out their economic powers and are effectively resolving questions of assuring the comprehensive economic and social development of the territories. They have joined the struggle to increase the organizational spirit and discipline and to assure the proper order in all spheres of life. After the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee these questions were the subject of consideration and practical resolution in all Soviet agencies. In 1983 the number of people's deputies at sessions was greater than it had been previously, well-substantiated recommendations and comments were expressed, and the demand made upon the subordinate agencies and officials became stricter.

There has been a constant improvement in the long-range planning of the work of the Soviets and their agencies. The selection of the questions that require a truly joint decision is being guaranteed more consistently. For example, the comprehensive plan for the work of the Brest City Council and its agencies for 1983 planned for consideration at each session, at each meeting of the executive committee, as a rule, no more than two basic questions. The circle of these questions encompassed many of the very important aspects of the life of the city residents. The careful, weighed planning of the work, the determination of the optimal number of questions, were simultaneously the pledge of the well thought-out, thorough preparation of the matters that had been planned for consideration. A considerable number of questions that have been included in the plan and have been resolved at the sessions and meetings of the executive committee touched upon the everyday life of the city

residents, trade, and public nutrition. Constant monitoring of the execution of what had been planned was provided for.

This approach to the organization of the job at hand is directly linked with the fact that Brest occupies one of the leading places with regard to the services provided to the public.

Here is another example that characterizes the accuracy of the approach to the determination of the "limits of joint action." For questions that are linked with the organization of the work to be performed by the apparatus of the executive committee, and with the carrying out of decisions that have been made previously, the executive committee of the Moscow City Soviet issues operational orders. Specific days of the week for meetings of the executive committee and its presidium have been defined. Meetings with the managers of city and rayon Soviet agencies can be held only with the authorization of the administrators of the city executive committee. The increase in the organizational spirit and efficiency is promoted by the single calendrical plans that are drawn up on the scale of the city and rayon. This practice completely conforms to the party's requirements concerning the reduction of the number of sessions and meetings, especially for questions that do not require joint discussion.

It is well known that many meetings conducted at the local Soviet agencies are frequently duplicated both with regard to the makeup of the participants, and with regard to the subjects that are discussed, and the efficiency of those meetings is not very high. This has been a chronic disease. The medicine to cure it was suggested many years ago by V. I. Lenin. He posed the question in a direct manner: "What are our meetings and commissions, anyway? Very often, it's only a game." And he called for the "fight against the disgraceful abundance of commissions. . ." (Ibid., Vol 44, p 366; Vol 45, p 15).

How can one do this in the practical situation? We would like to cite the experience of Estonian SSR. The republic's Council of Ministers, having studied the question and having taken into consideration the recommendations coming in from the outlying districts, issued a decree that eliminated 26 commissions attached to the rayon and city executive committees, departments, administrations, and other agencies. Simultaneously the single document defined the list of commissions that were to be preserved and to be combined. The rule was established that the new commissions under the executive committees can be created basically in the instances that have been stipulated by the decisions of the superior agencies. And there is one more thing that is important: the persons who can be confirmed as chairmen of the commissions are not only the leaders of the executive committees, but also the members. As has been shown by practical life, the situation has not suffered from this. The local Soviet workers in the republic make recommendations concerning the further reduction and further efficiency of the commission work in the executive committees.

The work of many of the local soviets is characterized by the attempt to make the meetings of the executive committees as efficient as possible. For that purpose the optimal time periods for the preparation of the questions and the time to be allotted to the speakers and to those participating in the

discussion of the report have been established. The basic conditions are defined for draft versions of decisions: they must include an analysis of the question, an indication of the reason for the shortcomings, a precise formulation of the specific steps for improving the situation, a mandatory consideration of the execution of the decisions that were previously made, and an indication of the deadlines for execution and the individuals who are personally responsible. Many executive committees have begun to regulate strictly the maximum volume of a draft version of decisions, and the procedure for making the participants in the meeting previously acquainted with the draft version and other materials. There has been an expansion of the practice of making joint decisions at the executive committees of the local Soviets and the boards of ministries and departments. These acts are extremely promising ones, inasmuch as they reflect a real combination of the territorial and branch principles in management.

The development of legislative and organizational practice in the direction of the increase in the effectiveness of joint and individual forms in the work of the Soviets is indisputable. However, it would be incorrect to feel that there are no unresolved problems or shortcomings here. Wherever a deputy or an associate in the soviet apparatus works -- whether it is done individually or as part of a joint agency -- the main factor lies in the initiatory, creative, and responsible fulfillment by that individual of his personal tasks and duties. That is how the question is posed at the CPSU Central Committee also, as it directs the soviets toward the unconditional fulfillment of all the tasks that are confronting them.

One of the main problems is the increase in the efficiency of the session work. It is well known that at the sessions the deputies must consider and resolve very important state matters, and that any session is primarily the work of each of its participants. Unfortunately, at times one can observe a different situation. Certain meetings of deputies are typified by completely unjustified pomp. One is disturbed, for example, by the following fact. Studies of the session activity of a number of soviets have shown that at the sessions there has been an increase in the proportion of the questions for which there has been no open debate. In particular, it is very infrequent for the deputies to speak on organizational questions, although the need for discussing them exists.

A shortcoming of many sessions is their excessive state of organization, the lack of comparison of opinions, the lack of a collective search for the best decisions. In by no means all instances do the reports give the necessary tone to the joint work of the deputies. Many of the reports are excessively long and contain a mass of unnecessary, general information, although it is the task of the report to raise specific questions for collective discussion, and to direct the deputies toward that. It is clear that the report and the statements that follow it must be prepared ahead of time, and their interrelationship is inseparable. However, it often happens that the person giving the report and those who make statements following it prepare for the session independently of one another, and therefore they talk about different things. Are we really to consider it to be a reliable practice when the person giving the report declines to take the closing word even in those

instances when a large number of deputy's remarks and recommendations have been expressed with regard to his report?

Considerable reserves for increasing the efficiency of the collective work are linked with the statements made by deputies at the session. There are a large number of examples of good, constructive statements. But there are also a large number of instances of another kind. Typical shortcomings of the statements are the abundance of general words concerning the importance of the question; reports and discussions of successes achieved by collectives, which have nothing to do with the agenda; reports on personal achievements by the persons making the statements; the repetition of the main points made in the report and in other statements; the lack of any well-substantiated critical comments and recommendations. And people characterize this practice correctly when they say that, yes, people made statements at the session, but there wasn't any discussion.

What serves as a sign of the sluggishness in the discussions at sessions is, in many instances, the lack of any repeated statements by deputies, which statements, it might be apropos to say, have been provided for in the regulations. And yet it is in the comparison of opinions, in the struggle for them, that truth is born and the most correct decision is made. Without debate, dispute, or the struggle of opinions, V. I. Lenin wrote, no movement is possible. Developing this Leninist idea, the 26th CPSU Congress remarked that the comparison of opinions, frank and well-principled criticism, and the increase in the social and political participation of each citizen, constitute the essence of Soviet democracy, of working, effective democracy.

An analysis of practical life attests to the weak use by the deputies also of a number of other rights at sessions. Let us take, for example, the right of the deputy's inquiry. Statistical data for the past five years indicate that, on the average, there are annually no more than one or two inquiries per Soviet. In 1982 the deputies made 7510 fewer inquiries than in 1981. For example, only 26 inquiries came in from the deputies to the local Soviets in Latvian SSSR, of whom there are more than 23,000. Most of the inquiries are addressed to the managers of economic organizations, enterprises, and institutions, and only an insignificant number of them are addressed to the executive committees or other state agencies. Obviously, the deputy's inquiry is not an end in itself. It is needed for improving the job at hand and for ensuring effective supervision over the state agencies and officials. But the number of problems and shortcomings the overcoming of which requires the use also of the deputy's inquiry is rather large.

Much depends upon how the management of the session is being carried out and upon the efficiency of its chairman. As a rule, the persons who are elected to be session chairmen are persons with rich experience in organizational activity. At the same time there are very rare instances when they fight against idle talk, or require -- tactfully but persistently -- that the speaker talk not in generalities, but keep to the question that has been included on the agenda. In the regulations that govern the Soviets, the functions of the presiding officer receive increasingly detailed confirmation. That is good. At the same time, in by no means all instances is his chief

duty emphasized: the guaranteeing of the collective, free, and, most importantly, businesslike discussion.

All this leads to the making of imprecise decisions, which can scarcely serve as programs for actions. Here is a typical example. In March 1983 a session of the Mytishi City Soviet, Moscow Oblast, considered the question of the work of the executive committee. We might note that the executive committee has had both successes and shortcomings. The deputies adopted a decision running to more than 12 pages of printed text, containing 18 paragraphs of items that the executive decreed. Literally each one of them contains formulations of the type "increase the activity rate in the work," "devote attention," "increase the effectiveness," "guarantee supervision," "resolve in a time-responsive manner," etc. But the decision did not mention even a single official who would be given the personal responsibility of executing the assignments! Moreover, in the report of the executive committee one can read the following: "A considerable number of the executive committee's decisions and orders and the assignments indicated it them are executed later than the established deadlines and in incomplete volume. In certain departments and administrations the situation with regard to the supervision and checking of execution continues to be at a low level." Collectivity of this type, to use Lenin's words, is a tremendous waste of efforts and fails to satisfy the demands of rapidity and time-responsiveness in work.

Meetings of many permanent commissions of the soviets are of a truly businesslike nature. For the most part, many of the recommendations accepted by them are concrete and completely feasible, and this, incidentally, is promoted by the involvement of specialists in working them out. However, the efficient recommendations of the commissions are not always followed by the most important thing -- their complete implementation in practical life, the improvement of the work in a particular sector. That occurs whenever there is a lack of the proper daily supervision over the fulfillment of the recommendations both by the commissions themselves, and by the executive committees and their apparatus. A question that is of vital importance in this regard is the question of the time for the meetings of the permanent commissions. Is it possible that too many of them are being timed to occur only at the same time as the sessions of the soviets? (We are speaking not about those meetings that are conducted during the session and that constitute a part of the session work itself, but, rather, about those that are conducted either before the session or immediately after it, and are not linked with the agenda for the deputy forum.) Of course, meetings like this are also possible and their benefit has been confirmed by practice. But if all the meetings or the majority of them are like this, then does this not reduce the highly important independent role of the commissions, or their importance as agencies that guarantee the continuity of the work of the soviets?

Reserves exist for increasing the efficiency also in the work of the executive committees. There has already been an overloading of the agenda for the meetings of the executive committees, especially in the soviets at the higher echelons, where each meeting sometimes has to deal with not just one dozen questions. One still encounters a large number of instances of the making of repeated decisions, when the preceding ones have not been fulfilled. During the past three years, for example, the Karaganda Oblast Executive Committee

adopted approximately 200 decisions dealing with questions of construction. However the extensive program that was planned proved to be unfulfilled. The abundance of questions on the agenda precludes the possibility of their efficient consideration and resolution. We might recall how mercilessly V. I. Lenin ridiculed this practice. "Haven't you been in a situation," he said, "when after completing an agenda on which you have taken care of dozens of questions, you have not only said that you would be glad to drown yourself, or even something worse?" (Ibid., Vol 42, p 166).

One of the means of avoiding this practice is to choose the most correct level for the resolution of the question: to prepare it for a session, for a meeting of the executive committee, or its presidium, or to recommend it to the commission, a conference, etc. And, obviously, whenever it is possible to do this, to resolve the question independently. Lenin's principle here is also clear-cut: don't bring up every petty detail to the board, but decide things for yourself, and be responsible for them. Obviously, it is simultaneously necessary to note also the inadmissibility of allowing the executive committee to be replaced by one of its leaders.

Another important task is the task of increasing the individual responsibility borne by the deputy in the electoral district. We shall touch upon this question only as it pertains to the activity of the deputy groups. This form of joint deputy work among the population and in the labor collectives has been broadly disseminated. Many good deeds done by the groups are well known. Much here depends upon the organization of the work in the collective itself, upon the degree of precision with which the planning is organized, the degree of efficiency in conducting the meetings, and the concreteness of the instructions given to the members of the group. The most important thing is for the groups to be aimed at the tasks that require specifically the unification of efforts. For example, there are in existence a rather large number of mandates of the voters that were given simultaneously to many deputies. But we also know of another situation: the activity of the deputy as part of a group sometimes covers over his nonfulfillment of other, individual duties.

The deputy's powers and responsibility are clearly defined in the law. They are strictly individualized irrespective of where the deputy works: in the soviet, an agency of the soviet, or among the population. Therefore one cannot consider to be proper the practice of the collective reports by deputies or especially the attempts to substantiate the need for them by referring to special conditions. Group reports have a detrimental effect upon the interrelationships between the deputy and his voters, and reduce the number of participants in the report meetings. The group, as well as the executive committee, can and must help the deputy in preparing and conducting the report, but he must give that report only personally. We might recall Lenin's word to the effect that the members of representative agencies "... must work themselves, must execute their laws themselves, must check themselves to see what is happening in life, must be directly responsible themselves to their voters" (Ibid., Vol 33, p 48).

This Leninist idea is completely embodied in the USSR Constitution. Article 107 of that Constitution contains a clear formula stating that the deputy --

and we emphasize that it is the deputy, rather than the deputies -- is obliged to give a report about his work and the work of the soviet to the voters, as well as to the collectives and public organizations that have nominated him as a deputy. We can state flatly: a group report is a violation of the requirement stated in the Basic Law [USSR Constitution].

The strength of the soviets is in the party guidance of them. The CPSU, following the behests of V. I. Lenin, the 114th anniversary of whose birth we are marking this month, develops the democratic principles, confirms them more and more deeply in all spheres of our life, including the activity of the soviets, and maintains the high spirits of the agencies of authority in carrying out the practical deeds. In the further development of this work style of the soviets of people's deputies lies the true pledge of their successful activity.

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